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A b s t r A C t
Urban entrepreneurialism and intensive inter-city competition prevails in post-reform 
China, which has been extensively documented in the literature. However, 
decentralisation is not the overall characterisation of China’s changing central-local 
relationship since 1978. The aim of this research is to present various types of 
‘regionalisation’ initiatives and examine the development of regional governance in 
China With reference to the Western theoretical perspective of state spatiality, state 
rescaling and politics of scale, this study develops a research framework to examine 
the changing scale o f governance and explore the engagement and motivations of 
different actors. In this study, after an overall examination of recent regional practices 
in China, Yangtze River Delta (YRD) is treated as a laboratory to investigate the 
dynamics and politics around the building of regional governance. In addition to a 
large amount of relevant material and publications on regional policies, regional plans, 
administrative changes and collaborative practices, semi-structured interviews with 
involved academics, planning professionals and government officials are conducted to 
investigate the actual transformation process of regional governance.
Since the mid 2000s, the economic development and agglomeration in the YRD has 
created more scope, as well as a need for collaboration. It seems regional 
collaboration is valued and driven by both central and local government. Nevertheless, 
in terms of institutional arrangements, there has been no formal regional institution or 
informal regional coalition thus far. Moreover, both the bottom-up and the top-down 
regional governance initiatives lack substantial participation and multilateral 
negotiation between cities. There are essentially two different readings of the rationale
of regional governance. While the bottom-up collaborative development is envisioned 
by the local entrepreneurial government to use regional competitiveness to promote 
local development, the top-down national and regional agenda is used by the central 
government to tackle discretionary local development. Therefore, the emerging 
regional governance in the YRD is hybrid and complicated. The building of regional 
governance in China is contested by complex inter-governmental politics, especially 
the division of central-local power and responsibility.
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C h A p t e r  o n e
in t r o d u C t io n
1.1 Research background
China used to be a socialist country trying to achieve regional egalitarianism. The 
pattern and the cause of regional inequalities at national, inter- and intra-provincial 
levels constituted the key concerns of regional studies of China until the late 1990s 
(e.g. Cannon, 1990; Fan, 1992; Wei, 1996; Wei and Ma, 1996; Wei, 1999; Wei and 
Fan, 2000). However, economic reform marked the failure of the centrally-planned 
economy and regional policies, and the downscaling of state policies and governance 
towards the urban level (Wu and Zhang, 2010: 60). As a result of economic 
decentralisation, localities have become substantial decision making bodies which 
depend on their own revenue. Substantial fiscal decentralisation has thus triggered the 
rise of urban entrepreneurialism. Subsequently, urban studies have enjoyed a boom in 
China, with a particular focus on the extraordinary urban (re-)development and 
changing urban governance (e.g. He et al., 2006; He and Wu, 2005; Ma, 2002; Wu, 
2002; Wu et al., 2007). It is well documented that, on the one hand, prevailing urban 
entrepreneurialism has turned out to be a strong driving force for the local economy; 
on the other hand, entrepreneurialism has also exacerbated inter-locality competition 
and regional inequality (e.g. Chien, 2007; Chien and Gordon, 2008).
Since the mid 2000s, regional studies have re-proliferated within China, with a
l
volume of monographs and literature calling for inter-city cooperation and 
coordinated regional development, especially within the YRD (e.g. Hong, 2009; Ji et 
al., 2006; Tao, 2007; Wang, 2008; Wang, 2009; Zhang et al., 2007; Zong, 2008). 
Moreover, inter-locality cooperation has even become popular discourse for 
government leadership. For instance, the promotion of coordinated regional 
development is considered to be one of the indispensable aspects of the new keynote 
concept of ‘harmonious development’ (Fan, 2006). The heated discussion within 
governments on regional cooperation and regional coordinated development has 
demonstrated, to some extent, the trend of changing scale of governance in current 
China. However, the existing regional governance research in China is eager to learn 
the purported appropriate institutional design from Western experiences in order to 
promote inter-city cooperation in China. It is simply believed that a proper 
institutional and policy design would just reverse the path to entrepreneurialism or 
alleviate the downsides of entrepreneurial governance. It is commented that the 
understanding of regional governance in China as a problem caused by a lack of 
inter-govemmental communication and coordination is just too simplistic (Wu and 
Zhang, 2010: 60).
The new phenomenon of changing regional governance has also recently begun to 
catch the attention of overseas researchers. Ma (2005) investigated the changing urban 
and regional governance through the adjustment of administrative boundaries and 
hierarchies. Jiang Xu and Anthony G. O Yeh conducted a major study based on the 
experience of the Pearl River Delta area (e.g. Xu, 2008; Xu and Yeh, 2010, 2011; Yeh 
and Xu, 2008, 2011). Although Xu and Yeh’s work has provided a profound view of 
the nature of emerging regional governance practices in China, the nascent trend in
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regional governance has not yet been fully researched, especially in terms of the 
dynamics and politics around the development. This research, therefore, attempts to 
investigate the different agents in the building of regional governance, and their 
respective motivation. The examination is conducted with special reference to the 
Yangtze River Delta (YRD). The selection of the YRD region as an empirical study 
area is based on the following considerations. First of all, the recent emergence of a 
large number of Chinese-language studies on the governance of the YRD has 
demonstrated the discursive development of regional governance in the area. However, 
few studies have been conducted in the area in the English language. Secondly, the 
development of regional governance in the YRD can be dated back to before 
economic reform, which is much longer than the history of development in the PRD. 
Furthermore, regional governance in the YRD involves different provincial actors; 
thus, it is more complex than that of the PRD. Moreover, the experience of the PRD is 
not as typical as that of the YRD, since the PRD region is administered under one 
provincial jurisdiction. Finally, great importance has been attached to the governance 
of the region by the central government, which is represented by the issue of the YRD 
regional plan and policies by the central state. In contrast, the attitude of the central 
government to the PRD regional governance attempt is not very clear (Wu and Zhang, 
2010: 63). In other words, central intervention in the PRD development has barely 
been witnessed so far. Therefore, the case of the YRD offers a good opportunity to 
explore the trajectory of regional governance development, the diverse agents 
throughout the process and their inter-relationship.
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1.2 A im s o f  th is research
The first aim of this research is to highlight the direction of China’s changing 
governance beyond the well-known and well-documented downscaling of governance 
towards urban entrepreneurialism. This study aims to call attention to the 
re-emergence of regional scale in contemporary governance operations and policy 
delivery in China. Secondly, it attempts to explain the recent transformation through 
state theory and the strategic-relational approach. Moreover, it aims to understand the 
links between changing state strategy, the transformation of urban and regional 
governance, and the major outcome of urban and regional development. The political 
economy approach is crucial to provide a comprehensive and critical account of 
regional re-ascendance in contemporary China. Thirdly, the research focuses on an 
examination of the on-the-ground development of regional governance in China. The 
focus on the ‘existing regional governance’ shows the researcher’s interest in the 
process of governance building, which resonates with the call for a process-based and 
contextualised approach to compensate for abstract regulation theory and the general 
‘paradigm shift’ hypothesis (e.g. MacLeod, 2001a, b).
1.3 O rgan isa tion  o f  the th esis
The thesis consists of eight chapters. After the introductory chapter, Chapter two 
attempts to understand the political economies of regions and regional development 
through reviewing the recent research debate on the rise of ‘new regionalism’. Firstly, 
the key conceptual debate on city-regions and new regionalism is reviewed. Then, a 
debate on political regionalism in particular is reviewed, covering a range of topics
from the relational or territorial approach to regional mapping, the role of the state to 
regional development and state restructuring. These existing discussions are 
indispensable if a well-informed theoretical stance for this research project is to be 
developed. The chapter then reviews the key theoretical perspective adopted by this 
research, i.e. the existing literature on ‘new state spaces’. Finally, contemporary 
Chinese and international regional literature is reviewed to suggest the current gap 
between China and the West in terms of theoretical conceptions and empirical studies. 
The final part also establishes the significance and originality of this research.
Chapter three examines the transformation of regional governance in China by 
looking at the changing state of the central-local relationship, which reflects the 
evolving power structure and shifting regional policies in China since 1949 to the 
present day. The chapter then highlights the recent resurgence of policies and 
programmes articulated at the regional scale; the variety of projects is described in 
detail. It is summarised that the current emerging regional governance in China is 
steered by both central and local government and the fact that these regional 
programmes are very flexible in institutional organisation is confirmed. There is no 
devolution from the national government to the regional scale to insert a formal 
regional agency in the existing administrative structure, nor rescaling of authority 
from the localities towards the regional level. Meanwhile, the conceptual perspective 
of ‘new state spatiality’ is deployed here to provide an understanding of the 
mechanism of China’s changing regional governance and statehood.
Chapter four develops the research framework and methodology for the project. First 
of all, the research questions and hypotheses are raised. Then, a research design is put
forward based on the purpose of the research and the theoretical hypothesis. 
Subsequently, the methods of data collection and data analysis are introduced in detail 
in the latter part of the chapter. Firsthand data, especially in the form of interviews, 
are collected in addition to a large quantity of secondary data including statistics, 
reports, monographs, planning and policy documents etc. Qualitative analysis is the 
main research technique of the study, although methods of quantitative analysis are 
also applied when necessary.
Chapter five sets the background for the study area of the research, i.e. the historical 
development of the Yangtze River Delta in the coastal region, the leading economy in 
China, is introduced. The chapter is divided into three stages, according to the 
changing inter-city economic relationship. Broadly speaking, the chapter is also an 
indispensable part of the thesis which demonstrates that the regional territory is a 
social construct. Admittedly, it is dependent on economic and technological factors, 
but it is not limited to these. The actual development of regions is contextualised in its 
social and political context, and is riddled with conflicts and contradictions. The 
process is fully illustrated in the following two case study chapters.
Chapter six aims to explore local forces with regard to the development of governance 
at the regional scale. For this purpose, the chapter examines the changing 
inter-govemment relationship between Jiangsu and Shanghai. Firstly, an investigation 
is conducted on the rivalry competition between the two jurisdictions, which can be 
perfectly illustrated by the well-known story of ‘173 project fighting Kunshan.’ 
Interviews from both governments, as well as media reports and government 
documents, are quoted to illustrate the contents and motivation of the 173 project
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launched by Shanghai, and the counter-measures taken by the Kunshan government. 
Secondly, an examination of the nascent local cooperation practices at the border of 
the two jurisdictions is carried out. Again, interviews with relevant officials and 
planners from both sides of the governments are quoted to discover why cooperation 
is now preferred by the governments rather than hostile competition, the nature of the 
cooperative projects and the form of the progress and barriers. Finally, the chapter 
evaluates the degree to which cooperation is pursued by local governments in policy 
and practice, and reaches the conclusion that the current inter-locality cooperation 
between Shanghai and Kunshan is actually driven by economic mutual benefit. The 
economic principle triggers local interest in collaborative development, but it also 
limits the scope of collaboration since it is dominated by the economic sphere rather 
than being led by other urgent regional issues such as environment problems. Due to 
the same reason, the cooperation is merely a partnership based on a particular project. 
Governments would rather not put too much effort into institutionalisation, which 
would entail legitimacy and binding power.
Chapter seven attempts to investigate the top-down forces in the development of 
regional governance; this part is conducted through examining the resurgence of 
regional plans in the YRD region, which is currently a major instrument for the 
central government to deliver regional governance. The formation of a regional plan 
for the YRD can be dated back to the early years after economic reform, but it soon 
faded away with the rise of localism. Therefore, the new YRD regional plan, the first 
since the decades after economic reform, can be read as the reassertion of central 
intervention in local development. Interviews with officials, academics and planners 
who are involved in or are informed by the plan-making process are quoted in order to
illustrate the intention of the plan, and more importantly, to reveal the conflicts 
throughout the formation of the plan and the problems that could be confronted in the 
plan’s implementation. The chapter draws the conclusion that the top-down regional 
plan initiated by the central government plays an important role in the process of 
transforming governance, both as a result of the changing scale of governance and as 
a driver for transforming the scale of governance. Nevertheless, the re-building of 
state power is full of contention and conflict between different levels and divisions of 
government.
Chapter eight summarises and discusses the major research findings. It synthesises the 
general changing trajectory and the findings from the two case studies and provides 
an overall picture of the changing regional governance in China. Based on the results 
of the research, theoretical implications are proposed for the Western theory of ‘new 
state spaces’ and for the study of regional ascendance. Meanwhile, the limitations of 
the research are summarised and suggestions for future study regarding the relevant 
topics are put forward.
C h A p t e r  t w o
l it e r A t u r e  r e v ie w
2.1 In trod u ction
The review chapter lays the foundation for the theoretical perspective and research 
framework that is adopted in this PhD study. The chapter is structured as follows: 
section 2.2 reviews the different origins of the ‘new regionalism’ argument. Then, a 
political economic approach is deployed in section 2.3 and a debate of the perspective 
is reviewed. Subsequently, section 2.4 reviews the influential work of the political 
economic approach on state spatiality and new state spaces (NSS) by Brenner (2004b) 
and other contemporary scholars. By fusing the recent debate on the NSS framework, 
the author deploys a process-based regulation approach to studying the rescaling of 
the state, which is combined with the perspective of agency, politics and scale. The 
relevance of the Western theoretical perspective and the theoretical stance adopted by 
the research is further specified in section 2.5. Section 2.6 reviews traditional Chinese 
regional studies, which focus on economic geography, regional development and 
regional inequality. The theoretical and empirical gap between regional studies and 
the changing urban and regional governance is identified; nevertheless, a recently 
emerging group of literature which specifies regional renaissance in China is 
witnessed. Building upon the existing research, this study intends to use the NSS 
framework to argue that current regional transformation is part of the process of the 
restructuring of state spatiality. The research project further aims to extend the
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well-developed urban governance study to the understanding of the recent regional 
initiatives. The implication for the analysis framework of this PhD research is drawn 
in the conclusion section.
2.2 Unpacking the ‘new regionalism’
2.2.1 The regional resurgence and the city-region concept
Under the general context of global production and new economic agglomeration, 
world cities and global city-regions have been recognised to hold prominence in 
organising future global and national economies (e.g. Ohmae, 2004; Scott, 2001). 
With the main city continuing as the node of the economy, the dispersal of urban 
functions from the city to the wider city-region is also witnessed. Henceforth, the 
concept of the city-region is employed to refer to the economic markets or the 
relational space beyond an urban jurisdiction on a scale ranging from metropolitan to 
a cluster of cities (e.g. Etherington and Jones, 2009: 261, note 1; Hall, 2009). It is 
conceived that the city-regions will be the locus of various kinds of activities and ‘the 
integrators of the spaces of flows’ (Neuman and Hull, 2009: 779). Compared to the 
traditional urbanisation and suburbanisation, the urban expansion is stretched out and 
decentralised to a wider region; moreover, compared to the megalopolis analysis 
established by Gottmann (1961), the contemporary city-region is filled with 
functional connectivity, in addition to geographical proximities. Parr (2005) has 
analysed the typical interactions within the city-region, such as the flow of trade, 
labour forces, commuting, and capital movement between the city core and the 
hinterland surrounding it. Hall and his colleagues have made great efforts to examine
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the polycentric structure and connectivity of the city region (Hall and Pain, 2006).
On the other hand, the regional reifications based on the global city-region thesis (e.g. 
Scott, 2001) are challenged by alternative ways of defining and delimiting regions. It 
is argued that, in addition to the material change of regional economics, there is also a 
plethora of representations of the city-region structure in terms of technological, 
infrastructure, ecological, political, social, institutional, governance and territorial 
policies (e.g. MacLeod and Jones, 2001). In these circumstances, the term of 
‘city-region’ particularly refers to ‘a strategic and political level of administration and 
policy making, extending beyond the administrative boundaries of single urban local 
government authorities to include urban and/or semi-urban hinterlands’ 
(Tewdwr-Jones and McNeil, 2000: 131, note 1). In contrast to the presumably 
objective and hard boundaries of economic city-regions, these forms of city-regions 
are mostly represented by policies and institutions, narratives and initiatives, with 
ambiguous, fuzzy or artificial apparatus (Harding, 2007: 451). In other words, the 
geographical notions of ‘region’ are not only built upon pure spatial economy, but are 
also invented and reinvented by state institutions and social and cultural forces. It is 
hence argued that ‘regions are anything but natural entities: they are, at the same time, 
institutional, political and socio-cultural spaces’ (Gualini, 2004: 330).
2 .2 .2  T h e  d ifferen t o r ig in s  o f  the ‘new  reg ion a lism 9
One consequence of the intensifying interest in the contemporary city-regions is the 
urban-regional renaissance in all research fields ranging from geography and planning 
to political science (MacLeod, 2001a: 805). It is suggested that the key schools of
thought can generally be categorised under the banners of ‘economic’ and ‘political’ 
new regionalism (Harrison, 2006: 23). Firstly, the ‘new regionalism’ literature derives 
from a group of economic geography literature with a shift towards institutional 
aspects (MacLeod, 2001a: 807). It takes the resurgence of a region as an object of 
investigation and uses the institutional perspective to understand the dynamics of 
regional economic development (Harrison, 2006: 21). The thrust of the research is the 
role of non-economic factors in the resurgent regional economies of paradigmatic 
regions such as Third Italy, South Wales, and many more, i.e. the investigation of 
social and cultural capital (Hadjimichalis, 2006: 691-92). Some of the new 
regionalists even use the argument to clamour for a more progressive and democratic 
sub-national political environment (Hadjimichalis, 2006: 691; Harrison, 2006: 22). It 
is argued that devolution and regionalism is a form of ‘good governance’, based on 
the actual or perceived ‘economic dividends’ that would be brought about by the 
decentralisation and cooperation (Jones et al., 2005: 398; Pike and Tomaney, 2009: 
16). Although opening a brand new perspective for economic geography, the new 
regionalism thesis is criticised for a lack of precise empirical studies, the failure of 
theorisation of social capital, depoliticising politics, and narrow territorial studies 
without scalar analysis (Hadjimichalis, 2006; Harrison, 2008: 5-6; MacLeod, 2001a).
A new generation of research from the perspective of political and policy regionalism 
studies the ‘new regionalism’ of the rise of regional institutions since the 1990s in the 
Western context (e.g. Brenner, 2003a; Deas and Ward, 2000; Jones, 2001; Keating, 
1998). It is argued that ‘new regionalism’ is particularly characterised by the powerful 
economic arguments revolving around ‘economic competitiveness’ (e.g. Norris, 2001: 
557-558). It is further argued that although the contemporary regional agendas are
also concerned about region-wide problems such as urban sprawl, fiscal disparities, 
air and water pollution and large-scale regional infrastructure, somehow these 
purposes are pursued because they are viewed as essential to achieving regional 
economic competitiveness (Norris, 2001: 558). That is, the primary objective for 
contemporary regional projects has shifted from efficiency and equity to 
competitiveness (Keating, 1998; Norris, 2001: 558), which is qualitatively different 
from former regional projects (e.g. Valler et al., 2002: 187). Therefore, supply-side 
policy options are selected, since the environment for technological innovation, the 
quality of education, knowledge and skills, and the convenience of infrastructures are 
believed to be the driving forces behind regional development (Valler et al., 2002: 187; 
Lovering, 1999). Moreover, instead of covering the whole territory, regional 
intervention privileges specific territories such as individual urban regions'which are 
central to national economies (Wheeler, 2002: 270). As a consequence, the 
normatively good governance projects are actually played out by the agents to pursue 
‘a neo-liberally oriented “competitiveness” agenda’ (Lovering, 1999; cited in 
Lagendijk, 2007: 1195). Nevertheless, studies move forward to argue that the actual 
existing regional strategies, policies and governance are not only defined by the 
politics around ‘economic competitiveness’, but are also subject to institutional assets, 
social determination and political choices (e.g. Jonas and Ward, 2002; Norris, 2001; 
Ward and Jonas, 2004). A variety of case studies have demonstrated that the initial 
regional designation, in accordance with ‘ideological perceptions of changing nature 
of space economy’ (Deas and Lord, 2006: 1865; original emphasis), is to be 
constrained and reproduced by the political, administrative, democratic and cultural 
assets of the place (e.g. Boudreau, 2003; Deas and Ward, 2000; Deas and Lord, 2006; 
Harrison, 2010; Jones and MacLeod, 2004). That is, the trajectory of regional
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territorial development is contingent and open to uncertainties (MacLeod and Jones, 
2001). It is ‘political, institutional, and discursive constructs of which the 
development is structurally conditioned and enabled, but not fully determined, by 
external conditions’ (Lagendijk, 2007: 1195; original emphasis).
2.2.3 The regional concept and (city-) regionalism in political economy
As reviewed by Harrison (2007, 2008), the new regionalism thesis within the political 
economy (e.g. Keating, 1999) is now being superseded by the new term of ‘new 
city-regionalism’ developed within economic geography. The resurgence of the 
concept of ‘city-region’ causes further confusion in the area, where region and 
city-region do not enjoy a common analytical definition in various academic and 
policy communities. For example, in the research oriented for policy design and 
application, the use of terms such as ‘regions’, ‘city-regions’ and ‘sub-regions’ should 
be careful and subject to strict analytical methodologies. This is because each of the 
term may indicate particular policy recommendations at different administrative units. 
Therefore, it is important to clarify the meaning and nature of these terms in different 
purposes of research.
What is of particular note is that the ‘city-region’ concept in political economy terms 
does not necessarily indicate a scalar feature of a specific kind of region, such as an 
metropolitan area around a city core. ‘City-region’ here is a concept with its emphasis 
to a distinct territorial feature, that is, (1) urban focused; (2) functional connectivity 
and relational spatiality; (3) soft and porous, and not necessarily constrained by 
administrative boundaries. This is discussed by Harrison (2008: 11) who writes,
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...city-regions in political economy have strong relational undertones. Where 
regions were presented to be by and large territorially bounded 
political-administrative units in the new regionalism, the literature on the 
new city-regionalism has been quick to emphasise how “the geographic 
structure of these networks tends more and more to override purely political 
boundaries” such that city-regions are open, porous spaces, easily permeated 
by flows of capital, knowledge and finance, and increasingly free from 
regulatory control on the part of national states (Scott, 2001: 4).
Therefore, the scalar boundaries of the city-region in the political economy can be 
range from being relatively small scale metropolitan areas, to grand and large scale 
regions as indicated by the term such as ‘mega-city region’ (Hall and Pain, 2006) and 
‘global city-region’ (Scott, 2001). Overall, the regional resurgence indicated by ‘new 
(city-) regionalism’ does not indicate a particular scalar institution of region or a 
certain regional territorial form. A further example is that, the study on the emergence 
of the new regionalism in North America tends to be focused on the 
metropolitan-scale, while studies in Europe are generally orientated towards larger 
geographical entities, ‘extending beyond functional metropolitan areas and encompass 
other cities and their hinterlands, freestanding towns, and rural areas’ (e.g. Jonas and 
Ward, 2002; Deas and Giordano, 2003: 226). Therefore, the regional resurgence is 
only indicative of the general sub-national governance changes, or the emergence of 
multi-level governance at the sub-national level beyond the dominant localisation and 
urban governance at the earlier state neo-liberalism stage. As remarked by Jonas 
(2006: 402), ‘[T]he “region” can be seen to operate both as a between space and a 
mesolevel concept, which is amenable to thinking about a spatial combination of 
flows, connections, processes, structures, networks, sites, places, settings, agencies
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and institutions’.
Furthermore, the new ‘city-regionalism’ used in the political economy holds that the 
research subject is not an existing scale of regional territory but a developing process 
in formation and transformation. The process reflects the latest transition in the 
regulation and governance landscape, associated with a restless de-territorialisation of 
various forces at different scales and their re-territorialisation on a variety of regions. 
The (city-) regionalism in political economy is hence concentrated on the 
conflict-ridden forming process of the subnational governance, and to examine the 
degree to which the struggles have shaped or constrained the development of different 
forms of regionalism (c.f. Deas and Giordano, 2003). It aims to explain why regional 
state spaces (be they trans-national, trans-regional, pan-regional, regional, 
sub-regional, or city-regional) are produced as a particular scale in economic and 
social life, and how a certain regional territorial configuration is subsequently 
constructed and reconstructed. Overall, the city-regionalism in political economy is 
understood as an ongoing struggle for control of space (Ward and Jonas, 2004: 2135). 
The research subject is not an established object specific in scale or configuration, and 
the examining process may involve a flux of regional practices at the same time and 
various origins of regions during history. In terms of how to conceptualise the process, 
examine the dynamics and conceive the agency, the following sections are going to 
review the existing approaches and debate.
2.3 The debate within the political economic perspective
2.3.1 The role of the state in the ‘new regionalism9
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As reviewed above, the recent resurgence of regionalism has fundamentally shifted in 
its rationale from administrative efficiency to economic efficiency. Additionally, the 
new regionalism differs from the old regionalism in that voluntary and flexible 
cooperation instead of formal government structural change is called for by new 
regionalists (Norris, 2001: 558-559). The new approach, linked with public actions, 
partnership and negotiations rather than an authoritarian, top-down and rigid approach, 
overcomes the deficiencies of earlier regional reform projects in terms of legitimacy, 
local particularities, and implementation (Lefevre, 1998). In the new experiments, 
different localities and institutions may be grouped and involved in particular cases 
instead of building a fully-fledged supra-municipality or inter-municipality 
government structure to substitute or re-divide power divisions at the local level (ibid).
However, it is contended that, albeit as a main characteristic, over-emphasis on the 
merits of local institutions might lead to ‘soft institutionalism’ (MacLeod, 2001b). The 
specific agents underlying the regional governance advocated by the new regionalists 
are not clarified, which seems to infer that the region is an automatic agent itself. In 
contrast, the new regionalist practitioners have particularly downplayed the role of the 
state. In order to illuminate the actual mechanism of new regionalism, it is argued that 
an exploration of the agent underlying these specific projects is significant.
The mechanism of regional territorial development in the UK is mainly orchestrated 
by the national state. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, localities emerged into the 
main territory to deliver government economic development policies in the UK 
(Valler et al., 2002: 186), as well as a number of Western European states (Brenner, 
2004a: 465). This big transformation from traditional Keynesian macroeconomic
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policies to local devolution and national urban policy has been expressed as ‘central 
government localism’ (Valler et al., 2002: 186) or ‘new localism’ (e.g. Deas and Ward,
2000). That is, central government intervention was downscaled around urban and 
intra-urban areas (Deas and Ward, 2000: 275). Regional planning, as well as other 
regional policies, was marginalised as the tool of redistribution and inequality 
management; instead, economic regeneration of central cities was highlighted. In 
other words, the socioeconomic problems of inner cities were assumed to be the 
priority to achieve national territorial equalisation and remove deprivation (Webb and 
Collis, 2000: 860). However, since the early 1990s, there has been a salient refocusing 
from the urban level to the regional level. The Government Offices for the English 
regions, Regional Development Agencies in England and Regional Assemblies in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have marked a partial switch from previously 
urban-based regeneration to regionally-based intervention (Deas and Ward, 2000: 
275). Nevertheless, it is noted that the national state still plays a crucial role in 
‘delimiting the spatial boundaries, operational parameters and key actors out of which 
the new regionalism is being forged’ (Jones and MacLeod, 1999: 308; Jones, 2001). It 
is further established that centrally orchestrated regionalism again centralises power at 
the regional level and disempowers sub-regions in England (Harrison, 2008). Hence, 
it is argued that regionalism and regionalisation in the UK does not represent real 
decentralisation, but retains a high level of centralisation (e.g. Morgan, 2007; Musson 
et al., 2005; Pearce and Ayres, 2009).
In contrast, some other studies have highlighted the bottom-up mechanism in building 
region-wide governance. For instance, Jonas and Pincetl (2006) explored the ‘new 
civic regionalism’ in California, which is mainly backed by business interests in
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partnership with non-profit and private foundations and grassroots organisations. The 
project is part of the long-standing social movement to address localised conflicts 
around land use and environment, affordable housing, infrastructure, property tax and 
so forth (ibid: 482). The new regionalist discourse has been embraced, since it 
circumvented formal administrative reform, idealised regional economic spaces, and 
empowered the regional public (ibid: 501). Similarly, McCann (2007) highlighted the 
bottom-up regional initiatives by local state, neighbourhood and activist groups. 
Institutions are envisioned and policies are articulated at a scale beyond the local 
jurisdictional boundaries to achieve ‘smart growth’ and pursue urban liveability (ibid:
189). Overall, the different top-down and bottom-up phenomena have broadened the 
perspective of studying what ‘city-regionalism’ really is (Harding, 2007: 444-445).
2.3.2 Regionalisation, regionalism and the restructuring of the state
Scholars who recognise the role of the state in developing regionalism argue ‘the 
extent to which some new initiatives in the emerging regionalism are in reality 
rescaled governmental and quasi-govemmental intervention’ (Jones and MacLeod, 
1999: 307; original emphasis). For example, Jones (2001) has argued that, rather than 
a bottom-up social capital approach to networked governance, the Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs) for regions of England are actually ‘a new 
(regionalised) scale of state power’ (p. 1188). Later studies have echoed the view that 
the state orchestrated the regional institutions to ‘reassert its functional importance 
and deliver its policies more effectively’ (e.g. Goodwin et al., 2006; Jones et al., 2005). 
It is further contended that the regional institution is actually an additional hierarchy 
rather than a substantial restructuring of the traditional administrative system
(Harrison, 2007; Deas and Lord, 2006; Goodwin et al., 2005; Goodwin et al., 2006; 
Jones et al., 2005; Pearce and Ayres, 2009). The institutional system of regional-level 
governance ‘affords direct channels of influence to central government departments’ 
(Musson et al., 2005: 1397).
The resurgence of regions results in the restructuring of governance between and 
across different levels of territories. Along with the significant number of devolution 
projects undertaken in Western Europe, the concept of multi-level governance (MLG) 
has been invented to indicate the dispersed distribution of state power at various 
levels of governance (Marks et al., 1996, cited in Yang, 2005: 2147). However, the 
MLG approach is found to be deficient in two main respects. Multi-level governance, 
nevertheless,
... overplays the vertical nesting of discrete policy competencies, at the 
expense of analyzing the dense network of ‘tangled hierarchies’ (Jessop, 
2001) which mesh together to produce and implement policy horizontally 
across any one scale or over any one territory. Multi-level governance also 
tends to reify the different scales within these hierarchies -  when in practice 
scales of governance are relative and are actively produced (not least by the 
national state) (Goodwin et al., 2005: 423).
That is to say, the state restructuring process is far from straightforward and 
pre-established, but is open to conflict and contests. Moreover, the complex 
restructuring of governance is not only represented by vertical rescaling between 
scales, but also by horizontal relationships between institutions in the same territory 
(Goodwin et al., 2005: 432; Allmendinger and Haughton, 2007). More importantly, 
the MLG only gives a descriptive outline of the contemporary governance landscape,
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and does not offer any perspective to examine the actual mechanism through which 
state rescaling processes take place. Analogously, the ‘hollowing out’ metaphor 
simply describes ‘the delegation of powers away from the national level, and makes 
no explicit claims about the organizational or institutional forms that may result from 
this’ (Goodwin et al., 2005: 424). It is thus argued that the state rescaling process 
should be conceptualised as the twin process of the ‘hollowing out’ of powers at the 
national scale, as well as the transfer, or ‘filling in’, of powers to other scales (ibid:
425). That is, the state rescaling process is ‘a complex ‘qualitative process of state 
restructuring’ rather than a simple ‘quantitative process of state erosion or 
diminution” (Peck, 2001: 447; cited in ibid: 424). As such, any investigation should 
not centre on the extent to which the national state has become less powerful, but 
rather how its power has been differently articulated (Musson et al., 2005; Peck, 2001: 
447).
2.3.3 Territorial or relational approach to conceptualising spatiality
Although consensus is reached that regional geography is not pre-given and 
pre-established, but is an ongoing and contested process, theoretical disputes remain 
in terms of how to frame the spatial relations of the region. It is argued that the 
re-territorialisation argument has largely become entangled in a ‘territorial trap’ 
(Agnew, 1994, cited in Gualini, 2004: 331), or in other words, has gone too far in the 
direction of the state to ‘state centrism’ (Brenner, 1999b). That is, the 
re-territorialisation analysis is premised upon pre-defined multi-level governance and 
the macro-phenomenon of political economy and territorialisation of the state (Gualini, 
2004: 331). Instead, it is argued that interested actors should be perceived from a
micro- and aspatial dimension in order to reflect the network and relational aspects of 
the agents (Gualini, 2004: 331, emphasis added). That is, the non-scalar perspectives 
focus on the spatiality of socio-economic practices in terms of flow and connectivity 
(Lagendijk, 2007: 1202). Allen and Cochrane (2007) argue that the regional 
conception should be freed from the articulation of the hierarchical territorial 
jurisdictions, and the contemporary fuzzy and discontinuous region should be viewed 
as produced through a diffuse and fragmented engagement of both public and private 
political actors lodged at the regional assemblage. Yet, Harrison (2010: 22) contends 
that the investigated area of southeast England, on which the research of Allen and 
Cochrane (2007) is based, is a specific region in the UK territory. The boundaries in 
this region have less effect and appear to be more open and porous since southeast 
England is considered to be a polycentric global mega-city region with 
long-established economic links with the global city of London and political ties with 
Westminster and Whitehall (Pain, 2008; cited in Harrison, 2010: 22).
The relational approach does have certain merits in framing the agents in the 
territorial governance building process. However, MacKinnon and Shaw (2010) have 
argued that the territorial approach ‘retains value over relational approaches’ in that 
‘the relational approaches tend to view spaces as essentially unstructured and empty 
prior to its constitution by actor networks, reflecting an element of ontological 
‘levelling’ derived from actor-network theory and other poststructuralist philosophies’ 
(p. 1246). Similarly, Pike and Tomaney (2009) have also mentioned ‘relational 
accounts ... risk providing a partial explanation that can underplay or disregard the 
continued import of the territorialities of institutions and boundaries in governing 
economic development’ (p. 29). In contrast, the territorially- and hierarchically-
addressed state rescaling framework stresses the ‘historically embedded and 
path-dependent nature of [the] restructuring process’ (MacKinnon and Shaw, 2010: 
1227). In other words, rather than a ‘flattening ontology’, it is admitted that the 
development of city-regions is embedded and is also influenced by the existing 
structure of political-administrative units.
With regard to the binary divisions of the territorial and relational approaches, it is 
deemed valuable not to set the territorial and relational views against each other. It is 
argued that bounded territory is not necessarily exclusively porous in its boundaries; 
thus, the territorial view of regions does not opt out of the concept of horizontal 
interaction from civil society, social institutions and business sectors (Morgan, 2007). 
It is further argued that the relational approach definitely has value in comprehending 
the contemporary economic space of flows; however, as for perceiving the politics of 
regions, ‘the degree to which one interprets cities or regions as territorial and scalar or 
topological and networked “remains an open question: a matter to be resolved ex post 
and empirically rather than a priori and theoretically’” (MacLeod and Jones, 2007: 
1186, cited in Harrison 2010: 19). Based on England’s southwest region, Jones and 
MacLeod found that the empirical case has ‘realized both a political-economy of scale 
and a cultural construction of scale’ (2004: 448; original emphasis). Alternatively, 
Harrison (2010) has demonstrated the production of a city-region is tangled with both 
‘the outcome of both relational economic processes and political claims to territory’ (p. 
19) through exploring the initiatives and implications of The Northern Way project of 
England. Overall, it is widely acknowledged that scale and territory is not withering 
away and that the state retains a pivotal regulatory role in city-region development, 
although this includes the considerable participation of social institutions and
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individuals. City-regions are therefore unable to escape territorially oriented 
designations; nevertheless, when appropriate, non-territorial and/or relational 
socio-economic and political strategies should be conjoined (Jones and MacLeod, 
2004: 448).
2.4 Regions and new state spatiality
2.4.1 Regional scale, state spatial selectivity and new state spaces
Acknowledgment of the persistent role of the state, the rising importance of regional 
scale in contemporary policy and territorial governance is conceptualised to manifest 
a new form of ‘spatial selectivity’ by the state (e.g. Jones, 1997, 2001; Goodwin et al., 
2005; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999b; MacLeod and Jones, 1999). In this sense, 
Jessop’s strategic relational approach (SRA) to conceptualising the state and state 
power is highly relevant here (Jessop, 1990). It is perceived that the state ‘has no 
power -  it is merely an institutional ensemble; it has only a set of institutional 
capacities and liabilities which mediate that power; the power of the state is the power 
of the forces acting in and through the state. These forces include state managers as 
well as class forces, gender groups as well as regional interests, and so forth’ (Jessop, 
1990: 269-270: cited in Goodwin et al., 2006: 981). Drawing on the SRA, the concept 
of state spatiality, i.e. the multi-scalar organisation of state power (Brenner, 2004a: 
452-53), is created to spatialise the form of the state. Built on the conceptualisation 
that state spatiality is more a dynamic, transformative and contested process than a 
fixed, pre-given and permanent thing, Brenner (2004a) perceives the development of 
statehood as a spatial process. Moreover, it is deemed that territoriality is only one
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dimension ‘within the multi-layered geographical architectures of modem state 
spatiality’ (p. 77). The state space not only refers to the institutional apparatus of the 
state organisation, but also to the strategies and policies that state institutions are 
mobilised to undertake (p. 80). Henceforth, each scale of state power can be analysed 
‘with reference to its internal organization form, institutional structure, and 
geographical boundaries,’ as well as with reference to state activities and state 
interventions (p. 82). Thus, the process of change within states to different territorial 
parameters and structural configurations is defined as the unfolding of the rescaling of 
statehood (Brenner, 2004b: 105).
According to Jessop’s strategic-relational state theory, the state is, in actuality, a 
system of strategic selectivity, through which state intervention is enacted 
(MacKinnon and Shaw, 2010: 1228). Brenner (2004b: 89-94) extended the concept of 
strategic selectivity and defined state spatial selectivity as comprising state spatial 
projects and state spatial strategies. This corresponds with Brenner’s view of state 
space. The concept of state spatial projects refers to the specific programmes and 
initiatives that attempt to differentiate between or integrate state institutions and 
policy regimes across geographical scales and among different locations within the 
state’s territory, whereas state spatial strategies relate to a range of policy instruments 
beyond the state apparatus (p. 92-93). Brenner (2004b: 97-100) then summarises the 
four axes of the evolution of state spatial selectivity, comprising the scalar and 
territorial dimensions of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies. The grid is 
thus divided into the centralising state spatial projects and singular state spatial 
strategies, the uniform administrative state spatial projects and equalising state spatial 
strategies, the decentralising state spatial projects and multiple scalar of state spatial
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strategies, and customised state spatial projects and differentiating state spatial 
strategies (p. 102). Subsequently, the evolution of state spaces can be decoded as the 
‘complex amalgamations’ of state spatial selectivity with a particular historical 
formation of state spatiality. It is hence argued that the new state spaces of the 
changing statehood:
...should be viewed as the outcomes of multiple tendencies of state spatial 
restructuring whose precise institutional and geographical contours remain 
deeply contested and thus highly unstable ...
The restructuring of state spatiality rarely entails the complete dissolution of 
entrenched political geographies. ... (Brenner, 2004b: 107).
... New territorial and scalar geographies of state power are forged through a 
contested open-ended interaction of historically inherited configurations of 
state spatial organization with newly emergent state spatial projects and state 
spatial strategies at various geographical scales (Brenner, 2004b: 111).
Although the above abstract concept introduced by Brenner has demonstrated his 
recognition of the contingency and social construction of state spaces, it is argued that 
the conceptual framework only shows concern for economic and political logic by the 
tool of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies, thus neglecting the factors of 
social power and the process of social reproduction (Varro, 2010: 1257-1258, 1273; 
Ward and Jonas, 2004). In other words, the abstract logic of structural contradictions 
between state regulation and economic accumulation tend to be privileged over civil 
society as the driver of hegemonic projects when analysing the state (Oosterlynck, 
2010: 1156). It is generalised by Brenner (2004b) that the state apparatus has been 
downscaled from the national state to urban localities in response to post-Fordist 
crises such as fiscal deficit and urban degradation resulting from post-Fordist
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industrial restructuring; recently, statehood has again been upscaled from the urban to 
the meso-level region to counterbalance severe inter-locality competition and to 
prevent enlarging uneven development. Overall, it is perceived that the changing state 
spatiality, i.e. the process of state rescaling, represents the restless search of the state 
for ‘spatio-temporal fixes’ to the ever-changing wider political economy. It is hence 
contended that the approach is more effective in identifying the general trend and 
driving forces such as competition-oriented local politics than in decoding the 
particularities of the politics (Varro, 2010: 1254).
In short, while the social and political construct of the state is a fundamental concept 
in strategic-relational state theory and new state spaces, the current analysis tends to 
be structurally rather than contextually charged. It is contended that the strategic 
projects and strategies, or the process of rescaling, can be adapted and utilised for a 
multitude of purposes by different groups. As such, the research should focus on 
understanding the divergent sub-national politics where regionalism is situated, rather 
than summarising what is convergent around the new regionalism.
2.4.2 Process-based approach to scale and the politics of re-scaling: the building
process of regional scale
As put forward by Jonas and Ward (2007: 176), ‘the emergence of city-regions [is]... 
the product of a particular set of economic, cultural, environmental and political 
projects, each with their own logics’. With regard to the attempt to understand the 
place-specific and actual-existing process involved in the production of regions, Jonas 
and Ward (2002: 396-97) propose that three fundamental questions need to be
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addressed, namely, the roles played by different levels of government, the different 
logic underpinning urban and regional programmes, and the local development 
contexts within these city-regions, rather than merely focus on global context. That is, 
there are not only different context-sensible regionalisms across territories, but also 
different actors from multiple scales to manipulate at the same scale for different 
interests. The introduction of the lens of political agencies to the state relational 
approach is of crucial importance, since it shows that it is actually the actors that are 
‘acting through the state’ rather than ‘...the state itself that is pursuing glocalisation 
strategies’ (Oosterlynck, 2010: 1158). That is to say, ‘place-sensitive (or locally 
dependent) agents may act in the name of certain regionally based and imagined 
community places and localities’ (Oosterlynck, 2010: 1158).
While some of Brenner’s work (e.g. 2004a, b) is criticised for seeming to imply that 
state rescaling is ‘pre-formed from abstract processes that operate ‘behind the backs’ 
of individual actors’ (MacKinnon and Shaw, 2010: 1231), Brenner (2002) has 
demonstrated his recognition that the regional building process is not consolidated, 
with a singular, unified and internally coherent agenda. He argues that, under the 
general conditions of post-Fordist state restructuring, the urban and regional 
transforming project is, in the meantime, permeated by internal conflict and 
contradictions. These place-specific internal processes make various regional projects 
heterogeneous from each other, both institutionally and politically. Brenner identified 
the movement towards a ‘new politics of scales’, in which ‘local, state-level and 
federal institutions and actors, as well as local social movements, are struggling to 
adjust to diverse restructuring processes that are unsettling inherited patterns of 
territorial and scalar organization within major US city-regions’ (p. 3). That is, various
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interactions exist between state and non-state actors, and various forms of political 
actions at the root of rescaling processes (Boudreau, 2007: 2608). Following the line 
of reasoning, the new state spaces are actually ‘the subject of political conflict and 
struggle between actors and interests operating in and across different spatial scales’ 
(MacKinnon and Shaw, 2010: 1231). Overall, ‘political agencies’ and ‘politics of 
scale’ are the crucial concepts through which to examine the actual existing state 
rescaling process. Furthermore, the rise of new state spaces is something that should 
be investigated than assumed or generalised.
2.4.3 Planning and governance: the production of ‘new state spaces’ by means of
planning
Since the 1990s, Western European countries have witnessed the revival of strategic 
spatial planning, especially at the national and regional scale (e.g. Albrechts, 2004; 
2006; Albrechts et al., 2003). The changing trajectory is well represented by the fall 
and rise of regional planning in the UK. British regional planning culminated in the 
1950s and 1960s: plans were not only imposed on large cities and metropolitan areas 
to enhance amenities and direct overspill (Cullingworth and Nadin, 2006: 23), but 
were also accompanied by a role of social redistribution through a strategic approach 
to land-use control and investment (Healey et al., 1997: 3). However, regional 
planning was devalued and shifted to urban policies and projects (Hall, 1999), and 
was narrowed down to land use regulation in the 1980s (Thomley, 1993). In the late 
1990s, regional planning was reinvigorated, which was marked by the 1997 Blair 
government, which re-established the regional government bodies and reintroduced 
regional planning. Further reform was undertaken in 2004, when the spatial planning
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approach was widely adopted within the UK planning system.
In comparison to regional planning in the 1960s, strategic planning since the 1980s 
has been re-modified, both in terms of its planning objectives and policy priorities. 
Whilst traditional British planning is labelled as regulative and allocative, the more 
recent version is found to be more strategic, proactive and developmental (Faludi, 
2000; Healey et al., 1997: 241; Healey, 2006). Policy priorities are reoriented from 
reorganising physical space to broader scopes including economic development and 
environmental sustainability, in particular (Healey et al., 1997: 241). Land use 
regulations have been simplified to speed decision-making and ensure the growth of 
projects (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2009; Nadin, 2007). Moreover, the new spatial 
planning approach in the 2000s has further seen the reworking of the scale of policy 
making, as well as an expansion of the scope of the policy parameters (Allmendinger 
and Haughton, 2007). First of all, spatial planning is privileged to the sub-national 
level of planning, away from urban regeneration projects. Particularly in the case of 
British planning, the Structure Plan at the sub-regional level has been abolished, while 
the Regional Spatial Strategies (RSS) steered by the central government has been 
empowered with statutory status (Bianconi et al., 2006). As a result, although new 
spatial planning is embedded in community engagement and closer communication 
between hierarchies of government, the power of strategy making is rescaled from the 
local to the central and regional level. Secondly, the renewed positive view for 
planning is shaped by the ambition that new spatial planning will bring all involved 
policy sectors and stakeholders within and outside government to work together for 
the far-reaching development vision. In this way, the content of planning is not limited 
to land use planning, but to a broadened agenda such as environmental issues and
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economic development. As a consequence, the ownership of spatial planning is not 
only restricted to planners, but is open to all departments of government and 
partnerships that have a spatial concern or effect (Nadin, 2007). Apart from the 
existing levels of sub-national and sub-regional planning, many new plans are 
initiated by actors outside the public sector and do no correspond with the boundaries 
of administrative divisions. The emergence of soft planning spaces aims to break 
down bureaucratic barriers and directly point to the real boundaries of problems 
(Allmendinger and Haughton, 2009). In other words, the spatial and policy boundaries 
of new spatial planning are becoming soft and fuzzy (Allmendinger and Haughton, 
2007). To sum up, the broadened thematic focus, the privilege of the city-regional 
realm transcending beyond administrative boundaries to functional geographies, and 
the transition from hierarchical and bureaucratic government to horizontal and 
associative governance in the new planning practice have been noted as the trend 
towards ‘new regionalism’ (Wheeler, 2002).
The notion of ‘new state spaces’ is helpful in understanding the changing nature of the 
current regional plan. With reference to the state theory, new spatial planning is 
considered to be part of the state’s ‘restless search’ for governance (Allmendinger and 
Haughton, 2009: 631). It suggests that the new planning spaces are strategically ‘filled 
in’ by the state to create or privilege new scales of governance (Haughton et al., 2009: 
234). The re-working of the scale and the scope of planning are argued to be two 
indispensable elements of the current state restructuring process (Allmendinger and 
Haughton, 2007). The shifted scale of planning represents the renewed policy terrain 
for state intervention in response to the changing context: ‘...spatial planning is a 
contributor to and a reflection of a more fundamental reform of territorial
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management...’ (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2009: 620). For example, the 
networked feature of new economies leads to the privilege of the city-region scale in 
new spatial planning (e.g. Nadin, 2007). However, on the other hand, and as a more 
fundamental mechanism, the re-introduction of regional-level governance is a new 
‘fix’ to the crisis produced by urban entrepreneurialism in the 1980s (Brenner, 2004a, 
b). For example, the aim of collaboration between regional spatial planning in 
England and different levels of government and disparate policymakers is the main 
improvement that is sought after: fragmented government and partnerships is just like 
‘a bowl of spaghetti’ and leads to confusion over lines of accountability (Nadin, 2007: 
45-47). Overall, even though the new strategic spatial planning process is more 
democratic and less exclusive, it is found that governments still play a significant role 
in plan-making (Albrechts, 2006). These regional planning efforts have represented 
revived ‘government-led strategic interventions at the urban and regional level’ 
(Albrechts et al., 2003: 114).
2.5 Summary: theoretical perspectives on city-region governance
The above literature, from the political economic perspective, has presented 
city-region development in a reflective way. The approach sees the designation of the 
city-region as politically constructed, historically embedded and culturally contested, 
and emphasises the role of the state in the formation process. The NSS framework 
(Brenner, 2004b) further explores the ongoing transformation of regional governance 
with regard to the restructuring of state power. The political economic perspective and 
the NSS framework are useful in addressing Chinese regional manifestations because 
they do not treat the emergence of regions as a neutral occurrence, which seems to be
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naturally-developed and pre-given; rather, it is a result of political-economic struggles. 
Therefore, the perspective is particularly useful to unravel the actual processes by 
which such regional territories have been constructed and reconstructed throughout 
history.
The territorial/scale approach, rather than the relational approach, is assumed to be 
more appropriate in the Chinese context, since democracy has not improved much in 
China over the past decades. Therefore, ‘state-centred political economy perspectives 
incorporating the imperative of sustaining control by the Party-state’, which are 
applicable to China in the last half century from 1949 to 2000 (Ma, 2002: 1546), may 
still account for many of the Chinese transformations in the present day. Therefore, 
the NSS framework developed by Brenner (2004b) is followed by the study as a key 
framework to conceptualise the restructuring of state and the development of regional 
scale. The notions of ‘state spatiality’ and ‘state spatial selectivity’ are helpful, since 
they incorporate all the state activities ranging from strategies and policies to 
administrative institutions. By these means, all of the state actions can be examined 
through the insights of state theory, which can help to understand the nature of the 
changes, for example, in terms of planning. All in all, even though Brenner’s work 
predominantly aims to theorise the transformation of regional governance from the 
capitalist state and economy in general, the concept tools in his framework are still 
relevant and can be borrowed for analysis of the state, even in a totally different 
context.
Although the NSS framework fundamentally accepts that the state spaces are 
politically charged, socially constructed and culturally contested, the framework does
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not offer effective tools to examine the causal relationships and dynamic processes of 
the changing statehood. Brenner’s theory (2004a, b) is criticised for its predisposition 
to conceptualise the new regionalism as a process of state rescaling in response to the 
broader context of political economy under globalisation and crisis management of 
capitalism (e.g. Jonas and Pincetl, 2006; Oosterlynck, 2010; Varro, 2010; Ward and 
Jonas, 2004). This also runs contrary to the central discussion from the political 
economic perspective that regionalism is not pre-established and consolidated. 
Therefore, building upon the NSS framework on state spatiality, the study has also 
introduced the lens of ‘political agency’ and ‘politics of scale’ for use as research tools 
to examine Chinese specific processes and politics of the development of city-region 
governance.
Meanwhile, although the theoretical stance adopted by the research is generally based 
on the political economic approach, the awareness of the debate on the economics in 
the political economy of city-regions (e.g. Harding, 2007) also reminds the researcher 
to be aware of the role of economic development and economic logic in the process of 
city-regional development. In the next section, the existing regional studies in China 
will be reviewed and the theoretical and empirical gap will be highlighted.
2.6 A literature review of contemporary regional studies in China
2.6.1 Regional development, model transition and the implication for regional
inequalities
Since the first decade after economic reform, the rapid development and
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transformation of the Pearl River Delta (PRD) in Guangdong province has caught the 
attention of scholars. The southern region, which is the first area opened to the outside, 
has become a laboratory in which to examine China’s changing regional development 
and governance in the 1980s.
Lo (1989) examined the impact of rural reform and the open-door policy on the 
urbanisation and economic development of the PRD. One significant change is the 
industrialisation of the rural economy in the villages and towns (Lo, 1989: 299). With 
the advantage of cultural affinity, county level officials (ibid) scrambled for foreign 
investment, mainly from Hong Kong. The economic restructuring subsequently 
brought along urbanisation and population change (Lo, 1989: 301). The changes are 
uneven in the delta, since the cities of Foshan, Shunde, Panyu, Dongguan and 
Jiangmen, which are close to the provincial capital Guangzhou, received the most 
benefit from the development and become the core of the growth in the region (ibid:
302). Correspondently, clusters of town settlements were stimulated in the area (ibid:
304). During the early stage of development, migration in the delta was 
short-distanced: industrial workers were formerly the surplus agricultural work forces 
from the same county/city or from the same village (ibid: 305). Moreover, because 
urban reform lagged behind rural reform in the 1980s, the overall industrial 
development in the surrounding rural area even surpassed that of Guangzhou and, 
hence, there was no overwhelming migration into the large cities (ibid).
The general features of PRD development revealed by Lo (1989) were intensively 
studied in the following decade. Sit and Yang (1997) identified the peculiar 
urbanisation pattern in the post-reform period, which was predominantly induced by
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external forces of foreign investment. Therefore, the economic momentum was 
contingent upon the distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI). Shen et al. (2000) 
found that, initially, areas with a geographical proximity to Hong Kong tended to 
receive more FDI. Although the distance factor gradually faded after the 1980s, the 
attractiveness of these cities was reinforced over development (Shen et al., 2000: 320). 
This is because industrial know-how, infrastructures and business environments were 
developing in the area (ibid: 321).
The metropolitan development of PRD in the first decade is characterised by rural 
industrialisation and the enormous transformation at the periphery of existing urban 
centres (Lin, 2001a, b). In other words, the urbanisation did not result in magnificent 
rural-urban migration and the increase of the primary city (Xu and Li, 1990). 
Conversely, urbanisation was accelerated by the relaxed control on town designations; 
hence, the increased number of designated towns, as well as the growth of towns in 
terms of both economy and population (Ma and Lin, 1993). Henceforth, the 
development of peri-urban zones produced a high mixture of agricultural and 
industrial activities in towns and villages (Lin, 2001a: 67), and the distinct spatial 
phenomenon of desa kota found in other developing Asian countries (Lin, 2001b). 
This is in stark contrast to the situation during the Maoist period, when the delineation 
between city and countryside was strictly constrained. Compared to the rapid 
development of some selective rural areas, the growth of major cities was relatively 
slow during the period of time (Lin, 2001b). This is because of the state policy to 
control the development of large cities and the persistent control of population 
movement to large cities.
As a result, even the regional discrepancy in the Guangdong province was weakened 
to some extent (Weng, 1998: 440), particularly between Guangzhou and the nearby 
countryside (Lo, 1989: 305). However, since the development of rural towns was 
intensively concentrated in the delta area around Shenzhen, Dongguan, Zhonghsan, 
Shunde, and Panyu, there was still a remarkable gap between the delta core and the 
periphery area of Guangdong province (Lo, 1989: 306-07; Fan, 1995: 443; Gu et al.,
2001). It appears this tendency has been reinforced since the 1990s, with further 
globalisation and marketisation, maybe even more so due to the current economic 
restructuring from manufacturing to a knowledge and service economy (Lu and Wei, 
2007).
The flourishing of towns in PRD is termed by scholars as ‘urbanization from below’ 
(Ma and Lin, 1993: 603) or ‘spontaneous urbanization’ (Shen et al. 2002) in 
comparison with city-based urbanisation in the period prior to reform. Before 
economic reform, the development of urbanisation was reliant on the top-down 
allocation of resources according to a central plan. Large cities were the major 
recipients of resources because they were located with large state enterprises, which 
was more efficient in terms of production (Ma and Lin, 1993: 583). Even the satellite 
towns of Shanghai and Beijing were mostly engaged in agricultural production with 
sluggish growth (c.f. Ma and Lin, 1993: 603). The massive transformation of the rural 
economy after economic reform resulted from the state’s ‘tacit laissez faire’ policy 
towards rural areas rather than the central government’s active support (Ma and Lin, 
1993: 602). Lin (1997) affirmed that market forces and local developmental initiatives 
were the main contributors to the rural economy in the post-reform PRD region. More 
recently, Shen et al. (2002, 2006) and Wong et al. (2003) have conducted further
investigations into the urbanisation pattern in the PRD region during the 1980s and 
1990s. It is argued that both city-based urbanisation and town-based rural urbanisation 
exist in the post-reform urbanisation process. Furthermore, since the late 1990s, more 
concentrated urbanisation has appeared to take place in large cities such as Shenzhen 
(Shen et al., 2006).
Through examination, of regional development, the changing governance and rising 
role of the local state have been detected and documented by many scholars. Eng 
(1997: 555) described officials of local governments and foreign investors as the most 
important players in Guangdong’s market-oriented economic development processes. 
The structural changes that came with economic reform and decentralisation have 
reoriented local governments from being agents of central government to 
implementing administrative commands to actors of the development of local 
economies, which has realigned the interests of local officials with those of foreign 
investors (ibid: 555-56). The local governments gained development capital, local 
taxes, administrative fees and land revenue from foreign investors (ibid: 558), while 
foreign investors have benefited from a large pool of cheap labour, sufficient supply 
of land, efficient and friendly government service, and relaxed and flexible 
governance (ibid: 555). However, the alliance between local governments and 
investors would skew the priority of urban development from the provision of public 
goods to production-related services such as infrastructure, and this type of 
development poses ecological tensions and human resources problems for future 
economic growth and urbanisation (ibid: 565-66).
In the meantime, revitalised towns and countryside were seen in the Yangtze River
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Delta (YRD) in the 1980s (Ma and Fan, 1994). In contrast to PRD, this progress was 
mainly driven by the growth of collectively-owned town and village enterprises 
(TVEs) (Oi, 1995; Walder, 1995) rather than FDI. However, since the mid 1990s, 
there has been a gradual transformation of TVEs in YRD in terms of both organisation 
and ownership (Shen and Ma, 2005: 761-62). This is because the Sunan model, the 
regional development driven by TVEs (ibid: 764), has met with bottlenecks since the 
early 1990s (ibid: 763). Because the Wenzhou model in Zhejiang province, which was 
developed through private enterprises (Liu, 1992; Parris, 1993), remained vibrant and 
competitive, the privatisation of collective ownership was encouraged (Shen and Ma, 
2005: 763).
The pervasive privatisation of property rights since the second half of the 1990s (e.g. 
Han and Pannell, 1999; Li and Rozelle, 2000; Wei, 2002: 1740) has changed the 
nature of the Sunan model. Subsequently, the model’s transition has implied the 
changing role of local state in YRD. Before privatisation, the local government was 
intimately involved in enterprise activities (e.g. Huang, 1990; Oi, 1995; Walder, 1995) 
with the benefits of direct administrative interventions in the market, bank loans and 
other resources. After the reform of property rights, the government was expected to 
refrain from running businesses. The transition was accompanied by Deng Xiaoping’s 
1992 southern tour and China’s decision to open up Pudong and develop Shanghai as 
a global city in 1990 (e.g. She et al., 1997). In consequence, all local governments 
turned to preparing land for the construction of industrial parks in order to attract 
investors and enable industrialisation (Shen and Ma, 2005: 770). As a result, there 
appeared to be increasing enthusiasm for setting up industrial zones and increasing the 
volume of foreign investment across the nation, particularly in the YRD region. The
transformation of local states away from bureaucratic entrepreneurs (Sunan model) 
has laid the foundation for the area to embrace FDI (Wang and Lee, 2007: 1874).
Therefore, since the late 1990s, there seems to have been convergence between the 
dynamics of regional development in the YRD and PRD in the sense that their rapid 
economic growth is driven by foreign investment and exports (Chen, 2007). It is 
suggested that the traditional Sunan and Kunshan models in the YRD have had to 
integrate nationally and globally in order to maintain competitiveness (Wei et al., 
2007, 2009). However, implicit differences exist between the two regions in terms of 
state governance and local initiatives. According to Yang’s (2009) research on 
Taiwanese IT redistribution from the PRD to the YRD, the desktop cluster in 
Dongguan in the PRD has mainly been fostered by ‘bottom-up dynamics of 
Taiwanese third-tier firms without proactive local initiatives’ {ibid: 403); whereas the 
laptop cluster in Suzhou in the YRD has been initiated top-down by local 
governments and explicitly fostered with intentional direction by those local 
governments {ibid: 404). This directive and entrepreneurial role of local governments 
is labelled as the Kunshan model, which has gradually diffused and replaced the prior 
Sunan model in YRD (Chien, 2007; Chien and Zhao, 2008; Wei, 2002; Wang and Lee, 
2007). Kunshan is one of the county-level cities under the administrative purview of 
Suzhou. In the 1980s, Kunshan commenced industrialisation by following the fashion 
of setting up TVEs; however, it was not competitive at the time (Chien and Zhao, 
2008: 431). Since the 1990s, Kunshan has witnessed a tremendous increase in FDI, 
coupled with the opening up of Pudong, Shanghai (Chien and Zhao, 2008: 432; Wei, 
2002: 1739). In 1997, its volume of FDI even surpassed that of Wuxi and Suzhou 
{ibid: 1740). The dramatic success of Kunshan’s economic development is contingent
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upon two conditions. The first is the transfer of a large amount of capital and 
production activities from overseas to the YRD (Wang and Lee, 2007: 1880; Yang, 
2009). The second is greatly attributed to the active and facilitating role of local 
government - the key tasks of Kunshan’s leaders are to engage in attracting external 
projects and satisfying external investors with the most friendly and efficient services 
(Wang and Lee, 2007: 1883; Wei, 2002: 1741-42). The institution building and 
entrepreneurial skills of Kunshan’s governments have been learned and adopted 
through working alongside external investors (Chien and Zhao, 2008; Wang and Lee, 
2007: 1883).
The endorsement of Kunshan practices by central government greatly impelled the 
diffusion of the Kunshan model (Chien, 2007). Even Wenzhou, which is well known 
for its prosperous private economy, started to copy the Kunshan model (Lu and Shi, 
2008: 218); that is, all levels of governments were encouraged to attract foreign 
investment. This was in part forced by the embarrassing situation that Wenzhou, 
although ahead of others in terms of the development of market institutionalisation, is 
relatively backward compared with Hangzhou and Ningbo in terms of economic 
growth and fiscal revenue {ibid: 219).
With entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) at the end of 2001, China, 
especially its coastal regions, has effectively become the world’s workshop. However, 
regional problems such as land encroachment, environmental pollution, rising 
inequalities and competition also intensified from this point. The widespread imitation 
and implementation of GDP and FDI evaluation for local cadres has produced vicious 
competition between localities for mobile capital in the regions and across the nation.
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Policy isomorphism, which refers to the formulation and implementation of very 
similar or even identical economic development policies, according to Chien (2008), 
caused cut-throat competition based on aggressively reducing development costs by, 
for example, tax concessions and land price reductions (Chien and Gordon, 2008; 
Wang and Lee, 2007: 1886). As a result of crude competition, the locales occupied a 
weakened bargaining position in negotiation with foreign investors (Wang and Lee, 
2007: 1886). Moreover, fierce competition made cross-boundary policy coordination 
difficult and regional production networks lacked agents and motivation (ibid), which 
is detrimental to long-term local development. The production network and economic 
zone are virtually detached from the local community, and are not an organic part of 
the local economic base (ibid). They contributed to the growth of current GDP, tax, 
land price, and property speculation, but not the real development of the local 
state-owned, private or collective economy. It seems the great success of the region is 
as a result of benefiting from the institutional innovation of local governments, but 
now it is also the earlier innovation that impedes the upgrade of the local economy 
(Wang and Lee, 2007: 1887).
With the paradigm shift of economic development, the dispersed town development 
of the 1980s is gradually being transcended by new ‘city-based’ ‘urbanization’ (Lin, 
2007). The spectacular expansion of cities is the visible result of the rampant 
development of economic zones, industrialisation, and urban and rural settlements, 
but also the ironic outcome of institutional innovation: the adoption of ‘place 
promotion’ strategy and the land lease policy (ibid: 1832). The prior-reform city-based 
urbanisation is dependant on centrally planned and controlled investment, whereas the 
current post-reform city-based urbanisation is reliant on heavy investment from local
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governments (e.g. Xu and Yeh, 2005). Using the 1990 and 2000 census data by county, 
Zheng et al., (2009) found that, by 2000, there was a regional scale of urban growth 
and net migration gains in the YRD, PRD and Bohai-Sea-Rim (Jing-jin-Tang) regions, 
whereas, elsewhere, economic development and concentration still focused on major 
cities and their peripheral zones. These three mega-city regions represent the greatest 
absorption of FDI and a huge concentration of cross-border economic activities (Zhao 
and Zhang, 2007). The reinforced economic clustering ahd agglomeration in the three 
city regions demonstrate a spatial polarisation of national development {ibid: 991). 
Meanwhile, a sharp contrast also exists within these mega-city regions, as 
development is not evenly dispersed within the regions (e.g. Wei and Fan, 2000; Ye 
and Wei, 2005). Although regional inequality declined earlier in the 1980s as a 
consequence of rural industrialisation and town development outside the large cities, 
uneven development has tended to intensify due to the new city-based development 
(e.g. Lin, 2007; Lin, 2009) and the dominance of large cities (e.g. Zhao et al., 2003).
2.6.2 Current literature on emerging regional governance
With the liberalisation of trade and investment after economic reform, China’s 
regional economy witnessed increasing economic interplay, as well as conflict. With 
the development of economic regionalisation, economic interaction within the private 
sector and civil society would develop spontaneously according to economic returns, 
even though at the time inter-govemmental communication was still very weak. The 
development of the relationship between Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta (PRD) 
is a case in point. In the 1980s, the economic cooperation between Hong Kong and 
PRD started from the traditional area of investment and trade. The link with
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export-oriented processed industries led to an increase in the movement of people and 
vehicles between the regions after the mid-1990s (C. Yang, 2004: 10-15). During this 
long time period, inter-region economic interactions were spontaneously initiated by 
the manufacturing businesses of Hong Kong and local governments in the PRD (ibid: 
24), based on the conditions of cultural connections and geographical proximity. In 
1998, informal inter-governmental communication was established in the form the 
‘Annual Hong Kong-Guangdong Cooperation Joint Conference’ (ibid: 16).
Afterwards, in 2002, a new mechanism in the form of the ‘Mainland and Hong Kong 
Large-Scale Infrastructure Coordination Meeting’ was instituted to cope with keen 
competition in container ports and the coordination of airports in the region (ibid: 18). 
As positive as the progress was, there was no organisation to provide a coordinated 
vision for the regional groupings (ibid: 19). However, since mid-2003, a significant 
transition has occurred towards institutional regionalism with the agreement of CEPA. 
The central government has played a key role in the marked progress in cross-border 
economic integration. However, it is more important to recognise the context leading 
the interests of each side towards institution-based integration. Hong Kong was not 
interested in integration during the economic boom years. Only after the 1997/98 
Asian Financial Crisis did the Hong Kong government show more enthusiasm for the 
initiative. Therefore, for both Hong Kong and the PRD, it was in the context of 
anticipation of increasing competition from Shanghai and the YRD that strategic 
cooperation was agreed (ibid: 20, 25).
A similar trajectory of changing inter-city relationships is also found in the YRD 
(Zhang, 2006). During the 1980s, the cities in the region were more partners with 
Shanghai to gain technology assistance and industrial transfer. However, since the
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1990s, they have turned into competitors to Shanghai, as every city can be accessed 
by FDI after the introduction of China’s open policy. With aggressive development, 
many cities such as Suzhou and Nanjing have become the economic peers of 
Shanghai in terms of FDI and GDP competition. However, since 2000, the region has 
been faced with the reorientation of central policy and external competition from 
Bohai Sea Rim centred on Beijing, as well as rising regions in the neighbouring 
countries of Asia. Under the circumstances, collaboration dialogue is intensified 
within the region. From the experience of both the PRD and YRD regions, it seems 
that the tendency of urban governance towards regionalisation and regional 
cooperation are fostered by potential external competition. However, it is still a long 
way from this point to the achievement of a regional alliance, a unified regional 
governance structure or regional collaborative planning.
In order to strengthen urban competitiveness in the climate of inter-city and 
inter-region competition, the city government is found to be actively involved in the 
formulation of ‘repositioning strategies’ for local development (e.g. Wu and Zhang, 
2007; Xu and Yeh, 2005). For example, Guangzhou repositioned itself as a regional 
centre by restructuring its spatial resources and expanding its development boundary 
from a congested city proper to a city-region incorporating suburban counties and 
county-level cities (Xu and Yeh, 2005: 295-298). It is anticipated that the renewed 
metropolis city image will conform to Guangzhou’s economic status in the region, 
and boost the city’s publicity and competitiveness for FDI. In order to better 
coordinate the development of the suburban region with the central city, the 
Guangzhou municipal government and Guangdong provincial government even 
managed to redraw the administrative boundary by adjusting adjacent county-level
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cities, Panyu and Huadu, into the city districts of Guangzhou (Xu and Yeh, 2005: 
298).
For a short period of time following Guangzhou’s practice, regional repositioning and 
administrative annexation occurred across the country with the aim of pursuing 
collaboration and coordination in order to enhance competitiveness (Wu and Zhang, 
2007). Coordination was particularly necessary between the central city and the 
outskirts because the economy and civil life had already been regionalised in the area, 
but the facilities and transport system could not be unified because of the separation 
of administrative systems. Zhang and Wu (2006) documented the wave of 
administrative annexations in YRD. In addition, they found the downside of 
administrative annexations: mandatory coordination with coercion by top-down 
administrative power (Zhang and Wu, 2006: 17), which was in favour of 
prefecture-level government and undermined the interests of county-level 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, this powerful and direct measure was not an absolute 
resolution to coordination, since it could not handle the problems between 
prefecture-level cities and between provinces (ibid: 15).
Though still not prevalent, inter-governmental negotiation and inter-city partnership 
are seen on some occasions. The cross-border development zone between Jingjiang 
and Jiangyin in Jiangsu province is a case in point. The need for cooperation 
originated with the opening of the Jiangyin Bridge of the Yangtze River in 1999, 
which links and facilitates the interaction between Jiangyin and Jingjiang. However, 
friction has also arisen due to ‘regionalisation’ (Luo and Shen, 2006: 7). For example, 
the enterprises registered in Jiangyin, but operated in Jingjiang, still submit
46
administration fees to the Jiangyin government according to the rules, although they 
are actually using land and infrastructure services offered by the Jingjiang 
government. Due to the conflict, a ‘forum for the enhancement of Jiangyin-Jingjiang 
river-side area development’ has been established between the local leadership since 
2001 (ibid: 9). Moreover, the positive involvement of provincial government at this 
point has played an important role in facilitating inter-city cooperation. Subsequently, 
cross-boundary projects were launched in the area with the cooperation of Jiangyin 
and Jingjiang ports and the cooperative development of the JZJ economic zone (ibid:
9-13). For the purpose, not only were working groups and an administration 
committee, consisting of local officials from the two sides, formed to liaise and 
coordinate, a coordination unit at the provincial level was also formed with members 
from provincial government and prefecture-level government (ibid: 13). The 
indispensable role of provincial government in the inter-city coalition reflects the 
persisting hierarchical power structure in China (ibid: 1).
In fact, these cross-boundary infrastructure projects have become a main vehicle to 
impel the formation of regional integration and regional governance in China (Liu et
al., 2010: 31). These projects represent an occasion to bring governments and 
departments together, and to promote inter-governmental communication and ease 
administrative hurdles. However, at the same time, the decision-making process of 
these regional projects is filled with bargaining and power struggles between levels of 
governments. According to Liu et al. (2010), this process entails re-territorialisation 
for governments, particularly for hierarchical governments. Currently, their 
cooperative attitude depends on their conception of interests and power; gradually, 
however, a new division of labour between levels of governments on regional issues
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will be formed through the process.
Therefore, at the current stage, with neither regional level authority able to resolve 
delicate cross-boundary issues, nor any power division between levels of governments 
on regional issues in evidence, the role of higher-level government is significant in 
terms of acting as a coordinator and facilitator among various government actors. For 
example, in the proposal for the construction of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge, 
seven relevant parties are involved in negotiations. These are: the central government, 
Guangdong provincial government, Zhuhai municipal government, Macao Special 
Administration Region government (Macao SAR government), Hong Kong Special 
Administration Region government (HKSAR government), Shenzhen municipal 
government, and Hong Kong businesses and NGOs (Yang, 2006: 829). Each party 
articulated local interests in the regional infrastructure proposal negotiations. The 
HKSAR government wanted the landing point at Zhuhai rather than Shenzhen to 
circumvent future direct competition with Shenzhen in terms of deep-water container 
ports; whereas the Shenzhen government conceived the proposal as a kind of threat to 
its position which thus represented marginalisation in the region; hence, the Shenzhen 
government initiated an alternative proposal to collaborate with Zhongshan, another 
city in the Guangdong province, to build an inter-city bridge {ibid: 830-832). Finally, 
central government intervened and enforced the consensus on HKSAR government’s 
scheme. In other words, the central government played an important backstage role to 
step in and mediate between multiple and disparate jurisdictions and actors in the 
region (Yang, 2005).
In addition to the negotiation process involving multi-scalar actors to coordinate
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regional development, efforts have been initiated by some governments to establish 
types of inter-govemmental coordinating mechanisms, for example, via regional plans 
or regional organisation. For example, YRD established its Economic Coordination 
Joint Conference in 1992, although at the time it only consisted of 14 cities; for a long 
time, the organisation had only nominal power with no concrete agenda (Luo and 
Shen, 2009: 55). It was not until 2003 that the member cities of the forum progressed 
into actual cooperative agenda negotiations involving issues such as the tourism 
market, human resources, regional transport, market institutions, administrative 
coordination and so forth (Luo and Shen, 2009: 56).
The PRD has also operated a regional cooperation scheme since 2003, which has a 
tremendous territorial coverage of eleven provincial level jurisdictions. The Pan-Pearl 
River Delta regional cooperation project is intended to dismantle administrative 
barriers and shape coordinated development by drawing on the complementary 
advantages of different provinces. Partnership was established with the operation of 
the Pan-Pearl River Delta regional cooperation and development forum. However, 
according to Yeh and Xu (2008), currently the project may be not integrative enough 
to be conceived as a single region. The regional scheme is contested by individual 
intentions to maximise local benefit from the project, and a lack of support from the 
central government for the mega-cooperative project (ibid).
The other major form of regional cooperation mechanism is manifest by the 
proliferation of regional plans in China (Wong et al., 2008). It is observed that the 
regional plan is being used as an instrument to juxtapose policy and spatial integration, 
regional infrastructure provision, as well as environment conservation (ibid).
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However, it is still a challenge for it to perform as an effective form of regional 
governance. There are actually different actors and motives behind these plans and the 
destiny of each plan is subject to local political processes (ibid: 165). Meanwhile, 
coordination is undermined by a lack of consistency between different plans (ibid:
167, 170, 172).
The argument can be demonstrated by the failure of city-region planning for 
Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou, initiated by the Jiangsu provincial government in 2001. 
Anticipated to be a solution to excessive competition between these three 
prefecture-level cities, the plan resulted in a new competition by individual 
prefecture-level cities to define their own city-region centred on themselves, rather 
than a goal to compromise and coordinate with one another (Luo and Shen, 2008: 
214). On the one hand, the reason this occurred is because the plan-making is more of 
a top-down commanded administrative task, which did not pay due respect to local 
stakeholders’ interests; however, more importantly, it is also due to decentralisation 
and the weakened role of provincial government (ibid: 215).
A more recent case is the formulation of a regional plan for the PRD region in 2004. 
Xu (2008) examined the various rationales of individual actors. The central and 
provincial governments attempted to use the region-level plan to reassert central 
regulation on local territorial development after decentralisation; however, for the 
provincial and municipal governments, it is alternatively an institutional fix to build 
regional competitiveness in order to cope with fierce inter-city competition and keen 
competition from outside cities and regions. Thus, the provincial government is 
involved in both top-down and bottom-up initiatives due the diverse roles of its
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different departments. Therefore, if not properly represented, regional planning may 
be caught up in local interpretation based on present political capacity (Xu, 2008: 33) 
and, hence, cause even greater regional disparities (Xu and Yeh, 2010: 21). In 
addition to the conflicts between tiers of governments, it is found there are even 
tensions between different government departments, for example, between central 
ministries of UCCDP and NDRC to compete to be top authority on the issue (ibid),
and those brought about by the mixed role of provincial government in initiating 
regional governance attempts.
2.6.3 Regional studies in China
This section mainly reviewed the contemporary Chinese regional literature focusing 
on the period after the economic reform. Regions in Chinese studies have changed 
dramatically in its division and spatial scales over time. This is associated with the big 
transformation of the usage and meanings of region in Chinese context. Regional 
studies in the pre-reform period were focused on regional inequalities between six 
large regions or three regional belts, owing to the official division of regions in the 
national five-year plan at that time (see Goodman, 1989). However, due to the 
diminishment of regional policies after the economic reform, regions become loosely 
defined and refer to all sorts of spatial configurations bigger than cities. For instance, 
a large number of regional studies after the economic reform are addressed to the 
regions of PRD and YRD, the two most dynamic regional economies in China. While 
the PRD region constitutes an assemblage of cities under the Guangdong province, 
the YRD consists of cities which are administered under different provinces.
Regional studies after the economic reform are at first largely concerned with the 
strong regional development in China and the implications to spatial transformation 
and regional inequalities. Only recently has regional governance begun to catch the 
attention of researchers. At first, intensive studies have been conducted on PRD and 
YRD regions in terms of development dynamics, urbanisation pattern, the role of the 
state, and regional inequalities and so forth. The development trajectories of the two 
regions in the 1980s were slightly different in that the economy of the PRD was 
largely influenced by the Hong Kong-based FDI, while that of the YRD was led by 
the development of TVEs. Yet, both of the developments demonstrated the pattern of 
bottom-up urbanisation, which was manifested by the rapid development of small 
towns (Ma and Lin, 1993; Ma and Fan, 1994). However, the development mode of the 
two regions seems to have converged since the 1990s. The YRD region also began to 
embrace FDI with the opening up of Pudong, Shanghai. A great number of 
researchers made the effort to posit the regional growth in these regions using various 
threads of theories, ranging from the micro-lens of cultural connections and 
interpersonal trust (guanxi) (e.g. Hsing, 1996) and the Marshallian Industrial District 
concept (e.g. Wei et al., 2007, 2009) to the macro-angle of globalisation, for example, 
strategic coupling (e.g. Yang, 2009) and the global production network (e.g. Wang 
and Lee, 2007; Yang and Hsia, 2007). Recently, it has been argued that both the 
localisation factors and the globalisation elements should be taken into account in 
explaining regional development (Wei, 2010).
Changing urban governance in the regions has also been witnessed through economic 
development. The local state has been transformed from being a passive 
implementation agent of the central state to becoming assertive and aligned with
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capital and economic investors (e.g. Chien, 2007; Eng, 1997; Wei, 2002). An 
outstanding feature of China’s regional progression is the fact that the local 
governments play a strong interventionist role in economic development by using 
their administrative monopoly. However, it is argued that there are minor differences 
between the YRD and PRD in terms of the local state. It is suggested that the 
government of the YRD is stronger and has even more proactive initiatives than that 
of the PRD (Yang, 2009). Although the active local government has played a crucial 
role in local economic progression, the interventionist local state has also caused 
problems in regional development. For example, many local governments are racing 
to reduce overheads such as tax rebate and land fees in order to attract foreign 
investment, which results in adverse competition between cities and regions (Chien 
and Gordon, 2008). Furthermore, unbridled inter-city competition tends to hinder the 
fostering of local clusters, which is crucial to innovation and industrial upgrading 
(Wang and Lee, 2007: 1886-1887). According to Chen (2007), the regional 
economies of both YRD and PRD feature low-tech industrialisation. Industrial 
upgrading is moving slowly in these regions and they are in danger of ‘being “locked 
into” a “low-road” (labour-intensive and wage-squeezing) to economic development’, 
although the YRD is enjoying a slightly more favourable manufacturing and 
knowledge environment with better timing than the PRD {ibid: 193). Moreover, the 
active intervention of local state also exacerbates regional inequality and focuses 
economic concentration on certain city-regions (e.g. Lin, 2009; Zhao et al., 2003; 
Zheng et al., 2009).
Compared to the intensive research on regional development, studies on regional 
governance in China are just emerging. It is found that, although the ‘traditional
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administrative barriers tend to keep cities in the region somewhat isolated in a vertical 
administrative system with relatively few horizontal ties’ (Chen, 2007: 196), and 
cities are competing with each other for manufacturing investment and squeezing 
profit margins for local economic growth (Chien and Gordon, 2008), regional 
cooperation is just emerging in the regions (e.g. Yeh and Xu, 2008; Zhang, 2006). 
The research has documented the historical development of regional cooperation and 
planning in China and discerned the intrinsic transformation of the priority of the 
regional agenda from administrative communication to partnership building (Luo and 
Shen, 2009; Yeh and Xu, 2008). It is suggested that the changing attitude of local 
governments towards cooperative development is fostered by potential external 
regional competition at home and overseas (Xu and Yeh, 2005; Zhang, 2006). 
However, it is argued that this attitude is far from eliminating all the hierarchical and 
horizontal inter-city conflicts (Chen, 2007: 195). In contrast, some major cities take 
advantage of the cooperative measures or administrative annexations (e.g. Luo and 
Shen, 2006; Yeh and Xu, 2008; Zhang and Wu, 2006). The politics within the local 
cooperative strategies are very well documented in both the PRD and YRD regions 
(e.g. Luo and Shen, 2006; Yang, 2005; Yeh and Xu, 2008). In addition to the 
spontaneous cooperative measures taken by the local governments, the two regions 
have also witnessed the preparation of a regional plan with the involvement of the 
higher-level government. It is suggested that this marked the rescaling of the central 
government to intervene in local excessive competition and manufacturing 
development (Wong et al., 2008; Xu, 2008).
The existing body of literature does well in analysing a particular event and 
unravelling the complicated and contextually specific power struggles and politics
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within the region-building process. However, there have been not enough attempts to 
examine and theorise the mechanism for state rescaling and the emergence of regional 
governance. Initially, it is explained that economic cooperation is the result of the 
development of economic regionalisation (Zhang, 2006). However, this assumption is 
criticised and it is argued that the development of economic regionalisation does not 
mean a firm consensus is formed between governments regarding the political agenda 
of economic cooperation (Yeh and Xu, 2008: 409). A hypothesis is then proposed 
through the lens of the changing economic accumulation regime and the crisis of the 
entrepreneurial city (Xu, 2008; Xu and Yeh, 2009, 2011), yet the proposition is still 
problematic in two respects. First of all, it seems to suggest that the transformation of 
state governance is naturally part of the process of a changing economic regime. 
Secondly, the literature does not specify the agent underlying the process, or tends to 
frame the agency vaguely with a single whole state. Therefore, the theoretical 
concepts developed from the Western context such as new state spaces, agency and 
politics of scale are helpful to improve understanding on China’s emerging regional 
governance.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter reviewed relevant debate and sought to understand regional 
re-ascendance in Western countries through a theoretical lens. A discussion on new 
regionalism was firstly initiated in the realm of economic geography in the turn 
towards ‘new institutionalism’. It is suggested that recent regional success stories such 
as ‘the Silicon Valley’ resulted from the ‘bottom-up’, or civil society-based forms of 
regional governance. Such a governance approach is assumed to be ‘good’ as it is well
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suited to enhancing regional competitiveness with regard to its ‘reflexivity’ and 
‘institutional learning’, which is highly compatible with a neoliberal view 
(Hadjimichalis, 2006: 696). However, such theorisation is fiercely challenged, 
particularly from a political economic perspective (e.g. MacLeod, 2001a, b). Although 
acknowledging the general shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’, it is believed that 
the role of the state is still indispensable because it is the state which orchestrates 
grassroots empowerment and the process of democratisation. It is thus argued that the 
transformation does not represent the diminishing role of the state, but rather the 
rescaling of state power. Henceforth, it is considered that studies focusing on the 
institutional settings within the regions tend to be based on value judgements rather 
than logical accuracy or data evidence (Bristow, 2010: 27), or what is called ‘soft 
institutionalism’ (MacLeod, 2001b). It is argued that regional transformation cannot 
be substantially interpreted if the political economy and the changing state are not 
taken into account (e.g. MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999a, b).
This critical regional approach is recognised as highly relevant to regional studies 
conducted in China, which remain largely influenced by neo-classical analysis. Even 
though the regulation approach is firstly developed from an abstract theory of 
capitalism accumulation and economic production, the efforts of spatialising 
regulation theory oriented it to the changing geographies of governance (Brenner, 
1999a). The ‘new state space’ is hence established to inform the geographical 
accounts of state restructuring (MacKinnon and Shaw, 2010: 1227). It emphasises that 
state space is socially produced and fluid; it is historically embedded and 
path-dependent (Brenner, 2004b). These conceptions allow the NSS framework to be 
focused on the process and the place-specific politics associated with state
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restructuring instead of the abstract accumulation process that is perceived to generate 
state reconfiguration. It is also the context-sensitive approach that makes the NSS 
framework appropriate to China’s experience, which is a transitional society 
remarkably different from the features of Western capitalism. Following the clues in 
the review, the study not only aims to examine the rescaling of Chinese statehood, but 
also to consider the ‘agency’, e.g. the role of central and local state, or other groups, 
in the process of changes and development. The study views city-region governance 
as a scale-building process open to the agenda of economic, political, environment, 
social and other problems, which needs to be examined carefully in empirical studies 
rather than presumed theoretically. The analysis framework of the research is hence 
organised as follows. The study firstly examines the regional renaissance in 
contemporary China. As informed by Brenner (2002), all regional strategies and 
projects ‘to establish institutions, policies or governance mechanisms at a 
geographical scale [...] within an urban agglomeration’ (p. 4-5) are included in the 
analysis. Afterwards, case studies are conducted to explore the mechanism and 
rationale behind the changing statehood and the building of regional scale. The 
examination is conducted from two aspects: the economics and the politics of regional 
development. The former is focused on the changing geography of the Chinese 
regional economy over the last half-a-century plus of economic reform and 
market-oriented development; the latter is concentrated on the agency and logic in the 
state rescaling in order to uncover the nature of the changing process. Finally, the 
‘new politics of scale’ is revealed through the investigation.
57
C h A p t e r  t h r e e
t r A n s f o r m A t i o n o f  r e g i o n A l  g o v e r n A n C e i n  C h i n A :
t h e  r e s C A l i n g o f  s t A t e h o o d
3.1 Introduction
Regions of various types during the history are reviewed in the chapter to offer a 
general overview of the changes in territorial governance in China from 1949 to the 
present day. Through describing the evolution of the central-local relationship and 
regional governance, it is suggested that although decentralisation from the central 
government and ministries to localities is a salient feature of China’s changing 
territorial governance after 1978, it is not the entire picture. Throughout the process, 
regionalisation efforts from both central and local governments also occurred for their 
own purposes.
In the first section, the evolution of urban and regional governance in China since 
1949 is illustrated in detail. The changing administrative apparatus at the urban and 
regional scale is examined with reference to existing studies on China’s economic 
decentralisation and urban entrepreneurialism. Then, the chapter investigates the 
changing regional concepts and regional policies in China. After an overview of the 
consequences of the downscaling of state regulations and state strategy, the recent 
practices beyond the downscaling of governance are highlighted. In the following 
sections, a variety of initiatives of governance up-scaling, administrative
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regionalisation and regional strategies are collected and examined. Particular concern 
is given to the initiator and the performance of the exercises. Subsequently, features of 
the recent regional renaissance are summarised. In the final part, the trajectory of the 
changing territorial governance is generalised and it is argued that the changing 
governance is dominated by state forces. Henceforth, the theoretical concepts o f ‘state 
spaces’ and ‘state spatial selectivity’ (e.g. Brenner 2004b) are highly relevant in 
theorising the transformation of governance in China.
3.2 The development of regional policy and governance in China from 1949 to
present
China’s territorial governance has undergone dramatic transformations since the 
launch of economic reforms. One salient change is the extensively documented 
decentralisation and the resultant changing urban governance. Specific forms of 
governance, such as pro-growth machine (e.g. Zhu, 1999; Zhang, 2002a), place 
promotion and entrepreneurial governance (e.g. Wu, 2000a, 2000b, 2003b), are 
widely documented, mainly based on case studies. However, the conventional notion 
of ‘decentralisation’ is just too general and simplistic. This section will examine the 
evolution of both state apparatus and spatial strategies. China used to be a country 
with a socialist tradition of strong regional policies and the issue of regional 
inequalities was of significant concern to both academia and national governors. Yet, 
the dimension of changing spatial strategies has kept being overlooked by previous 
studies. To fill the gap, this section is going to examine the demise and re-emergence 
of regions during the last few decades. Moreover, it will also reflect upon how 
governance was facilitating the implementation of the regional policies, and how the
regional policies were drifting away with the shift in governance.
3.2.1 State centralism and redistributive policies in the Socialist period
(1949-1978)
Prior to 1978, China operated a centrally-planned economic system dominated by 
vertical administration. It was characterised by constraints of resources; all production 
materials were nationalised and the national state held the monopoly to make final 
decisions. The State Planning Commission (guojia jihua weiyuan hui) was the 
backbone of the planned economy, deciding on input allocation and resource 
distribution across the country. The Five-Year Social and Economic Development 
Plan was the important government tool in managing investment projects and 
allocating production materials. The plan was manipulated in accordance with 
different sectors of economy. Under the State Planning Commission, subordinate 
ministries of different sectors were responsible for preparing individual plans for the 
investment, production, distribution and reproduction of their industries; afterwards, 
the command and quota was sent down from central ministries to local work-units 
(e.g. Unger, 1987: 16). The multiple levels of local states mirrored those of central 
government (Figure 3.1). The identical institutional design between central and local 
governments facilitated top-down administration through layers of government 
bureaucracy. Overall, except for some short term decentralisation during the Great 
Leap-forward and Cultural Revolution (e.g. Donnithome, 1972), power was highly 
centralised and rested with the central government during the period. Even during the 
Maoist administrative decentralisation period, central control continued and attempts 
were made to harness local initiatives to improve the implementation of national goals,
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rather than real devolution (Lardy, 1975; Wong, 1991b). In a word, local development 
did not take place without a central decision regarding financial investment and 
resource allocation (Naughton, 1995: 74; Ng and Tang, 1999: 593).
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Figure 3.1: Sectoral dominance and administrative hierarchy
Source: compiled from Yeh and Wu, 1998: 216.
Under state centralism, regional institutions above provinces were developed by the 
state to consolidate central control and intra-regional coordination. Table 3.1 shows 
the regional units established from 1949 until the 1970s. The regions of the early 
1950s housed the military, the Party and a full set of governmental departments; the 
‘economic coordination regions’ in the late 1950s were equipped with coordinating 
commissions and regional economic planning offices without Party-State
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organisations; whilst in the 1960s, Party Bureaus were reinserted into these regions to 
reinforce the regional authority (Solinger, 1978: 630).
Table 3.1: Regional administrations from 1949 to 1978
Period Regionaladministrations Regional constitution
Institutional
settings
Intention and
task
1949-1954
Great 
Administrative 
Regions 
(da xingzheng
qu)
Six regions, including the 
Northeast, the North 
China, the Northwest, the 
Southeast, the Central 
South, and the Southwest
The regions 
housed the 
military, Party and 
complete 
governmental 
departments
To strengthen 
central 
regulation, 
and facilitate 
sending down 
mandatory 
orders
1958-1961
Economic 
Cooperation 
Regions 
(jingji xiezuo qu)
Seven regions, including 
North China, the 
Northeast, the East 
China, the Central China, 
the South China, the 
Southwest and the 
Northwest
The regions were 
equipped with 
coordinating 
commissions and 
regional economic 
planning offices
To function as 
self-reliant 
economic 
regions under 
central 
guidance
1961-1966
Economic 
Cooperation 
Regions 
(jingji xiezuo qu)
Six regions, including 
North China, the 
Northeast, the East 
China, the Central-South, 
the Southwest and the 
Northwest
The regions were 
equipped with 
Party Bureaus and 
regional economic 
planning offices
To function as 
self-reliant 
economic 
regions under 
central 
guidance
1970
Economic 
Cooperation 
Regions 
(jingji xiezuo qu)
Ten regions including the 
Southwest, the 
Northwest, the Central 
China, the South China, 
the North China, the 
Northeast, the East 
China, the Min-Gan 
region, the Shandong 
region and the Xinjiang 
region
Not materialized
To function as 
self-reliant 
economic 
regions under 
central 
guidance
Source: compiled from Liu and Feng, 2008: 34-35.
The institutional settings of these regions were slightly different, yet they all served a 
similar rationale. During each period of region building, politics and the economy at 
the local level were conceived to be in chaos; hence, regions that spanned provinces 
were used in the service of the central state to enforce the implementation of central 
plans, to build rationally designed regional economic systems and to oversee the
discretion of local agents (Solinger, 1978). Take the East China Economic 
Coordination Region (1958-1966), for example. It comprised Shanghai municipality 
and other six provinces, namely, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Shandong, and 
Fujian. It was intended to establish a comprehensive industrial system within the 
region in accordance with centrally-planned orders. The region was equipped with a 
regional bureau and a regional economic planning office, which were directly led by 
the State Planning Commission and State Economic and Trade Commission of that 
time. The regional institutions worked as the agents of the central government to 
implement and coordinate targets (Chen X. Y., 2007: 6). For instance, the economic 
plans prepared by the provinces and municipalities within the region had to be 
submitted to the regional office. Then, a regional balance would be made to ensure a 
coordinated distribution of industries in the region. This was intended to optimise the 
use of production resources and the division of labour. In 1961, a Party Bureau was 
added to help to enforce the decisions made by the regional office. In short, the region 
did not represent a central concession to provincial autonomy, but acted as a path to 
centralisation. It was expected that these regions, smaller in size and closer to the 
central government, would share the burden of central management and meanwhile 
facilitate regional coordination under the dominance of ministerial planning.
Meanwhile, a salient characteristic of China’s post-1949 development strategy was 
the commitment to ‘redistributive’ goals. Equipped with the powerful centralised 
control of national economic planning and central-provincial revenue sharing, the 
state was enabled to redistribute material and financial resources both inter-sectorally 
and inter-regionally (Donnithome and Lardy, 1976: 340-341). The integrated strategy 
was made, as the old Chinese saying goes, ‘to take all regions into account like in
playing chess (quanguo yipanqiy . During the period of the First Social and Economic 
Five-Year Plan (1953-1958), industrial and infrastructure investment was channelled 
to interior areas in order to reverse the disproportionate distribution of industries 
between coastal and inner areas (Yang, 1990: 234-35). For instance, among the 
proposed 156 large-scale industrial projects, 42 were located in the western area and 
58 were placed in the northeast, with only five along the eastern coast; as to the 694 
middle-scale projects, 472 out of the 694 were sited away from the coast (Wang et al., 
1997: 23). This inland investment focus is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
180 360
O utput(1952) (1953-1958) (1966-1970)
H im  Coastal Area
I I Inland Area
Figure 3.2: Regional investment in the First Five-Year Plan (1953-1958)
Source: data is compiled from Liu and Feng, 2008: 34, 61.
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During the periods of the second and third Five-Year Plan (1966-1975), the country 
was divided into ‘First-Front’, ‘Second-Front’ and ‘Third-Front’ regions (Figure 3.3). 
Furthermore, ‘Third-Front Construction’ (sanxian jianshe) was prompted by the 
central authorities through the decade. Under the strategy, military and manufacturing 
industries were allocated or transferred to the Third Front Area, which was 
mountainous, inland and remote from the coastal area. The strategic decision was 
made under the circumstances of the Cold War and deteriorating relationships with 
the Soviet Union, and hence was mainly out of consideration for national defence 
(Naughton, 1988). Just in the years of 1964 and 1965, 174 plants were moved from 
industrial cities such as Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Shenyang to the Third Front 
region (State Council Development and Research Institute, 2008: 3). It is claimed that 
20 billion yuan were devoted to Third-front development during the period (Kirkby 
and Cannon, 1989: 9). The capital assets of SOEs in the region accounted for 35 per 
cent of total national assets (Wang et al., 1997: 27). As a result, industrial distribution 
in China was spread from the predominantly concentrated ‘First Front’ (yixian) along 
the coastal area, to the ‘Second Front’ (erxian) in the central area, and particularly to 
the ‘Third Front’ (sanxian) in the west. Throughout the course of the period, industrial 
productivity and transport accessibility in the west were therefore greatly improved 
(Figure 3.4). The railway lines of Chengdu-Kunming, Jiaozuo-Zhi cheng, 
Zhuzhou-Guiding, and Xiangfan-Chongqing were all constructed during the period, 
and were subsumed into the main transport network within the region (Chen, 2006).
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Figure 3.3: Regional division and investment in the Third and Fourth Five-Year 
Plans (1966-1975)
Source: compiled from Kirkby and Cannon, 1989: 5, 6, 8-9; Naughton, 1988: 365; Wang et al., 
1997: 23-28.
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Figure 3.4: Third-front development in the 1960s
Source: compiled from Chen, 2006: 99.
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The redistributive economic planning was made possible via the unitary state 
budgetary system. Revenue was transferred from richer to poor provinces in the form 
of state subsidies, or in Chinese terms, ‘blood transfusions’ {da shuxue). For example, 
the wealthiest provinces usually remitted over 60 percent of their revenue to the 
central government, whilst poorer provinces only turned in 10 to 40 percent 
(Donnithorne and Lardy, 1976: 341). In return, primary materials in the 
resource-abundant poor regions were procured by the central state at low prices to 
support manufacturing in the richer production provinces (Wu and Zhang, 2010: 60). 
When compared with the compensatory regional policies in the UK, the two practices 
were fundamentally divergent. Whereas regional institutions and regional policy in
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the UK at the time was trying to equalise the distribution of population, industry, 
infrastructure and public services across the nation, the redistributive efforts made in 
China in the form of channelling industrial projects to the interior were much more 
limited in scale. It is argued that the redistributive regional policy in socialist China 
was, in actuality, a kind of counter-measure to balance the enlarging regional 
inequality incurred by centrally-organised labour division between regions for 
industrialisation (Wu and Zhang, 2010: 62). The arguments regarding whether the 
redistribution efforts were for the attainment of egalitarian development per se, or 
primarily for the ends of national defence and rapid industrialisation, were also 
examined by earlier studies (e.g. Donnithome and Lardy, 1976; Kirkby and Cannon, 
1989: 5).
3.2.2 The development of the urban scale after economic reform (1978-2000)
In 1978, economic reform and the open-door policy were launched in China. 
Economic decentralisation was actively promoted by the central state to dismantle the 
command economy and to accommodate the market from the 1980s. While the 
supra-provincial regional institution was not completely abandoned by the central 
government, these kinds of regions were much frailer in power after economic reform, 
since they were only alliances organised between the municipal Economic Trade 
Bureau rather than a level of government body. That is, the purpose of the regional 
settings changed from political consolidation to economic development and economic 
regionalisation. For example, the East China Economic Zone was announced in 1981 
by the central government to promote horizontal economic cooperation and 
coordination. The founding of the economic regions rose to a peak in 1986 when the
68
State Council published an official document on promoting horizontal economic 
alliances. Prior to the end of 1987, more than 100 economic zones had been 
established under the proposal of the central state (Xu, 2008: 14). Although these 
regions were centrally mandated, they were essentially loosely organised and 
informally institutionalised (Xu and Yeh, 2011: 106). These organisations were 
actually coalitions on a voluntary basis, conferred with no central power or any 
funding resources.
In contrast to the weakened role of regions, profound administrative adjustments were 
introduced after economic reform, which contributed to the sharp increase in the 
number of cities in China (Chung, 2007; Ma and Cui, 1987). ‘City administering 
counties (shi dai xian or shi guan xiariy and ‘converting entire counties to 
county-level cities {xian gai shi)’ are the two measures that transformed the territorial 
management of cities in the 1980s. The ‘city administering counties’ was the new 
administrative system in which prefecture-level cities were authorised to administer 
their surrounding counties. The new system was carried out in three ways: ‘merge 
prefecture-level cities with prefectures’, ‘abolish prefectures and establish 
prefecture-level cities’, and ‘promote some counties directly to prefecture-level cities’ 
(Ma, 2005: 487). The three means contributed to a decrease in prefectures and an 
increase in prefecture-level cities. Figure 3.5 shows that the number of prefectures 
decreased from 173 in 1978 to 58 in 1999, and that prefecture-level cities increased 
from 98 in 1978 to 236 in 1999. ‘Converting entire counties to county-level cities’ 
was the administrative means to turn counties, which by definition are rural areas, into 
cities (Ma, 2005: 490). This was considered to be the main way to establish ‘cities’ in 
the 1980s and 1990s (ibid: 491). Figure 3.5 demonstrates that the number of counties
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decreased from 2,009 in 1978 to 1,510 in 1999, whereas county-level cities increased 
from 92 to 427 during the same period. As a result, the total number of cities 
increased considerably from 190 to 668 between 1978 and 1998.
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Figure 3.5: Urban administrative changes from 1978 to 1999
Source: compiled from Ministry o f Civil Affairs, 1998a, b, 1999, 2000.
It is suggested that the administrative changes at the urban level were ‘...associated 
with a localization process’ (Chung, 2007: 793). This is because political-economic 
power rapidly devolved from the central government to provinces and localities since 
the economic reform, and a dominant degree of administrative power was delegated 
to city governments. The reformed fiscal system is widely cited as the beginning of 
decentralisation in China. From the late 1970s, the responsibility for collecting fiscal 
revenue was decentralised, along with the right of disposal. It is argued that this 
reform caused China’s fiscal and financial system to go through a dramatic 
transformation from a unitary system to a ‘federal’ one (e.g. Montinola et al.y 1995;
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Qian and Weignast, 1997). After the fiscal contracting reform, local government 
expenditures accounted for around half of total government expenditure; the 
proportion increased from 1985 and stabilised at around 70% in 1989 for ten years. 
Furthermore, the percentage has kept rising since 2004, after a slight drop in 2000 
(Figure 3.6). Figure 3.6 shows that the central government maintained a decentralised 
pattern of government expenditure, even after the 1994 tax sharing reform, when 
fiscal distribution became more favourable to the central government and better 
methods of taxation were put into the central government’s pocket (Tao et al., 2010: 
2222). Faced with the mounting spending obligation, local revenue was starved to a 
great extent. Fiscal decentralisation has effectively hardened the soft budget (Smart, 
1998: 435,439; Walder, 1995) and local governments have been pushed to expand 
their revenue making capacity. As long as the central revenue is guaranteed, the 
central government turns a blind eye to local discretions such as diverting resources 
from budgetary to extra-budgetary channels or expanding extra-budgetary funds 
instead of budgetary revenues (Wong, 1991a). As a consequence, the volume of 
extra-budgetary funds was drastically expanded after the economic reform (L-Y. 
Zhang, 1999: 123-127).
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Figure 3.6: Percentage of central and local government expenditures between
1978 and 2008
Source: National Statistical Bureau, 2009
The fiscal restraint and expenditure obligations triggered provinces to put forward 
further fiscal contracts and devolve power towards localities. Local fiscal and 
administrative autonomy was conceived as the means to promote local initiatives in 
economic development. Some administrative decision powers were downscaled and 
finally dissolved, due to the gradual domination of the market mechanism, for 
example, in the sphere of commodity trade and foreign trade. However, some 
devolved administrative powers, such as investment approval for big projects, urban 
planning control, and land use management, transferred fundamental state power from 
provinces to cities. In respect of investment regulation, since 2001, local governments 
have been empowered to make decisions on overseas-invested projects with a value 
below 50 million US dollars, and have full authority on infrastructure construction 
projects as long as they are not funded by local revenue (Zhang and Zhang, 2005: 17).
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As a result, 70% of social investment is actually approved by the local government 
{ibid: 43). That is to say, central government is generally not involved in local 
economic development nowadays. While of significance, the implication of economic 
devolution to changing urban governance is not as potent as that of the administrative 
devolution on land and planning control, which started later on during the 1990s. As 
suggested by Wu (2003a: 1678), what was characterised by this period before the 
1990s was just random market-oriented activities, i.e. a preliminary form of 
entrepreneurial behaviour. The entrepreneurship of local government resulted from 
the symbiosis of the local state with SOEs and TVEs from a revenue perspective (Tao 
etal., 2010: 2221).
However, the 1994 fiscal sharing reform (Tao et al., 2010: 2220-2222) as well as the 
administrative devolution of land and planning control triggered more strategic urban 
governance of entrepreneurial cities. In 1980, the enactment of the Provisional 
Regulation for the Preparation of the Urban Plan indicated the transition from 
ministry-led development to urban plan-led development (Yeh and Wu, 1998: 178). 
The 1989 City Planning Act further consolidated the authority of local governments in 
land use management through the regulation that all development projects, no matter 
whether they were overseen by a government body or private developers, had to make 
applications for site-selection, land use and a development permit (Ng and Xu, 2000: 
412). More importantly, the preparation of the local plan was implemented by the 
same authority and the plan making proceeded without much guidance from 
upper-level government. In other words, local plan making was generally a kind of 
local issue, without much involvement by upper-level government. Although plan 
documents and revisions were required to be approved by the higher-level or even
central government, local strategies were predominantly formulated by localities 
under the will of local government (e.g. Wu and Zhang, 2007). Additionally, the 
enactment of the Land Administration Law in 1986 also transformed the land 
administration from central allocation to urban authorities (Wu, 2000b: 1362). 
Subsequently, local land administration bureaus at or above the county level were 
established to grant land use rights and land leasing (Chen and Wills, 1999: 37). 
Furthermore, the amended Constitution Article in 1988 legitimised land as a 
commodity. The land conveyance fees were, in practice, pocketed by local 
governments as local extra-budgetary incomes, although by law 30% of the revenues 
should have belonged to the central government (Tao et al., 2010: 2225). In a word, 
the local governments virtually became the managers, as well as the main beneficiary 
parties, of local land development. As land revenue became a significant source for 
local revenue, the local governments were turned into entrepreneurial agents in land 
development (Zhu, 1999; Zhang, 2002a).
Henceforth, particularly since the 1990s, cities gained unprecedented autonomy in 
local development, and possessed privileged administration resources such as making 
comprehensive economic plans, formulating local strategies, setting local taxation 
rates, leasing urban land and granting urban land use. In contrast to the socialist 
hierarchical control, urban government became the major actor in the local economy. 
The changing role of the local state was firstly documented by, for example, Oi (1992, 
1995), Walder (1995) and Unger and Chan (1999). Impelled by the growth imperative 
from fiscal strain and cadre tenure evaluation by an overriding criterion of economic 
growth, urban government formed an alliance with the capital and, hence, city-based 
entrepreneurial governance was established (Wu, 2000a). Through place-marketing to
sell cities as production sites, urban government achieved not only enormous GDP 
growth, but also huge amounts of land-leasing income through land commodification.
Moreover, urban governance also witnessed consistent down-scaling towards urban 
districts, towns and townships within the municipality. For example, in 1992, 
Shanghai devolved an array of key administrative powers such as fiscal revenues, 
construction fees, urban planning, financial management, state asset management, 
regulation of foreign trade and investment, and land leasing to district governments 
(Wu, 2002). Furthermore, power was decentralised to residential offices and 
communities to help the municipal and district governments to manage fluid 
population and community service (Zhang, 2002b: 312; Wu et al., 2007: 127-130). On 
the one hand, it is observed that the devolution and reconfiguration of the local state 
strengthened and consolidated state governance at the local level (Shue, 1995: 97; 
Chung, 2007: 793; Wu et al., 2007: 132-133). The state fostered urban communities 
and extended government functions into base-level organisations to re-fill the 
governance vacuum caused by increasing mobility after marketisation (Wu et al., 
2007: 132-133). However, on the other hand, decentralisation also empowered 
grassroots organisations and fostered entrepreneurial governance (Wu, 2002: 
1084-1087). As shown by the studies of He and Wu (2005) and Yang and Chang 
(2007), district governments have become the major actors engaged in current urban 
redevelopment. In part, this is due to the fact that the devolution of power 
accompanies responsibility for self-finance, which pushes district governments to 
scramble for fiscal resources (Zhang, 2002b: 311). As a result, the devolved 
regulatory power is utilised instrumentally by local authorities for local revenue 
creation.
Fiscal burdens at a higher level of government led to the radical solution of 
self-financing for almost all the localities, which also laid down the premises for fiscal 
autonomy, economic and administrative devolution. Pushed by financial responsibility 
and driven by growth first mentality, even towns and villages entered the race for 
inward investment alongside city and county government (Wei, 2002). In order to 
stimulate local economic development, Zhejiang province began testing power 
devolution from municipal governments (prefecture-level cities) to county-level 
governments (county-level cities, counties, and city districts) as early as 1992. By 
2006, four rounds of power devolution had been carried out to expand the power of 
economically strong counties (kuoquan qiangxian). Twelve main categories of 
administrative power have been devolved, including economic planning, commodity 
and trade, foreign trade, land and resources, transport and construction (Z. B. Zhang, 
2009: 61). The broad range of new competencies in the county-level government has 
improved the business environment of county-level jurisdictions, and even freed 
county-level governments from control by prefecture-level governments (Chien, 2010: 
144). Throughout the process, these county-level units have almost possessed 
equivalent administrative power to municipal governments. However, although power 
devolution has greatly helped to flatten hierarchical control and fix administrative 
procedures, it also decentralised the decision-making structure in the local territories 
and caused it to be scattered in discrete territorial administrations.
The simultaneous downward shift to the urban scale was also taking place in state 
spatial strategies. After 1978, the ideology of egalitarianism was abandoned due to the 
practical problems of production efficiency and fiscal deficit (e.g. Luo and Pannell, 
1991: 29; Yang, 1990: 240). The national policy framework was sharply reoriented
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from the pursuit of equality to efficiency (Prime, 1991: 9; Fan, 1995: 424). An uneven 
economic strategy was introduced by the central state to emphasise comparative 
advantages and efficiency. It was stated that uneven development was an inevitable 
stage and would eventually lead to uniform wealth via a trickle-down effect (Fan, 
1997). As a result, the more competitive coastal area, in place of the interior, was 
prioritised in national policies. Since the late 1970s, the coastal share of central 
government investment increased from 40 percent to about half (Yang, 1990: 246). In 
contrast, a redistributive policy to poorer regions was addressed to more pragmatic 
objectives - poverty alleviation rather than regional disparity alleviation {ibid: 255). It 
is argued that active programmes on local initiatives and endogenous development 
would have been more effective and efficient than prior passive ones relying on 
subsidies (Wang et al., 1997).
In contrast to the fading regional policies, many urban programmes were launched 
during the period, with an explicit regional bias towards the coast. For example, 
various open zones were designated to attract foreign investment, all in the coastal 
area. After the announcement of four Special Economic Zones in 1980, another 
fourteen open coastal cities were assigned in 1984. These urban programmes entailed 
a package of preferential policies and power decentralisation, ranging from 
investment, through foreign-exchange retention, revenue remittance and price, to 
finance (Fan, 1995: 426). As a result of the preferential policies for foreign investors 
locating projects in the coastal area, of the total of 41,998 foreign projects approved 
by the governments from 1979 to 1991, 37,665 (89.7%) were located on the coast 
whilst 3,973 (9.5%) were based inland (Liu, 2007: 222). Apart from the economic 
zones and the opening of cities for trade, the state was also determined to build some
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global cities to introduce China to the global stage. One striking example is the 
phenomenal development of Shanghai. Rather than being the ‘pump of blood 
transfusion’ to the whole country, it is documented that Shanghai received a massive 
central tax return and reduction in the 1990s, which significantly helped its initial 
infrastructure investment (Wu, 2003: 1688). Moreover, the Pudong New area was 
conferred with a sub-municipality administrative rank, which is higher than ordinary 
urban districts (Wu, 2000b: 352). Overall, the socialist regional redistributive policies 
have been largely substituted by urban programmes, in which growth poles are 
expected to lead the regional development and spontaneously remove the uneven 
pattern of growth distribution.
3.2.3 Consequences of the downscaling of governance
Under the centrally-planned economy, continuous efforts were made to build a 
regional economy by a ministry-led economy, where horizontal links were inherently 
highly insufficient (e.g. Donnithome, 1972: 610; Wong, 1991b; Fan, 1995: 423). In 
the market economy, however, economic regionalisation was developing 
spontaneously, but was nevertheless under artificial barriers. This was because 
economic localism was beginning to emerge due to economic decentralisation and 
competition. ‘Dukedom economies’ (zhuhou jingji) were particularly common in the 
second half of the 1980s (for more materials and documentary sources, please see e.g. 
Breslin, 1995: 68-70; Breslin, 2000: 224, note 27-28; Zhao and Zhang, 1999: 272), 
when economic trade and outflow was blockaded by China’s provincial and local 
governments (Lee, 1998: 281). Local protectionism and impediments to economic 
integration were so common between provinces that economists think the domestic
market was even less developed than openness to foreign trade (e.g. Poncet, 2003). 
Although regional blockading of the market gradually subsided due to substantial 
progress in price reform, the 1994 tax assignment reform and the increasing share of 
non-state economic sectors, fierce inter-city competition did not reduce in the least 
(e.g. Chien and Gordon, 2008; Wu and Zhang, 2007; Xu and Yeh, 2005; Zhang and 
Wu, 2006). Inter-locality competition was then particularly manifested in the implicit 
realms of policies and strategies, as well as in project competition and road 
disconnection. For example, Shanghai used local funds to construct its own sea port, 
despite the fact that Ningbo port is just nearby. Such policy emulation and repetitive 
construction worsened the zero-sum competition (Chien, 2008). Furthermore, it is 
observed that the border area was often marginalised and deficiently invested by local 
jurisdictions (Zhou, 2008: 242). That is, local government would make no investment 
outside its own jurisdiction, or make any investment that was expected to benefit 
others more than itself. Overall, the economic contour was still dominantly confined 
by administrative boundaries. It is suggested that local governments showed little 
interest in cross-border cooperation (Wang et al., 1997: 39). This is conceptualised by 
Chinese scholars as a phenomenon unique to China, and is termed as ‘economy based 
on administrative divisions’ (xingzheng qu jingji) (Liu, 2001). That is, market 
activities and economic development were divided by invisible walls established by 
administrative boundaries.
On the other hand, the downscaling of governance power also challenged the 
authority of higher-level regulation. One typical example was in the sphere of land 
use and planning control. In order to tackle the environmental problems caused by 
rapid and widespread economic development, the State Planning Commission
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launched territorial planning (guotu guihua), a kind of trans-administrative regional 
plan, in the late 1980s and the 1990s across the country. However, since planning 
power had been decentralised from the central government, the requirements for 
rational land use and spatial labour division from the central government were nearly 
impossible to carry out in provinces, cities and counties. As a result, these formulated 
plans eventually failed to be applied (Hu, 2006: 586). This kind of local discretion 
was not only present between the central government and localities, but within 
localities as well. Provinces and municipalities all met with difficulties in remedying 
rampant land encroachment and uncoordinated development in their jurisdiction, 
owing to the devolution of planning control towards cities and counties (Ng and Tang, 
1999). Take urban planning as another example. As administrative power had been 
devolved from the municipality to districts and towns, the municipal urban planning 
turned out to be merely responsible for central city land management. Even the 
statutory urban system plan at the municipal level couldn’t regulate town and village 
development under its jurisdiction, since they had been empowered with local 
decisions (Xu, 2006: 40). In other words, the governance downscaling towards 
localities at the mean time produced governance fragmentation and in-coordination. 
Due to insufficient coordination at the urban and regional level, duplicate 
development across administrative boundaries became pervasive. It is concerning that 
production over-capacity built up in some industries. In 2004, the nationwide 
over-investment in steel, cement, and the electrolytic aluminium industry was so 
severe that austere economic programmes were applied by the central state (Zhang 
and Zhang, 2005: 12). Another example is from the YRD region. It is calculated that 
the average industrial similarity coefficient1 between Jiangsu and Zhejiang was 0.954
1 The similarity coefficient calculation formula is Sij= E (X in • Xjn) / V ( £ X  2 in) • ( E X  2jn). X inrepresents the
concentration o f industrial sector n in the area i, and Xjn represents the concentration of industrial sector n in the
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from 1993 to 2002, the coefficient between Shanghai and Jiangsu was 0.843, while 
that between Zhejiang and Shanghai was 0.747 (Zhang et al., 2007: 309). The same 
conclusion can be made from similar manufacturing products produced by each 
economic development zone within the region (ibid: 311).
In terms of uneven development, it is widely recognised that the disparities between 
rich and poor areas had been enlarging, especially after the economic reform. During 
the 1950s and 1960s, it is shown that productive capacity underwent some relative 
shifts from the coast to inland, particularly to the Third-Front area (Wang et al., 1997: 
29). However, in terms of industrial output and per capita income, the pattern is 
inconclusive (Fan, 1995: 423-424, 427; Wang et al., 1997: 29). Although a large 
amount of state capital did go to the interior provinces by means of a centralised fiscal 
and investment system (Wei and Ma, 1996), it was far from enough to effect 
fundamental change in regional inequality (Wei, 1996). The persistence of inequality 
is primarily attributable to the legacy of an uneven spatial economy, urban-centred 
industrialisation, and poor returns of interior investment (Wei, 1999: 51). In particular, 
the subsidised energy and raw material supplies to urban sectors under a distorted 
price structure contributed to the problem of urban-rural and inter-sectoral dualism in 
the Socialist economy (Naughton, 1995: 71-73). In the 1980s, interprovincial 
inequality declined, especially in the eastern regions due to the slow growth of old 
industrial cores such as Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin and the rapid development of 
other growth cores in previously less developed provinces (Wei and Ma, 1996). 
Nevertheless, interregional inequality persisted and economic growth did not spread 
from the initially developed areas to the central and western region, as previously
area j. The Sy index is the similarity coefficient. A higher Sy index suggests a higher similarity o f industrial 
structure between two areas.
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justified. In the 1990s, inequality even surged and the rate stabilised from the late 
1990s (Fan and Sun, 2008). It is recognised that regionally-biased fiscal, investment, 
FDI and decentralisation policies launched after economic reform were the main 
determinants of regional inequality (e.g. Fan, 1992; Ma and Wei, 1997; Wei, 1996, 
2000; Wei and Fan, 2000; Zhao and Tong, 2000; Long and Ng, 2001). Although the 
openness policy was actually extended to the whole country in the 1990s, foreign 
direct investment kept concentrating on the coastal area. Furthermore, the 
development gap not only existed between regions and within regions, but also within 
provinces and cities (e.g. Wei and Fan, 2000; Wei and Ye, 2004; Wei, 2007). 
According to a case study set in Zhejiang (Ye and Wei, 2005), it is found that the 
historical inequality between the coast and southern interior within the province 
widened, and the emergence of rapidly growing cores tended to concentrate in three 
clusters, that is, Hangzhou-Shaoxing-Ningbo, the coastal Wenzhou-Taizhou, and the 
central Jinhua-Quzhou. In other words, the spatial pattern of inequality is now not 
simply between cities and counties, but between certain city-regions and the 
remaining area.
Fiscal decentralisation contributed to and exacerbated the growing gap between rich 
and poor regions. Firstly, it is argued that the revenue contract scheme influenced the 
proportion of central revenue and, hence, impacted on the capability of central transfer. 
However, the situation did not improve after tax sharing reform in 1994 (Yep, 2008). 
Secondly, it is revealed that after inter-regional transfer was reduced in the 
post-reform period, the replacement scheme had not yet been well addressed (Ma, 
1995: 230; Wong, 1991a: 712; L-Y. Zhang, 1999: 140). The substituted national 
poverty alleviation plan was limited to certain extremely deprived areas and although
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programmes of inter-provincial assistance, joint development and technological 
transfer were firmly encouraged by the central government, they were voluntary and 
based on a principle of mutual benefit. It is reported that the cooperation dialogue was 
effectively more favourable to the coast than to the interior (Prime, 1991: 21; Yang, 
1990: 253). Thirdly, it is suggested that the limited amount of transferred money was 
oriented more to minority regions for political concerns rather than all the poor 
regions (Liu, 2007: 214-17). Finally, the inter-govemmental transfer functioned 
poorly and could even be manipulated by provincial or municipal governments in the 
midway. The countryside, particularly in the backward areas, therefore experienced 
extreme difficulties (ibid: 218-19). Overall, local discretions, fragmented governance, 
adverse inter-locality competition and the enlargement of uneven development have 
come to be conceived as the urgent issues that caused the governance capacity crises 
in China.
3.2.4 The re-emergence of the regional scale in China (2000-present)
After decades of marginalisation of regional institutions and policies, new regional 
concepts have reappeared in China since 2000. Not only regional policies have been 
resumed, but also regional plans and alliances have been rejuvenated. The emergence 
of regional governance is being heatedly discussed in the Chinese literature, 
especially from the perspectives of planning, administration and institutions (e.g. 
Hong, 2009; Ji et al., 2006; Tao, 2007; Wang, 2008; Wang, 2009; B. J. Yang, 2004; 
Zhang et al., 2007; Zong, 2008). The following sections will elaborate the changes 
and practices of various aspects. They include the new western, middle and coastal 
regional polices, and the main functional area plan, which represents the return of
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regional policies; the recentralisation of land management, and 
province-leading-county administrative reform, which manifests an upward scaling of 
governance towards the regional scale; and various regionalisation exercises 
undertaken by both central and local governments, which consist of urban 
administrative annexation and mergers, the building of regional alliances and 
partnerships, and the formulation of regional plans.
3.3 The re-emergence of coordinated regional policies since 2000
Regional policies in China have been characterised by preferential treatment for 
coastal and urban areas (especially large cities) since economic reform. However, the 
central state has launched a series of new regional policies since 2000 in order to cope 
with the regional issue of enlarging economic disparities. Following the proposal of 
Developing the Western Region in late 1999, the central government successively 
proposed the strategy of Reviving North-East Industrial Base and Boosting the 
Midland Economic Growth in 2003 and in 2004 (See Figure 3.7). The proposal of the 
three regional policies marks the revival of balanced regional policies after a long 
absence since the economic reform.
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Figure 3.7: Strategy of regional coordinated development launched in early 2000s
Source: compiled by the author.
These programmes contain a package of discrete policies. The current policy 
packages and institutional apparatus in the western, middle and northeast regional 
programmes have been compiled from various sources and are listed in Table 3.2. 
Take the west development, for instance; the programme involves massive state 
investment and strong political support. As early as 1997, the central government 
elevated Chongqing, a major city within the region, to be directly administered under 
the State Council in order to use its conspicuous administrative status to build a 
growth pole in the western region. In January of 2000, the Leading Group Office for 
Western Region Development was set up under the State Council. Moreover, a 
specific Five-Year Plan was prepared for the region in both Tenth and Eleventh
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Five-Year Plan periods. In addition to increasing central fiscal expenditure, a 
favourable bank credit scheme and tax policies have also been designed for western 
provinces (Naughton, 2004: 267).
Table 3.2: National policies for western, central and northeast regions from 1999 to 2009
Western Northeast Central
Institutional
setting
West Development Leading Group Office set up under the State Council in 
2000
Northeast Regeneration Leading 
Group Office set up under the State 
Council in 2004
Reviving Mid-land Region 
Office set up under the 
National Development and 
Reform Commission in 2007
Policy focus To make development strategy, planning and policies; 
To ensure environmental protection;
To encourage investment.
To make industrial planning and 
policies;
To assist the restructuring of 
state-owned heavy manufacturing 
enterprises.
To make development 
strategy and planning;
To coordinate development 
policies;
To encourage investment.
Published
central
documents
Circular on implementing West Development Policies by the State Council 
in 2000;
Implementation of a Directive on Western Development Policies by the 
State Council in 2001;
West Region Development Master Plan in the Tenth Five-Year Plan period 
in 2002;
The formulation of laws on the promotion of western development is taken 
into procedural consideration in 2003;
Further Implementing Advice on Western Development Policies issued by 
State Council in 2004;
West Region Development Master Plan in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan 
period issued in 2005;
Directive on Implementing Old 
Industrial Base Regeneration 
Policies by State Council in 2003; 
Implementation of a Directive on 
Promoting the further Opening of 
Northeast Old Industrial Base by 
State Council in 2005
Directive on Implementing 
Middle Region Revival 
Policies by State Council in 
2005;
Preferential
policies
Tax reduction from 2001 to 2010 for both domestic and foreign investors 
who invest in the west in preferred industries;
Exemption from tax on land occupation if invested in highway construction; 
Exemption from tariffs on imported equipment of encouraged industries; 
Relaxed restrictions on the foreign investment field mean telecom, 
insurance, retailing business and so on will be opened to foreign investors.
VAT tax rebate for eight industries, 
including equipment manufacture, 
petrochemical industry, metallurgy, 
marine manufacturing, motor 
industry, military manufacturing, 
high-technology industry, and 
agricultural processing
To be materialised
Source: compi ed from http://www.chinawest.gov.cn/web/Column.asp?ColumnId=16: http://x 3kfs.ndrc.g0v.cn/igsz/default.htm;
http://chinaneast.xinhuanet.com/iianiie.htm: http://dbzxs.ndrc.gov.cn/.
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In addition to the mega-regional policies, the state council initiated a ‘new socialist 
countryside’ project in 2002 in order to tackle the entrenched inequalities between 
urban and rural areas. Before then, the countryside had been suffering from fiscal 
deficits and poorer infrastructure, since the city-leading-county system and the 
post-reform economic policies had been biased toward the urban area (e.g. Chung, 
2007). Nevertheless, the central government prioritised rural problems from 2004. 
The First State Council Document has been dedicated to rural development for eight 
successive years (Table 3.3). The document is also dubbed as ‘No. 1 central 
document’. This is the first document released by the CPC Central Committee and the 
State Council at the beginning of every year. The document is of great significance, 
since it represents the government’s priorities for that year. Due to the importance of 
the document, all relevant ministries and departments of the government will 
subsequently present their working programmes in order to implement the central 
policy. Therefore, the eight consecutive documents targeted at issues of agriculture 
and peasants have demonstrated the efforts and determination of the central 
government to improve rural conditions. These policies comprise five main aspects: 
subsidies and price support as a commitment to rural income, the abolition of 
agricultural tax and fees, the protection of rural collective land rights, the gradual 
elimination of restrictions of hukou and rural-urban migration, and increasing central 
government spending on rural health, technology, education, physical and social 
infrastructures in rural areas. It is estimated that the appropriation and subsidies from 
the state budget since 2004 have amounted to 30 billion Yuan (Liu, 2007: 173). The 
initiatives manifest a remarkable reorientation of national development priority from 
urban areas to the vast rural regions.
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Table 3.3: The series of No. 1 State Council Documents from 2004 to 2011
Issued date Name of the document Key issues
February 8, 2004 Instructions on increasing peasant 
income by Chinese Communist Party 
Central Committee and State Council
To solve the problem that the rural 
income per capita was increasing 
very slowly
January 30, 2005 Instructions on broadening 
government work on rural 
development and improving rural 
comprehensive productivity by 
Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee and State Council
To consolidate existing agricultural 
policies;
To improve agricultural 
productivity;
To adjust the agricultural and rural 
economic structure
February 21, 2006 Instructions on promoting the 
construction of a new socialist 
countryside by Chinese Communist 
Party Central Committee and State 
Council
To consolidate existing agricultural 
policies;
To improve rural infrastructure;
To promote the development of 
human services in rural areas
January 29, 2007 Instructions on advocating modem 
agriculture and steadily promoting 
the construction of a new socialist 
countryside by Chinese Communist 
Party Central Committee and State 
Council
To modernise agricultural 
development by means of modem 
engineering, modem technology, a 
modem industrial system and a 
modem management style
January 30, 2008 Instructions on intensifying rural 
infrastructure construction and 
promoting rural development and 
improving rural income by Chinese 
Communist Party Central Committee 
and State Council
To promote the urban-rural 
coordinated development;
To industrialise agricultural 
industry;
To urbanise rural areas
February 1, 2009 Instructions on promoting steady 
agricultural growth and improving 
rural income by Chinese Communist 
Party Central Committee and State 
Council
To keep supporting agricultural 
development;
To stabilise agricultural 
production;
To improve modem engineering 
and service systems in rural areas; 
To promote urban-rural 
coordinated development
January 31, 2010 Instructions on consolidating urban 
and rural coordinated development 
and rural growth by Chinese 
Communist Party Central Committee 
and State Council
To stabilise rice production;
To modernise agricultural industry; 
To increase rural income;
To promote the development of 
human services in rural areas;
To reform rural land management 
systems and financial systems
January 29, 2011 Decision on accelerating water 
conservancy reform and development 
by Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee and State Council
To accelerate the development of 
water conservation;
To tackle flood and drought issues 
and promote the sustainable use of 
resources
Source: compiled from http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/10893986.html. and
http://europe.chinadailv.com.cn/china/2011-01/31/content 11945533.htm. accessed on 7 Feb, 
2011 .
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Overall, it seems the national regional policy has entered a new stage since 2000. In 
place of the ideology of growth being of overriding importance, the concept of 
coordinated development was put forward during the Third Plenary Sessions of the 
Sixteenth Central Committee (11/10/2003-14/10/2003). This represents that a 
balanced, coordinated and sustainable development mode is advocated by the central 
state to replace decades of uneven development and growth-first mentality (c.f. Fan, 
2006). New emphases are now laid on balanced urban-rural and regional development, 
social harmony, environmental protection and energy conservation. In 2007, the 
Scientific Development (kexue fazhan guari) was written into the Party Law and the 
strategy of coordinated development was reaffirmed by the Seventeenth Communist 
Party Committee National Congress (15/10/2007-21/10/2007). It is put forward that 
the forthcoming core issue for all the governments is to narrow the regional 
development gap, optimise the pattern of territorial development, and equalise public 
services between different regions. Nevertheless, it is still too early to examine the 
real effect of these discursive policies on redressing inequality.
3.4 Launch of the main functional area policy in 2005
After economic reform, the territory plan (guotu guihua) was imported from Japan 
and Western Europe, and the State Council prepared to enforce it in the early 1980s. 
At that time, various tiers of local planning commissions above the county-level were 
instructed to prepare their levels of territory plan, and a national-level plan and 
nineteen key trans-boundary plans were formulated by the National Planning 
Commission (NPC) (Wang and Hague, 1993: 567). The plan was anticipated to justify 
national leaders in constraining the downsides of market-oriented development and to
90
preserve natural resources through land use regulation (Hu, 2006). In other words, the 
territory plan was intended to be used to guide local development in place of 
top-down economic planning and economic command. However, the making of the 
territorial plan came to a halt in 1996 (Hu, 2006) due to many reasons. For example, 
the formulation of the plan and its document lacked legitimate status; moreover, the 
plan was only a blueprint document without any concern for the implementation 
mechanism and public policies. As a result, the effect of the plan was increasingly 
challenged by decentralisation and market reform, where the governance context was 
much more complicated than purely top-down instructions and administrative 
obedience. Furthermore, the territory plan was criticised for being actually grounded 
upon economic growth and was, in essence, a productivity distribution plan like that 
in the socialist period, since the plan mainly placed locations of growth centres (Wang 
and Hague, 1993: 571; Mao and Fang, 2002: 270; Yin et al., 2007: 14).
In October 2006, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) took 
the initiative to prepare The Main Functional Area Plan for the whole national 
territory. The initiative gained strong support from the State Council. Compared with 
the previous territory plan, the new plan divided the national territory into four types 
of development units: a ‘prioritised development area, optimised development area, 
constrained development area and forbidden development area’. This was intended to 
plan the intensity of territorial development and population distribution in order to 
achieve the ‘scientific development’ advocated by the central government, i.e. 
coordinated and sustainable development. In addition, each type of unit was to be 
incorporated with a corresponding investment policy, industrial policy, migration 
policy, land policy, environment policy, fiscal redistribution mechanism and
differentiated economic growth target and political achievement rating policy (see 
Table 3.4). For the prioritised area, the package of policies revolved around 
encouraging advanced industries and controlling resource-consuming manufacturing; 
for the optimised development zone, the set of policies concentrated on building new 
growth poles and the development of labour-intensive industries; in the constrained 
and forbidden development areas, policies were otherwise focused on the environment. 
Therefore, the development of the so-called main functional area plan represented 
national policies in different types of regions. Compared with the macro-regional 
policies aimed at uneven development, these procedures were designed to prevent all 
jurisdictions matching their economic growth under GDP evaluation and fiscal 
pressure disregarding their comparative advantages and environmental conditions. 
That is, a dominant feature of the plan, which distinguishes itself from earlier 
territorial plans or regional policies, was its focus on control rather than development. 
This represented a transformation of national policies from universal growth incentive 
to differentiated regional policies to advocate the rational distribution of labour based 
on comparative advantage. Furthermore, and for the first time, compensatory policies 
were proposed to equalise public service and living conditions between different 
regions. Overall, the plan demonstrated an attempt by the central government to 
intervene in local discretionary development. The basic planning unit of the central 
main functional area was county-level jurisdiction, except that the forbidden 
development area was based on the boundaries of natural reserves. By delegating the 
main functional area with the county-level units, the plan also related the duty of 
controlling the intensity of development and setting an environment threshold to each 
level of local government.
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Table 3.4: Definition of the main functional areas and corresponding policies
Prioritised development area Optimised development area Constrained development area Forbidden development area
Concept
Area with high development 
density which is going to or has 
threaten(ed) the environment.
Area with high environment 
carrying capability and a 
favourable economic location.
Area with low environment carrying 
capability and poor economic 
location,
Or an area with concern for 
ecological security.
All types of natural areas 
established by law.
Fiscal policy
To advocate the development of 
high-tech and high value added 
industries;
To restrict the development of 
high energy consuming and high 
pollution industries;
To encourage technology 
advancement in resource 
conservation and environmental 
protection.
To advance infrastructural 
conditions;
To encourage the development 
of labour-intensive industries;
To encourage the development 
of supporting industries.
To advance infrastructural 
conditions;
Fiscal transfer for public services 
and environment;
To support the development of 
specialty industries that are suited to 
the local conditions and 
environment.
Fiscal transfer for public services 
and the environment.
Government
investment
policy
To control the projects that are 
incompatible with assigned main 
functions.
Government investment will be 
directed to support 
infrastructure development;
To create an economic growth 
pole.
Government investment will be 
directed to support public 
infrastructure development, 
ecological construction and 
environmental protection in the area.
Government investment will be 
directed to support public 
infrastructure development, 
ecological construction and 
environmental protection in the 
area.
Industrial
policy
To strengthen innovation 
capability;
To upgrade industrial structure 
and promote competitiveness.
To strengthen supporting 
industries, to receive an 
industrial shift, to increase 
innovation capacity.
To develop industries appropriate to 
the area;
To restrict the expansion of 
inappropriate industries.
Prudent industrial development 
policies.
Land policy Strict control of construction land increase.
Increase land supply on a 
appropriate scale.
Strict land use regulation, changes to 
ecological land use are strictly 
prohibited.
Strict land use regulation, changes 
to ecological land use are strictly 
prohibited.
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Migration
policy
In-migration is encouraged;
To promote the open labour 
market.
In-migration is encouraged;
To promote the open labour 
market.
Out-migration is encouraged on a 
voluntary basis and in a steady 
process to reduce environmental 
tension.
Out-migration is encouraged on a 
voluntary basis and in a steady 
process to reduce environmental 
tension.
Environmental
policy
Strict requirements on pollution 
discharge and environmental 
protection;
Priority work to reduce pollution 
discharge.
Balance the environmental 
carrying capacity,
Increase production and reduce 
pollution.
Protection is the priority, to ensure 
environmental restoration and 
protection.
Strict protection by the law.
Government
achievements
rating policy
More emphasis on economic 
structure, resource consumption 
and innovation, less emphasis on 
economic growth.
Comprehensive evaluation on 
economic growth, cost and 
benefit, industrialisation rate, 
and urbanisation;
The quality of development is 
encouraged.
Evaluation of ecology development 
and environmental protection will be 
highlighted,
Evaluation of economic growth, 
industrialisation rates and the 
urbanisation level will be weakened.
Evaluation will be focused on 
ecology and environmental 
protection.
Planning
policy
To strictly control the land use of 
high energy consuming and high 
pollution industries;
To encourage high-tech and high 
value added industries.
To encourage economic growth 
poles;
To encourage the development 
of labour-intensive industries.
To strictly control development 
activities that are incompatible with 
assigned main functions;
To encourage the development of 
some specialty industries.
To strictly control development 
activities that are incompatible with 
assigned main functions.
Source: compiled from Instructions on Preparing National Development Priority Zone Plan Issued by the State Council, 2007-7-26; and State Council Development 
and Research Institute, 2008: 137-138.
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The plan was reported to be approved on 12 June, 2010 at a meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the State Council chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao (central government 
website, http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2010-06/12/content 1626813.htm). However, the 
contents of the overall plan and the spatial zoning map have not yet been published, 
except for some vague and literal clarification on the boundary of the constrained and 
forbidden development areas. Based on a comprehensive consideration of 
environmental capacity, current development intensity, future development 
opportunity and potential, population distribution, industrial distribution and 
urbanisation level, the plan identified certain agricultural production areas in 
Northeast Plateau, Yellow Huaihai Plateau and the Yangtze River Basin as the 
constrained development area, and the Tibet Plateau, Huangtu-Yungui Plateau, 
Northeast Forest, and rivers and other environmentally vulnerable areas as the 
forbidden development area. It is realised by the central government that the main 
functional area plan making and implementation will not be an easy process, but 
requires a long-term trial and negotiation. Currently, the plan is still at the preliminary 
stage and the recommended policy packages for different spatial zones are still being 
researched, not to mention the implementation process.
3.5 Recentralisation of land management since the late 1990s
Since the economic reform, land management has been substantially downscaled. 
After the economic reform, the 1986 Land Administration Law authorised territorial 
governments to take power from central ministries and subordinate work units to 
perform functions in land administration (Wu et al., 2007: 31). Hence a five-tiered 
system was set up at the central, provincial, municipal, county and township levels.
Each tier of bureaus was responsible for land administration under the jurisdiction. 
Local governments, especially city and county governments, gained substantial power 
in authorising land expropriation, land supply, rural land conversion and land income 
disposal (Xu and Yeh, 2009: 575). However, the territorialisation of land management 
put land administration under threat. For example, the majority of industrial land has 
been transferred through negotiated trading since the 1990s, the price of which is 
much lower than the real value of the land. Many local governments have sacrificed 
enormous rent and land use fees for potential industrial enterprises. In turn, local 
governments usually grab vast areas of land at the city margin by moving resident 
farmers away in order to ensure the supply of cheaper land. Consequently, a large 
amount of land has been encroached upon and a large number of peasants have lost 
their land and means of subsistence. As a counter measure, the land system has 
undergone practices of recentralisation since 1998, not only in terms of administrative 
structure, but also in law and policy regulation. This represents a reaction exerted by 
the central state to handle widespread local discretion on land disposal (Xu and Yeh, 
2009).
In 1998, along with the reorganisation of central governments, the Ministry of Land 
and Resources was established to take the place of its predecessor, the State Land 
Management Bureau. The change from bureau to ministry is of great significance, as 
ministries and commissions represented the constituent departments of the State 
Council, while agencies and bureaus were attached to the State Council. That is, land 
management became one of the major functions of the central government (Xu and 
Yeh, 2009: 574). More importantly, the Fourth Session of the Ninth National People's 
Congress held in 1998 revised and approved the new Land Administration Law. The
1998 law commenced new power divisions between levels of government and new 
procedures of land administration. Before 1999, municipal and district governments 
had certain powers to authorise land acquisition, land allocation and land use 
conversion. However, after the 1998 Land Administration Law, the approval power 
for land conversion and land acquisition was taken over by the central and provincial 
governments, especially in terms of agricultural land conversion (Xu and Yeh, 2009: 
575). The system set up a land quota for each local government. As a result, it became 
much more difficult to obtain a land quota for urban expansion, and cities and 
counties could only seek to readjust existing construction land use to accommodate 
land demand. According to the new rule, the new urban construction land could not be 
selected beyond the boundary of land use plan. Furthermore, centralised management 
(chuizhi guanli) was engineered by the central government in 2003. This involved the 
means of personnel/budgetary allocation, cadre appointment, and revenue collection 
(Mertha, 2005: 797). For example, the director of land management department was 
no longer under the direct appointment and management of territorial governments, 
but answered to its higher-level land department (Mertha, 2005: 792; 798). At the 
same time, the new land revenue division, in terms of income from converting rural 
land, stipulated that 30% must be surrendered to the central government rather than 
the whole amount be retained by local government (Xu et al., 2009: 903). Obviously, 
the central government hoped to govern local land management by fiscal disincentives 
and direct regulation of senior land management officials.
In addition, the central government published a number of land administration 
policies to reassert control over local discretion on land disposal from the late 1990s 
(see Table 3.5). Firstly, from 1997 to 2002, great efforts were exerted by the central
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government to protect arable land. Measures were taken to strengthen land use 
approval procedures and the management of civil servants, thus constraining arable 
land conversion to industrial or commercial land use, and retaking leased land which 
was not developed for a certain period. Then, from 2003, the central government 
initiated several campaigns to check economic development zones for problems of 
aggressive industrial land development and land encroachment. In July 2003, the State 
Council issued the ‘Urgent Notice on a Temporary Ban on the Approval of Various 
Kinds of Development Zones’. The approval was temporarily halted in a measure to 
check various development zones established by local governments at and below the 
provincial level, as well as by government ministries. The check was also intended to 
crack down on unauthorised national industrial park extensions. In August of the same 
year, the State Council released ‘The Notice on the Clean-up and Rectification of 
Development Zones of Different Types and Tightening-up of the Construction Land 
Management’. This was reiterated in the document issued by the State Council in 
November. Shortly afterwards in December, further stipulations on the rectification 
were released by the Ministry of Land and Resources, together with other relevant 
ministries such as the Ministry of Construction. In February of the following year, the 
Ministry of Land and Resources issued another official letter to cancel unqualified 
development zones or those with poor performance. In August 2005, a document 
released by the State Council stipulated that some economic zones must be abolished 
if the zones were populated with only a few enterprises and the development rates 
were lower than 20% after five years of operation. In 2008, the Urban and Rural 
Planning Law also stipulated that industrial zones should not be established outside 
the area designated by the master plan. The series of land policies demonstrated the 
determination, as well as the difficulty, to control excessive industrial land
development.
In summary, the changes in land management and the great number of land policies 
launched by the central government have illustrated the re-consolidation of state 
regulatory power, which is opposite to the main trend of decentralisation and rising 
localities. It is true that the central campaign is progressing with great difficulties, 
hampered by local circumvention on central regulations (e.g. Yang and Wang, 2008). 
However, the efforts taken by the central state to more effectively regulate 
infringements of land management cannot be ignored.
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Table 3.5: Changing national land administration policies
Policy name Date issued Issued by Key issues/effects
The circular on strengthening land 
administration and protecting arable 
land
Apr. 1997
Central Party 
Committee 
& State 
Council
To strengthen macro-regulation on land, to implement more stringent construction land 
approval, to control the construction land area of cities, to strengthen the administration of 
collective land in rural areas, to strengthen the management of national land assets, to 
strengthen the supervision and examination of land management enforcement
The circular on freezing the land 
approval for occupying arable land for 
non-agricultural constructions
Mar. 199 8
Central Party 
Committee 
& State 
Council
No land approval for occupying arable land for non-agricultural constructions, except 
through examination and approval from State Council
Disposition on vacant land Apr. 1999
Ministry of 
Land and 
Resources
Land owners who postpone development on land sites longer than allowed are subject to 
the relevant disposition agenda or confiscation to control land speculation
The circular on strengthening land 
transferral management and prohibiting 
land speculation
May 1999 StateCouncil
To strengthen land transferral supervision and prohibit the acquisition of rural collective 
land for large commercial development such as orchards and manor development
Provisional regulation on national 
investment in land development and 
arrangement projects
Nov. 2000
Ministry of 
Land and 
Resources
Specifies the project application and supervision procedures
The decision to rectify and regulate 
market economy order &
The circular on strengthening 
administration on national land assets
Apr. 2001 StateCouncil
The Ministry of Land and Resources issued a notice to rectify and regulate land market 
order and began to check six types of activities against law and discipline
The tenth Five-Year Plan outline on 
land asset management Apr. 2002
Ministry of 
Land and 
Resources
To strengthen the land supply for construction, to strengthen the implementation of 
compensated land use, to vigorously promote open bidding or auctions, to strengthen land 
use transferral management and land price administration, to regulate land use approval
The circular on checking and rectifying 
all kinds of development zones and 
strengthening construction land 
administration
Jul. 2003 StateCouncil
Check the real land use area and approval departments of all kinds of development zones, 
and abolish development zones which are against the law and discipline.
The list of approved development zones was published by the central government and 
provincial government
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The urgent notice on further rectifying 
and regulating land market order Nov. 2003
State
Council
Continue to check development zones; to resolve the livelihood problems of land-loss 
farmers; to conduct stringent investigations of all kinds of activities against law and 
discipline
The specific standards and policy 
boundaries for checking and rectifying 
all kinds of development zones
Dec. 2003
Ministry of 
Land and 
Resources & 
National 
Development 
and Reform 
Commission 
& Ministry 
of
Construction 
& Ministry 
of Business
To implement the documents issued by the State Council on July and November of 2003; 
Establishing development zones is stipulated to be approved by the central and 
provincial-level government; local government are not authorised to establish development 
zones at its own will;
To abolish all the development zones established by the county-level government or 
below;
All development projects in existing development zones must abide by the city or town 
master plan, urban system plan, and land use plan
The urgent notice on deepening the 
rectification and regulation programme 
and strengthening land control
Apr. 2004 StateCouncil General land approvals have been suspended
The Advancement of Rural Reform and 
Development Oct. 2008
The 
Communist 
Party of 
China
To allow farmers to "lease their contracted farmland or transfer their land use right" to 
boost the scale of operation for farm production and provide funds for them to start new 
businesses
Source: compiled from documents downloaded from the official website of the State Land and Resources Ministry (http://www.mlr.gov.cn/).
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3.6 A new experiment of province-leading-county administrative reform since
2005
China has five levels of administrative system, i.e. the nation state, province, 
municipality, county and town and township (Figure 3.8). The administrative 
hierarchy in China results in bureaucratic mandates and subordination, which delivers 
instructions and management in a top-down fashion. All communications are 
transmitted upwards or downwards, level by level, through the structure, and the 
skipping of levels is not the norm. As commented by Ma (2005: 478), China’s 
administrative system has always been hierarchical and it is by this means that state 
power retains its grip and succeeds in being rearticulated at the local level, even after 
the substantial economic decentralisation since economic reform. However, conflicts 
with the five-level hierarchical system are becoming more acute, especially at the 
local level in recent years. First of all, since the distribution of fiscal revenue and 
public investment follows the hierarchical structure, the administrative rank has 
significantly impacted on the development of cities and counties (c.f. Chung, 2007: 
794; Ma, 2005: 481). The lower the administrative rank, the poorer the living 
conditions and public services; this is especially the case in terms of education, health 
care, public infrastructure and so forth. Therefore, the counties and townships, which 
are also the countryside units, are often the poorest areas in China in terms of both 
economy and infrastructure. This is generally the case even for the 
economically-developed counties and cities in the developed coastal area. This can be 
exemplified by the prevalent discourse of ‘prefecture-level cities extorting counties 
(county-level-cities)’, which means funding for counties is often diverted by the 
provincial and municipal governments for their own uses (e.g. Yep, 2008; Z. B. Zhang,
2009: 26). Secondly, under the city-leading-county system, the county-level units are 
not actually independent jurisdictions and are not even granted a whole institutional 
apparatus. The lack of competencies in project approval, foreign trade, outbound 
permits, land development and so forth stifle administrative efficiency at the 
grass-roots level. The administrative procedure is so bureaucratic that many issues 
have to ask for instructions and wait for approval from the prefecture-level cities. This 
is especially inconvenient for economically robust counties and cities, especially for 
those who have constant foreign trade and foreign investment. Thirdly, the five-level 
administrative structure means the lower level government is at the periphery of 
central control. A vivid example is documented by Wu and Phelps (2008: 473) with 
regard to the central control on property and villa development. It is believed by the 
county-level city leaders that the central regulation on land and property development 
is targeted at a central city such as Shanghai; thus, when the regulation is finally 
delivered to the county level, the construction of the villa project would have been 
finished already. Administrative discretion is now even more conspicuous at the 
grassroots administrative units in terms of land seizures. A number of forced and 
violent demolitions have been reported in the media since 2001, the majority of which 
are located in the rural areas of the rich Eastern region (for a map that marks these 
violent demolitions and land disputes, please see 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-10/27/content_l 1462495.htm, accessed on 
7 Dec, 2010). Some experts argue that ‘as long as the central government could 
guarantee local governments financially, local governments can act as the service 
provider rather than the money maker in land management’ 
(http://www.chinadailv.com.cn/bizchina/2010-11 /06/content 11511477.htm. accessed 
on 7 Dec, 2010).
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County-level cities
Townships and towns
Counties
Townships and towns
Prefecture-level cities
Provinces
Nation state
Figure 3.8: Administrative hierarchy under city-leading-county administrative
system
In order to ease the fiscal pressure at the grassroots level, fiscal management system 
reform under the provincial level by the National 11th Five-Year Plan was suggested in 
2005. Instead of the current five-level fiscal system, it was proposed that a 
province-leading-county administrative system should be carried out in areas where 
conditions permit. In early July 2009, the Fiscal Ministry released ‘the Directive on 
Promoting the Province-Leading-County Fiscal Reform’, which aims to re-establish a 
separate fiscal system for prefecture-level cities and counties/county-level cities. In 
other words, counties are to deal directly with provinces instead of via 
prefecture-level cities in taxation and fiscal distribution, budgetary schemes, fiscal 
transfer and fiscal rebate, central and provincial subsidies, and so forth. The reform is 
likely to be fully adopted across the country as of 2012, which will eventually extend 
from the fiscal sphere to the whole institutional framework. By this means, the power 
of the prefecture-level city over the county-level would be gradually eliminated and 
removed. That is, the main cities, secondary cities and the vast number of counties
would be equalised at the same administrative rank (Figure 3.9).
Provinces
Nation state
City districts
County-level cities
Townships and towns
Counties
Townships and towns
Prefecture-level cities
Figure 3.9: Administrative hierarchy in the ongoing province-leading-county
reform
The new fiscal management measure has triggered an extensive experimentation of 
the province-leading-county administrative system across the country. Hainan, Hubei, 
Anhui, Guangdong, Henan, Jilin, Jiangxi and other provinces have all initiated their 
reform agenda (Z. B. Zhang, 2009; Zhou, 2008: 43). Many of them have followed the 
prototype of Zhejiang, which is generally recognised to be the premier in the country. 
Zhejiang began experimenting with power devolution from municipal governments 
(i.e. government of prefecture-level cities) to county-level governments (including 
governments of county-level cities, counties, and city districts) as early as 1992. At 
that time, this experiment was applied to 13 counties and county-level cities out of a 
total of 58 county-level jurisdictions. The economic administrative power of the 13 
jurisdictions was expanded to include approval rights for infrastructure construction, 
technological innovation projects and foreign investment expansion; furthermore, 
some approval procedures had also been simplified (Z. B. Zhang, 2009: 61). In the 
subsequent years of 1997, 2002 and 2006, Zhejiang province continued to transfer
administrative power which used to be possessed by the prefecture-level cities to 
selective county-level units. In 2006, the county-level city Yiwu, which is well-known 
for producing accessories and home wares for both the domestic and global markets, 
was chosen as the subject of an experiment which entitled it with the equivalent 
economic administration rights of a municipal government. In addition, Yiwu was 
granted additional functional institutions such as customs, goods inspection and 
quarantine and foreign exchange management, which used to be led and managed by 
prefecture-level authorities on behalf of county-level governments (ibid: 62).
In addition to power devolution to the county-level administrations, the cadre 
management at the county-level has also been reshuffled. The management of 
county-level cadres, especially the heads of the county Party organisation and 
government, has been promoted from prefectural to provincial appointments and 
supervision. Moreover, the county-level cadres have even been summoned to Beijing 
for training by the Party School of the CCP Central Committee since 2008 
(http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1025/9788437.htmk accessed on 12 Nov, 2010).
To sum up, there are two perspectives associated with the tentative administrative 
structure reform from the city-leading-county system to the province-leading-county 
system. On the one hand, this shift represents recognition from the central government 
of the devolution, legitimacy and accountability of county-level governments. The 
so-called rural units are no longer affiliated outposts that are peripheral to central 
cities. The gradual equalisation of different levels of cities may help to redress the 
unequal development between urban and rural areas. Furthermore, this may facilitate 
communication and negotiation between cities over the regional issues. On the other
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hand, the strengthened central training and provincial management of the county-level 
cadres goes hand in hand with the power devolution. That is, the central government 
wants to relate its regulation more closely with lower-level local governments by 
means of direct cadre management. This carries great implications because it means 
the regional administration system is restructured from a three-tier to a two-tier 
hierarchy. In the prefecture-leading-county system, the prefecture-level city 
government was expected to function as ‘central administration’ in the area to 
eliminate conflicts between various local authorities. However, with the 
decentralisation to the county-level jurisdictions over the last decades, the nested 
administrative hierarchy has, in fact, been dismantled. The urban scale at the 
prefecture-level is fragmented. The hierarchy restructuring makes the provincial level 
responsible for replacing the ‘dead’ prefecture-level governance and coordinating 
local development. It seems the weakened regional governance can be strengthened 
by these means.
However, it is found that some prefectural-level governments resent the reform, since 
they would lose a certain amount of power and authority. For example, it is 
documented that, in Hubei province, although over 200 administrative approval rights 
are said to have been decentralised to the county-level, nearly half of them have either 
not been implemented or are impractical (Zong, 2008: 203). That is, the real progress 
of the province-leading-county reform is in doubt in reality. Moreover, the current 
reform seems to be simply addressed towards promoting the economic development 
of county-level units; the corresponding reform for the provincial government is much 
less discussed. Therefore, the implication of province-leading-county reform for 
regional governance and regional development needs to be closely observed.
3.7 Administrative regionalisation with jurisdictional mergers and annexations
since 2000
After economic reform, China relaxed the criteria for city and town designations (e.g. 
Lee, 1980; Ma and Cui, 1987; Zhang and Zhao, 1998). As a result, the number of 
cities and towns has considerably increased since 1983. The total number of 
designated cities increased from 190 to 668 in 1998. Coupled with economic 
devolution, the number of individual local agents available to participate in economic 
activities has increased phenomenally. However, 1998 seemed to be a turning point 
because the number started to decrease from 1999. Figure 3.10 extends the data from 
Figure 4.5 to 2008. It demonstrates that the number of county-level cities started to 
decrease for the first time in 1997, which meant the total number of city units declined 
from the peak total of 668 to 655 in 2008. Simultaneously, the quantity of city districts 
has undergone an unprecedented increase. This is due to the recent administrative 
incorporations of suburban counties and county-level cities into prefecture-level cities 
as city districts (c.f. Ma, 2005; Zhang and Wu, 2006).
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Figure 3.10: Urban administrative changes from 1978 to 2008
Source: compiled from Ministry o f Civil Affairs, 1998a, b, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009.
For example, 19 new city districts were set up between 2000 and 2004 in the Yangtze 
River Delta region through the abolition of counties or county-level cities. As a 
consequence of the administrative adjustment, the jurisdictional area of the 15 
prefecture-level cities has expanded massively, before and after administrative 
readjustment. As shown in Figures 3.11 and 3.12, the areas of some cities, such as 
Suqian, even multiplied tenfold. In addition to the sharp increase of land area, the 
merger also means a change in the relationship between prefecture-level cities and the 
former county-level units. Before the annexation, these county-level units were under 
the leadership of prefecture-level governments, according to the city-leading-county 
system. However, the central administration of the prefecture-level government was 
actually greatly weakened and, to some extent, was retained in name only due to the 
power decentralisation after economic reform. After the annexation, these previous
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county-level units were transformed into city districts, which were no longer 
independent county-level administration centres, but became units directly under the 
city government. In other words, the central administration of the prefecture-level city 
governments was strengthened through the means of administrative merger.
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The administrative regionalisation has reduced the number of administrative divisions 
within the region. Coordinated infrastructure development tends to be more easily 
resolved within a municipality than between central cities and nearby counties. The 
administrative annexation represents an important attempt by the state to enforce ‘big 
government’ strategy in order to handle incoordination and solve zero-sum 
competition (e.g. Yeh and Xu, 2008: 414). However, these administrative 
realignments have been conceived as short-term oriented and are an unfavourable 
form of regional governance (Zhang and Wu, 2006). On the one hand, the crude 
administrative annexations are severely detrimental to the interests of the annexed 
counties and cities. Due to the discontent of the counties and cities, the municipal 
governments often had to make significant compromises for these ‘new’ districts to let 
them keep their financial independence and ability to make decisions (for example, 
Zhang and Wu, 2006: 13-14). In this sense, administrative annexation alone is a poor 
way to implement a unified strategy and a plan to resolve the fundamental problems 
of inter-city competition and incoordination. On the other hand, annexation is often 
considered by the municipal government to be an effective instrument to secure its 
central city position amongst the competition and to exploit the land resources of the 
countryside (Zhang and Wu, 2006: 15). As a result, annexation has only solidified the 
process of urbanisation contingent upon huge land consumption and inequality 
between core municipalities and peripheral areas within the larger regions, and 
exacerbated the rapid loss of farmland, the livelihood of landless farmers, the informal 
economy in the city and so forth (Lin, 2009). These unfavourable consequences 
resulted in the reduced frequency of administrative annexations, which were carried 
out in a more prudent manner after 2004. Since then, the administrative structure of 
the whole country has basically remained unchanged except for some small
adjustments. Small-scale annexations have occurred at the township and town tier, 
which is highlighted by a decrease in the number of towns and an increase in street 
offices (Table 3.6). Overall, the administrative annexation to counties and towns 
represents the expansion of functional urban areas and the consequent consolidation 
of the corresponding institutional territory. However, the legitimacy of the 
administrative measure is challenged due to the authoritarian manner of the 
agglomeration process. Meanwhile, the impact of annexation on coordinated 
development is also under suspicion owing to the pragmatic rationale held by the 
localities. Local governments often make use of the annexation to seek out ample land 
resources and to enhance economic competitiveness, instead of promoting efficiency 
and the equalisation of government services.
Table 3.6: Administrative changes below county-level from 2000 to 2007
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of
Townships 23199 19341 17196 16636 16130 15951 15306 13928 13872
Number of
Towns 20312 20374 20600 20226 19892 19522 19369 19249 19234
Number of
Street
Offices
5902 5510 5516 5751 5829 6152 6355 6434 6524
Source: compiled from Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009.
Note: the number of townships excludes nationality townships and others.
3.8 The rejuvenation of inter-city regional associations since 2000
In order to promote horizontal inter-government relationships under the hierarchical 
administrative system in China, the central government established institutions such 
as regional economic cooperative regions (jingji xiezuo qu) at the end of 1980.
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Following 1981, the North China Economic and Technological Cooperation Region, 
Middle and South Liaoning Urban Economy Region, Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan 
Economic Cooperation Region, Yangtze-Riverside Main City Economic Coordination 
Association, Nanjing Regional Economic Association and Wuhan Regional Economic 
Association were subsequently set up. Some associations even spanned several 
provincial units, which were far ahead of the development of the regional economy. 
Meanwhile, regional cooperation was residual with central command. This so-called 
cooperation was, in fact, used by the central state as an alternative means of resource 
appropriation (Zong, 2008: 193). As a consequence, these regional institutions failed 
due to a lack of local enthusiasm, as well as the remains of an authoritarian manner. 
Nevertheless, forms of regional economic associations were rejuvenated after 2000. In 
contrast to the previous top-down efforts, the new regional activities have been 
spontaneously built from the bottom. Collaborative initiatives have become prevalent, 
especially in the regions of Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta and Bohai Sea Rim. 
For example, the Guangdong province put forward the ‘Pan-PRD’ concept in 2003. 
Afterwards, a series of agreements were signed due to Pan-PRD cooperation 
including transport, human resources, tourism, energy, and trade (Yeh and Xu, 2008; 
Zong, 2008: 197). Likewise, the cooperation agenda in the Bohai Sea Rim has; also 
been proceeding rapidly between Beijing, Hebei and Tianjin since 2004 (Zong, 2008: 
199).
The evolution of the Yangtze River Delta Economic Region can be taken as a striking 
example to demonstrate the dynamics of the inter-municipality regional institutions. 
The Yangtze River Delta Economic Region was initiated by the Economic and Trade 
Bureau of fourteen municipal-level governments in 1992, including Shanghai, Suzhou,
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Wuxi, Changzhou, Nantong, Hangzhou, Jiaxing, Huzhou, Ningbo, Zhoushan, 
Zhenjiang and Shaoxing. The development of the area-wide inter-municipality 
organisation can be divided into four stages: the initial stage from 1992 to 1997; the 
second stage from 1997 to 2003; the recent stage from 2003 to 2008; and the latest 
stage since 2008. Initially, the institution was managed by a member system and 
operated in the form of a forum. The biennial forum was attended by officials from 
the economic coordination office, usually belonging to the economic and trade bureau 
in each city. Hence, the forum was at first named the Joint Conference o f Directors o f
Coordination Offices o f the Yangtze River Delta Region (Changjiang sanjiao zhou
Chengshi xiezuo bumen zhuren lianxi huiyi). The original purpose of the forum was 
merely information exchange and investment attractions between cities (Luo and Shen, 
2009: 55). At the time, the main task was enterprise-oriented, namely to promote the 
business connections between local (particularly state-owned) enterprises. For 
instance, the Nanjing economic coordination office made efforts to help Nanjing 
enterprises to set up retail stores in Shanghai, and to facilitate the collaboration 
between Shanghai Baoshan Steel Enterprise and Nanjing Rolling Mill (The Yangtze 
River Delta Urban Economic Coordination Office, 2007: 38). This is contextualised in 
the period of residual planned economy. During the time, SOE was still the dominator 
in the economy, which was used to following administrative orders and was very 
weak at horizontal cooperation. However, except for assisting business cooperation, 
the YRD institution could not make any resolution in terms of general regional 
development. This is because the institution was only an economic collaboration 
office under the economic and trade bureau. Many propositions that lay beyond 
departmental powers had to be submitted to the mayor in charge, which would take a 
long time (ibid, 39).
116
In 1997, the joint conference was upgraded to the mayor-level and was renamed as the
Coordination Committee o f Urban Economy in the YRD Region (Changjiang sanjiao
zhou chengshi jingji xietiao hui). Mayors in charge of economic development, as well 
as officials of economic coordination offices, were expected to take precedence at the 
meeting. In addition, another two cities were qualified in 1997 and 2003 respectively, 
enlarging the membership from 14 to 16 cities. The political upgrade facilitated the 
communication between city leaders and functional departments, including an 
economic planning committee, a science and technology office, a state-owned 
enterprises office, a trade bureau, a tourism bureau, and so forth. Even though the 
political tag of the forum was enhanced, the institution that remained in charge was 
the department of economic and trade bureau. In other words, no specific institutions 
were established for the purpose, but remained merely as a liaison under the existing 
government framework. As shown in Table 3.7, the collaboration agenda during the 
stage was narrowly confined to specific department issues such as information sharing, 
common market building, and tourism regionalisation, which are also considered to be 
mutually beneficial. It was not until 2001 that a unified plan on regional development 
appeared on the agenda.
To sum up, the committee forum is more like ‘an occasional tea party, which is not a 
priority in government routine work, and no institution or department is afterwards 
responsible for the agenda put forward by the forum’ (interview, professor and expert 
on YRD regional development, Nanjing University, 19 March 2010). As a 
consequence, regional governance functions in name only. It largely remains as a 
working meeting for local departments to exchange information, and represents a 
dialogue between local governments for symbolic meaning. The agenda and
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agreements are at a superficial level, seeming to be more of a kind of slogan than 
concrete actions for cooperation (Luo and Shen, 2009: 55-56). Sensitive topics such 
as industrial development tend to be skirted around, as no agreements can be reached 
among the members themselves.
Table 3.7: The agenda of the Urban Economic Coordination Committee of the
YRD Region
Year Place Agenda
1997 Yangzhou
The joining of Taizhou of Jiangsu province
Collaborative development of YRD tourism industry, and active
promotion of YRD chain store development
1999 Hangzhou
Regional cooperation in terms of science and technology; 
promotion of trans-border business annexation; regional 
information website construction; deepening of tourism, trade 
and business collaboration
2001 Shaoxing
The deepening of last year’s agenda
Attempts to strengthen the integration of regional transport 
network, the collaboration of industries, and the integration of 
financing
2003 Nanjing
The joining of Taizhou of Zhejiang province 
Sharing 2010 Shanghai Expo opportunities and expanding the 
expo's effects; collaboration in investment attraction; deepening 
of tourism integration, regional transport network, environment, 
logistics and trade cooperation.
Source: compiled from The Yangtze River Delta Urban Economic Coordination Office, 2007: 
48-84.
Since the new millennium, inter-municipality communication has become even more 
active than before. The Urban Economic Coordination Committee of the YRD Region 
has changed from a biennial to an annual forum since 2003 (Wang, 2009: 120). 
Furthermore, provinces have also become actively involved in the building of a YRD 
area-wide institution. For example, a provincial-level forum mechanism was 
established between Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai in 2001, namely, the Jiangsu,
Zhejiang and Shanghai Forum on Economic Coordination and Development
(Su-Zhe-Hu jingji hezuo yu fazhan zuotan hui). The annual forum is attended by
executive vice-provincial governors and prefecture-level city mayors. The senior-level 
government meeting demonstrates the positive attitude of the top leaders to regional 
coordination. Strategic proposals have been made in various fields, such as the 
sharing of information resources and human resources, and the building of a common 
market and coordinated infrastructure system. Overall, YRD regional integration has 
been turned into a catchphrase in the 2000s that various kinds of seminars and 
communication have been promoting. It is estimated that over 100 seminars were held 
in 2002 and 2003 on YRD regional development (Lu and Shi, 2008: 157) and around 
20 agreements were signed between Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai in 2003 and 2004 
(Ji et al., 2006: 88). Table 3.8 lists the newly emerging events or forums based on the 
provincial level. Although no assessment has ever been made to evaluate how these 
agendas have progressed in reality, it is recognised that the involvement of the 
provincial sector shows a progressive tendency. As commented by a scholar in 
Shanghai,
These moves are of significance as provincial governments, who used to be 
the main barrier of integration, showed the gesture to push cooperative 
development between cities. In the past, it is always the provinces that made 
‘red-headed’ document to obstruct trade and unified market (interview, 
professor and expert in YRD regional development, East China Normal 
University, 21 April 2010).
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Table 3.8: The emergence of provincial-level cooperation forums in the YRD
region
Name Attendees
Year of 
commencement and 
regularity
International Symposium of the 
Development of YRD Region
Key cadres from the region, 
governors from central ministries, 
and even overseas academics
1999
annual forum
Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai 
Forum on Economic Coordination 
and Development (Su-Zhe-Hu jingji
hezuo yu fazhan zuotan hui)
Executive vice-provincial 
governors and prefecture-level 
deputy city mayors
2001;
annual forum
Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai Joint 
Conference on Financial Coordinated 
development
Provincial governors of Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang and Shanghai, the Bank 
of China, and other associated 
banks
2008;
annual forum
Source: compiled from Ji et al., 2006: 87-88; Sun and Zhao, 2009: 435.
In 2008, the various associations within the region were formalised into an integrated 
three-tiered cooperation channel. At the top is the annual round-table conference 
attended by provincial top leadership from the YRD region, which is held to discuss 
common issues and make strategic decisions; the top-level is followed by a 
lower-level joint-conference between executive vice provincial governors and 
executive deputy mayors, which is supposed to follow up the agreed agenda and put 
forward coordinated arrangements. The implementation is the responsibility of the 
offices of the joint conference convened by the development and reform committee in 
each jurisdictional city, the working groups for specific cooperation subjects, and the 
coordination forum between the 16 cities convened by the economic coordination 
offices (interview, civil servant, Nanjing Economic and Trade Bureau, 16 Feb 2009).
To sum up, the cooperation agenda has obtained greater support from both local and 
higher-level governments since 2000. Since the current cooperation mechanism is 
spontaneously initiated and the decision power rests with the member authorities, the
inter-municipality has gained more recognition from the localities. However, the 
disadvantages are that the inter-municipal structure is based on forums and 
conferences on special occasions, rather than a permanent institution. Moreover, it is 
not supported by stable financial support granted from anywhere. The omission of a 
standing agency means the function of coordination remain fragmented throughout 
different governments and ministries, which is detrimental to its effects and efficiency. 
As noted by Yang and Chen (2007: 21), the forum or conference form of cooperation 
channel is far too reliant upon senior officials and governors, which is not an efficient 
dialogue platform, and lacks an implementation and monitoring mechanism. Overall, 
enthusiasm for inter-city cooperation has increased since 2000 compared to levels in 
the 1980s and 1990s. However, as observed by Yeh and Xu (2008) in PRD 
experiences, the current inter-municipality cooperation mechanism in China is largely 
based on imagination rather than on concrete and consolidated institutions. In other 
words, the bottom-up regional institution is still ‘a collection of loosely assembled 
local governments’ (Wu and Zhang, 2009: 12).
3.9 Formulation of regional spatial plans since 2005
In order to promote regional coordination, planning in China is experiencing its 
second period of change after the previous ‘entrepreneurial city plans’. In the late 
1990s, city plans in China underwent some important changes, from a traditional land 
use blueprint plan to a strategic spatial plan (Wu, 2007). These non-statutory city 
plans made attempts to reposition urban development on a larger regional scale than 
by local administrative boundaries. This type of strategic plan has played a positive 
role in building inter-city highways and regional transport network. Nevertheless, the
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locally-initiated plans are addressed from a position of local competitiveness and tend 
to position themselves more favourably in the region, which marginalises other 
regional issues such as environment protection and coordinated industrial 
development. In effect, these plans are used as promotional instruments by local 
governments to attract additional investments, and as justification for entrepreneurial 
strategies such as expanding existing built-up urban space for GDP growth (Wu and 
Zhang, 2007).
However, the spatial plan approach has recently been employed by the central and 
provincial governments for larger regions such as the Pearl River Delta and the 
Yangtze River Delta (Figure 3.13). As opposed to previously, the current wave of 
plan-making is not only compiled by the Ministry of Housing and Urban and Rural 
Development (MHURD) and its subordinates, which are the main plan-making 
institutions after economic reform, but also by the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), the previous overall planning commission during the Socialist 
period. As a matter of fact, the powerful organisation NDRC, rather than MHURD, 
leads current regional plan-making. In 2009 alone, over ten regional plans were 
published by NDRC, with even more under preparation or waiting to be approved. 
Finally, the rationale and functionality of the current regional plans have undergone a 
great transformation from development plans towards development control, whether 
they are undertaken by NDRC or MHURD. For example, NDRC changed the name of 
the conventional five-year economic plan (wunian jihua) to the 4 five-year spatial plan’ 
(wunian guihua) in 2002, which officially announced the new direction of the plan. In 
the past, the five-year economic plan was prepared by the planning commissions of 
various government levels to find resources to sustain economic growth. As the
government used to be the only investor in the planned economy, each level of the 
five-year economic plan was hence the virtual government spending plan of the 
corresponding government. Furthermore, since all economic resources were 
nationalised in the command economy, the central plan usually had a decisive role in 
local government spending and economic growth. However, with the diversification 
of investment sources since economic reform, the hierarchical five-year economic 
plan has actually relaxed, as the central government no longer possesses leverage over 
local government and private investment. Nowadays, with the transition to a spatial 
plan, a territorial development strategy is thus entailed in conventional target-oriented 
plan-making. The new spatial approach indicates that the economic plan not only 
requires the achievement of growth, but also contains specific spatial regulations, i.e. 
in order to channel economic growth from developed to underdeveloped areas, or to 
control development activities in undesirable places. As remarked by the head of 
NDRC, the five-year plan is now ‘more than a text document on strategic industrial 
development policies, but also a means of spatial regulation regarding where building 
should occur’ (Ma, 2003). In order to achieve these objectives, compulsory policies 
have been formulated to be enforced on some industrial locations, in addition to 
general guidance on urban and industrial development in the past. Overall, the newly 
introduced spatial planning approach is actually acting as the newly sharpened 
regulative leverage of the central government, as local five-year plans are supposed to 
be formulated following the central plan. This means that the hierarchical five-year 
plan has been restored and regulation over local government spending has also been 
strengthened.
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Figure 3.13: The locations of the escalation of regional plans
Source: compiled by the author.
Parallel transformation is also witnessed with regard to the plan-making underneath 
the MHURD system. Indeed, MHURD prepared the National Urban System Plan 
(2006-2020) in 2005, which is the first national-level plan on urbanisation and spatial 
development, to strengthen top-down guidance and regulation. The plan identified 
existing major urban clusters and potential areas for development across the country, 
and, hence, formulated differentiated urbanisation strategies to mitigate the 
over-concentration of population in the coastal area. Based on the overall strategy, an 
infrastructure framework was provided to stimulate the development of city regions in 
the central and western districts. Built on overall consideration of the distribution of 
natural resources and ecological conditions, the plan draws up guidelines on
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urbanisation and spatial development in individual provincial-level jurisdictions. 
Within the guidelines, emphasis is placed on core city regions, trans-border areas, and 
regional and inter-regional infrastructure. Following the preparation of the National 
Urban System Plan (2006-2020), MHURD intended to launch a series of 
trans-boundary regional plans to guide spatial development in major city-regions. The 
meso-level plans under the National Urban System Plan try to deliver the principle 
and outline of development. That is, plan-making under MHURD also witnessed 
similar changes as NDRC. The conventional urban system plan concentrates on 
construction, which aims to achieve a rational distribution of urban resources within 
one region in favour of specific urban developments. In contrast, recent regional plans 
have prioritised achieving balanced development and eliminating adverse economic 
competition. There are many discussions in the planning realm about the obstacles to 
achieving integrated development in China (e.g. B. J. Yang, 2004; Chen and Wang, 
2006). Yet, in addition to technocratic innovation within the planning realm, the issue 
of ‘implementation’ is a concern of plan-makers (e.g. Wang, 2004). Spatial planning 
and regulation, as well as an action plan, are encouraged to be integrated into the 
regional planning package (Shao and Pan, 2004). It is believed that plan-making 
should not only be objective-oriented and problem-oriented, but more importantly, it 
should be implementation-oriented (Zou, 2006). Because of this understanding, 
leading planning institutions actively interact with MHURD and the provincial 
government in order to design regulatory measures; they also interact with 
institutional organisations and law makers to ensure the effect of regulation. In the 
pioneering project of the Pearl River Delta Urban Cluster Coordination Development 
Plan, led by Guangdong province and MHURD, different types and levels of 
regulation space are divided and linked with relevant levels of government and
departments; a dedicated government organisation has been established for plan 
implementation and evaluation and the regional plan has been conferred with statutory 
status by the provincial People’s Congress (Zou and Shi, 2004; Cai and Zhu, 2006; Xu, 
2008). Furthermore, the regional plan has been followed by the preparation of a 
regulatory detailed plan (kongzhixing xiangxi guihua), which is the only type of plan 
in China that is provided with regulatory devices at the local level (for example, see 
Huang et al., 2007). Overall, the proliferation of regional plans by MHURD 
demonstrates the renewed efforts exerted by the higher-level governments to 
legitimise top-down intervention (Xu, 2008: 28), which has been largely weakened 
since economic devolution.
To sum up, China’s territory is now covered by spatial plans by various state agents. 
The latest practices, driven by central government instead of municipal governments, 
demonstrate the concern of the central state over sustainability, coordination between 
regions and the quality of development. However, a sharp increase in planning and 
planning institutions has also confused the lines of accountability, and may undermine 
the effect of governance as well.
3.10 The features of re-emerged regional governance in China
The above practices, which have already been documented in a plethora of Chinese 
literature, have illustrated the regional renaissance in China. Nevertheless, the current 
regional projects in China have shown different dynamics, institutional features and 
rationales from earlier regional institutions in the 1950s and 1960s. A comparison with 
previous efforts, as well as with Western regionalism theories and practices, is
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considered valuable to aid understanding of the current re-emergence of regional 
governance in China.
3.10.1 State-steered restructuring of territorial governance
The role of the Chinese state is still pervasive and dominant, even after decades of 
decentralisation. For instance, place promotion and entrepreneurial governance in 
China is predominantly driven by the central and/or local state rather than the private 
sector (e.g. Wu, 2000b, 2003; Xu and Yeh, 2005; Zhang, 2002b). This is because the 
bulk of social and economic resources are still possessed by the state. Public 
participation and partnership with the business sector is only periodic; it is merely a 
temporary vehicle utilised by the state to materialise its political aims (e.g. Zhang and 
Wu, 2008). Due to the same reason, current city-region restructuring is also largely 
reliant on the forceful interventions of governments, even though some of the agenda 
may have initially been triggered by market forces and civil society (Liu et al., 2010). 
For example, Liu et al. (2010) have documented the trajectory of inter-city 
coordinated development between two adjacent cities of Guangzhou and Foshan in 
Guangdong province. Inter-city transport regionalisation between the two cities had 
been advocated by local residents for years due to the inconvenience of commuting. 
However, the issue had not been solved until the active involvement of government 
began in 2002. Since then, inter-city cooperation between Guangzhou and Foshan has 
quickly expanded from transport to urban development, environment and the 
economy.
In the current development, it should be noted that, after the previous state rescaling,
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decentralised local authorities have acquired their capacity to develop their own state 
spatial projects and strategies. In other words, the current regional initiatives are 
articulated by two different mechanisms, i.e. the top-down and bottom-up approach, 
which is a different situation from the first round of state rescaling. The top-down 
approach is initiated by the central government. This is very much akin to the 
‘centrally-orchestrated regionalism’ documented in the UK (Harrison, 2008). The 
bottom-up approach is initiated by the local governments. It should be noted that the 
mechanism is different from the notion of ‘bottom-up’ in the Western context. The 
resurgent ‘new regionalism’ literature in Western countries indicates that a new 
feature of the recent regional practices is the ‘bottom-up’ mechanism and the 
preference for ‘small government’. In other words, the recent regional practices are 
fostered by public-private partnership, such as government contracting, outsourcing, 
privatisation and voluntary collaboration with autonomous institutions in informal 
networks (Everingham, 2009: 85; Norris, 2001; Savitch and Vogel, 2000; Wheeler, 
2002). The involvement of non-public sectors has formed a complex and overlapping 
governance regime which is a hybrid of cross-jurisdictional, multi-level and 
networking actions (Everingham, 2009: 85). This is different to the notion of 
‘bottom-up’ in the new regionalism literature; the bottom-up mechanism in China is 
articulated by the local government without limited participation from civil society, 
business sectors or NGOs.
3.10.2 Contradictory rationales of the top-down and bottom-up approach
The regional practices respectively led by the central and local governments are 
actually operated out of distinct motivations. According to the above examination, the
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central government has initiated regional exercises such as recentralising land 
management, formulating spatial plans, launching province-leading county 
institutional reforms and remaking various regional policies. The package of actions is 
not rolled out randomly, but rather addresses different and specific problems incurred 
by insufficient central regulation; for instance, the regional policies in the middle and 
west regions were launched to quench the discontent of localities regarding the 
long-running central preference for the coast and balanced central policies between 
regions. Regional plans and main functional area plans, however, are formulated 
across the nation in order to reassert central guidance on spatial development and 
spatial coordination. Furthermore, the reduction of hierarchies of local governments 
by province-leading-county reform is not only to resolve the fiscal problem of 
‘prefecture-level city exploiting counties’ under the city-leading-county system, but 
also to strengthen the central regulation in ‘far away and unreachable areas’ by central 
government. Likewise, the recentralisation of land management also indicates the 
up-scaling of certain government functions towards the higher-level to control local 
discretionary land development. In short, it seems to suggest that uneven development 
and land politics, the latter in particular, constitute a central position in 
centrally-orchestrated regional practices. On the one hand, this is different from the 
setting up of a layer of administrative regions at the founding period of the new 
People’s Republic of China, when it was hoped that regional institutions would help 
to unify the nation, which was chaotic and divided (Donaldson, 2010: 26). On the 
other hand, this is also divergent from the regional motives documented in Western 
countries, which generally revolve around the containment of urban sprawl, boosting 
the efficiency of overlapping pubic services, the improvement of social cohesion, and 
common concerns over issues such as transportation, environment and quality of life
(e.g. Everingham et al., 2006; Gleeson, 2003; Jonas and Pineetl, 2006; McCann, 2007; 
McGuirk, 2007; Purcell, 2007; While et al., 2004). The Chinese experience of 
concerns about rational land development is closely associated with the present 
development stage of China, which is in a fast lane of industrial development which 
consumes a large amount of land for manufacturing.
In contrast, other exercises such as administrative annexations, inter-city associations 
and local spatial plans have been undertaken by the local governments for different 
motives. These practices are, to some extent, helpful in terms of expanding 
administrative boundaries and facilitating inter-city communication and cooperation. 
However, since the regional practices are generally initiated by the city government 
alone, they tend to be inward-looking and in pursuit of urban competitiveness. For 
instance, locally initiated strategic development plans were used as an instrument by 
the urban entrepreneurial government to enhance structural economic competitiveness 
(Wu and Zhang, 2007). Even though the local strategic development plans go beyond 
the boundary of administrative divisions, the relationship between different places is 
often perceived as fraught with rivalry and hostile. In other words, it was inter-locality 
competition that served as the motive and rationale for the local governments to 
initiate such city-region plans (Li, 2008). It is, hence, argued that locally-led 
cooperation is limited in scope in terms of agenda setting, which is predominantly 
based on competitive rationales (Zhang et al., 2005). The possibility of economic 
mutual benefit is crucial to the success or failure of the local cooperation programmes.
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3.10.3 Flexible institutionalisation of regional practices and projects
Unlike the Regional Development Agency in the UK, the regional initiatives in China 
are not formally institutionalised. The central government is using spatial strategies, 
planning and reshuffling of certain governmental functional structures to deliver the 
regional perspective, instead of setting up a new tier of government. This is 
distinguished from the establishment of full-blown regional government in the 1950s, 
which was even equipped with both governmental and Party institutions. The 
proliferation of regional plans suggests that formulating these plans has become a 
major tool for the central government to deliver top-down governance. However, so 
far, the responsibility for implementing and monitoring these strategies and policies 
and how this should be achieved is not well defined.
Similarly, the practices at the local level are also very flexible and basically reliant 
upon informal inter-local agreements, which seems like the new regionalism approach 
of ‘governance without government’. However, the voluntary approach allows the 
localities to agree upon certain cooperation arenas which are conceived as 
economically beneficial. Therefore, the regional issues that would be raised and 
resolved are very likely to be biased towards the economic realm. Apart from the lack 
of a comprehensive operation, this flexibility is also offset by the instability of the 
association and the lack of means of collective action and accountability. Formal 
networking is not easy to establish in China, generally for two reasons. Firstly, the 
role of the central state remains indispensable in deciding on the legitimacy of these 
locally-initiated projects. This is because China’s political system is still centralised 
and hierarchical. The sub-national state has to seek the approval of the central state to
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obtain support and legitimacy for the meso-level associative governance. Even though 
planners and academics inside China constantly suggest that a delegated regional 
organisation or association to handle regional issues is set up, it seems that the central 
government still does not give much consideration to these suggestions due to 
concerns regarding the over-complexity of the bureaucratic structure and 
ever-increasing bureaucratic costs. As a consequence, the informal institution based 
on the mayors’ association and regional forum causes the regional mechanism to lack 
binding capability and enforcement power. Secondly, China’s political system is 
currently built with five levels of administrative ranks. The strictly defined hierarchy 
of ranks also undermines the basis of horizontal networking. Currently, the mayors’ 
association or regional forum is only attended by prefecture-level jurisdictions, which 
means the vast number of county-level units (including counties, county-level cities 
and city districts) are just represented by their upper-level administrations. The lack of 
participation in these regional activities causes the county-level units to feel that 
regional issues are irrelevant to them. Moreover, even if these county-level units were 
involved in some cooperative agenda, they could not make decisions themselves, but 
would have to ask for instruction from prefecture-level governments. Overall, unlike 
the experiences in Western countries, there is actually no power reshuffling towards 
the regional level in the case of China’s regional make-up. There is no sign to suggest 
the central government will grant the regional level the power to make decisions. Nor 
is there any indication that the local governments will concede certain authority to the 
regional-based organisations for the sake of regional interests. As a result, the 
opportunity for and efficiency of city-networking is fundamentally undermined. In 
this sense, even though the consolidation approach, for example, the administrative 
adjustment of annexations of suburban counties and county-level cities into
prefecture-level cities, has its own problems, this unified government approach seems 
to be, at least at present, the only formalised institutional option in China. Even 
though city-county consolidation is very difficult to pass through referendum in 
Western countries, the approvals process for administrative annexation is relatively 
easier in China (Zhang and Wu, 2006: 5) because China has a centralised political 
system.
3.11 Conceptual framework for the transformation of regional governance in
China
Initially, some literature interpreted the phenomenon of ‘new regionalism’ from the 
perspective of the diminishing role of the state (e.g. Ohmae, 2004). It seems the 
renewed regional practices, which favour flexible and voluntary arrangements, are the 
improved approach from the past crude metropolitan administrative reform (LefVere, 
1998: 16-20). However, it is questionable whether ‘the institutional ensembles 
themselves [...] [can be] automatically assumed to be a pre-given part of the 
explanation’ (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999a: 697). It is argued that these institutional 
choices themselves need to be explained, rather than assumed as if they were 
ontologically and epistemologically given, in order to advance a deeper analysis (ibid).
Here, for the same purpose, Brenner’s framework of ‘new state space’ (2004b), which 
is drawn from Jessop’s state-theoretical work, is employed to understand changing 
urban and regional governance in China.
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3.11.1 Changing central-local relationship as a re-scaling of state spatiality
The previous sections illustrated the changes in the central-local relationship and the 
shift of regional policies in China from 1949 to present. Fiscal decentralisation and 
economic devolution have entailed a fundamental transformation of government 
structures and central-local relationships. Certainly, local governments are no longer 
the passive agents of the central state; they are directly involved in shaping and 
propelling local development (e.g. Oi, 1995; Walder, 1995; Zhu, 2002). However, the 
downscaling of governance does not necessarily mean the relaxation of central state 
control or the hollowing out of the state (Wu, 2002). In the Chinese case, the central 
government is ‘tooling’ urban entrepreneurialism (Jessop et al., 1999), or even 
becoming involved in the building of the entrepreneurial city, to enhance the structural 
competitiveness of China’s place on the global stage (Wu, 2003). Even though the 
state retreated from direct intervention in economic production and social 
reproduction, the entrepreneurial project legitimises the state to restore its intervention 
in economic spheres to promote and sustain development (Wu, 2003: 1694). It is 
therefore argued that the power decentralisation process is in actuality a 
re-territorialisation of the state, rescaling the state’s functionality from the 
predominant national level to the level of localities (Wu, 2003: 1695). A contentious 
process of power reshuffling between levels of state is underlying the broad scheme of 
decentralisation (Hsing, 2006) and the central-local relationship is not a zero-sum 
game, but has become all the more complicated and interactive (Li, 1997). Put in the 
language of state spatiality, this represents a rescaling of state power at a multitude of 
scales.
The concept of ‘state spatiality’, i.e. the multi-scalar institutional organisation of state 
capacity (Brenner, 2004a: 452-53), is highly relevant here. Brenner extended Jessop’s 
state-theoretical theory to ‘a spatialised and scale articulated conceptualization of 
statehood’ (2004b: 89). As defined by Brenner, state spatiality ‘combines both the 
geographical configuration of a state’s territory (its external and internal boundaries 
and the territorial organization of its political and administrative system) and the 
spatial dimensions of the state’s intervention in socioeconomic processes within that 
territory, including both spatiality targeted interventions and indirect spatial effects of 
aspatial actions’ (Breathnach, 2010: 1180). ‘State projects’ refers to projects that 
mobilise changes of state apparatus, whereas ‘state strategies’ relates to general state 
interventions that regulate the economy and civil society (Brenner, 2004: 87-88; 
MacKinnon and Shaw, 2010: 1228; Varro, 2010: 1256). That is, the state has no 
essential form, but constantly changes through the launch of state projects and state 
strategies.
Based on the study of the changing central-local structure and regional policies in 
China, Table 3.9 summarises the basic features of China’s changing state spatiality. 
During the socialist economy, centralised decision making was the single layer of 
state spatial regulation. The overarching goal was to redistribute resources and 
production forces to the lagging and remote regions and thus to redress the marked 
regional inequality in the national economy. As a consequence, the institutional 
framework of the era entailed a unified national system of material rationing and 
financial sharing, in which local political institutions and policies were compliant to 
the national command. The localities ‘have neither the incentive for ‘entrepreneurial’ 
endeavour nor the capacities and conditions to initiate such activities’ (Wu, 2003:
1679).
Table 3.9: Changing state spatiality from 1949 to the present
Socialist state
(1949-1978)
State in early market
reform (1979-2000)
State in post-WTO market society
(2001-present)
Geo-economic
and political
context
Centrally-plan 
ned economy;
Cold war;
Pursuit of 
self-reliance.
Decentralisation and
market-oriented
economy;
Pursuit of economic 
growth;
GDP growth is of 
overriding importance.
China as a world manufacturing 
workshop;
2008 global economic recession; 
Building of a ‘harmonious society’; 
Pursuit of sustainable development.
State spatial
projects
Centralisation 
of state 
regulation;
Uniform and 
standardised 
administrative 
and
bureaucratic
coverage;
Localities as a 
transmission 
belt to deliver 
administrative 
commands.
Economic and 
political power 
devolution to urban 
governance;
Asymmetrical 
devolution and 
diversities of practices 
in different regions, 
provinces and cities;
Coastal area as a 
forerunner in 
decentralisation 
scheme;
Open cities and 
economic
development zones as 
a field of experiment 
on government 
bureaucratic reform 
oriented to market 
economy.
Recentralisation in respect of some 
state functions, e.g. land 
management;
Upscaling of administration from 
urban level to the regional level, e.g. 
the province-leading-county 
administrative reform;
Administrative experimental zones 
under diverse titles across the whole 
national territory,
e.g. Tianjin, Shenzhen and Pudong in 
the coastal area as comprehensive 
reform areas, Chengdu-Chongqian 
(Chengyu) in the west as an 
urban-rural coordinated development 
reform area, Wuhan metropolitan 
area and 
Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan 
{Changzhutari) in middle China as a 
reform area to promote 
environmental-friendly development;
Inter-city economic cooperation 
associations are pursued in some key 
regions, such as Yangtze River Delta 
and Pearl River Delta.
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State spatial
strategies
Privileging of 
a single
national scale;
Taking all 
regions into 
account like 
when playing 
chess 
(iquanguo
yipanqi);
Egalitarianism
Urban units as the 
predominant scale for 
socio-economic 
activities;
Re-globalising 
Shanghai to bring 
China back to the 
global economy stage;
Uneven regional 
policy to allow some 
regions and some 
people to become rich 
first.
Urban regions around the core 
economic city (cities) as the scale for 
socio-economic activities;
City-regions (urban and town 
clusters) as the key form to promote 
urbanisation, economic development 
and to engage in global distribution 
of labour;
Coordinated development between 
regions.
Source: compiled by the author.
Since economic reform, the equalisation strategy has given way to economic 
efficiency. Preferential treatment was given to the coastal area, which is more 
competitive compared to the interior. Moreover, decentralisation and market reform as 
been engineered in order to unleash individual and local initiatives. Based on the 
socialist urban-rural division of labour, urban administrative units, which used to be 
concentrated with previous industrial assets, were given more support in terms of 
administrative and economic resources in order to build the urban economy as the 
growth pole of the region and thus to promote regional development. Along with the 
power devolution to the localities, fiscal pressure and a GDP-based cadre promotion 
system also became virtual incentives for various tiers of local government to 
stimulate economic growth. As a corollary, municipal government has become the 
major agent which is directly involved in promoting local development and the urban 
economy has turned to be the dominant engine of the national economy.
As of 2000, regional policies have been rejuvenated after a period of marginalisation. 
Following the publication of ‘West Development’, ‘Northeast Regeneration’ and
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‘Central Revival’, the interior region seems to have been given more attention by the 
state. However, the difference between recent regional polices and the previous 
regional equalisation policy in the socialist era is that efficiency is still prioritised in 
the latest strategies. Only some city-regions with potential economic competitiveness 
are selected and highlighted; for example, some specific projects such as 
Chengdu-Chongqian (Chengyu) in the west, Wuhan metropolitan area and 
Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan (Changzhutan) in the central region have been launched 
following the grand regional policy. The top-down regional plans initiated by the 
central government and the bottom-up inter-city association promoted by the 
higher-level governments are also concentrated in some particular regions such as 
YRD, PRD and Bohai Sea Rim. Overall, new state spatiality at the regional scale is 
just emerging in contemporary China.
3.11.2 Conceptualising the regional renaissance in China: the transformation of
state selectivity
State spatial selectivity demonstrates the ‘ state [’s] strategic tendency to privilege 
certain places [and/or groups] through spatial projects and strategies’ (Varro, 2010: 
1256), which is structurally inscribed under a certain context and timeframe. 
According to Brenner, state spatiality ‘is never permanently fixed but, like all other 
aspects of the state form, represents an emergent, strategically selective, and 
politically contested process' (Brenner, 2004a: 89, original emphasis). The evolution 
of state spatiality is mobilised through state spatial projects and state spatial strategies 
by diverse social forces {ibid). For example, Brenner (2004a, b) investigated changing 
urban governance through the lens of changing state spatiality. It is conceived that
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spatial Keynesianism, the centralised, redistributive and uniform administrative 
system, was destabilised by de-industrialisation and the crisis of North Atlantic 
Fordism. As a consequence, the local managerialism is contested by urban 
entrepreneurialism. That is, selectivity is transformed towards decentralisation and the 
customisation of state administrative arrangements, and the localisation and 
differentiation of national political-economic spaces (Brenner 2004a: 214). The 
resurgence of new spatial strategies and projects in China also demonstrates the 
tendencies of changing state selectivity. The selectivity is transformed towards 
recentralisation in administrative arrangements and regionalisation in 
political-economic space (Table 3.10). That is, another scale at the regional level is 
emerging in the contours of China’s state spatiality through centrally orchestrated 
strategies and bottom-up collaboration. However, compared to the regional 
intervention in the era before economic reform, the current regional initiatives show 
the distinct features of customisation and concentration on certain areas (Table 3.10). 
In other words, in comparison with past national redistributive policies and 
administrations, the current regional strategies and projects are quite differentiated at 
the territorial dimension.
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Table 3.10: The transformation of state spatial selectivity in China since 2000
State spatial projects State spatial strategies
Scalar
dimension
Re-centralisation of part of the state
functions:
Re-concentration of political authority 
towards the higher-level of government, 
e.g. recentralisation of land 
management, province-leading-county 
administrative reform
This enhances the regulatory 
responsibilities of central and provincial 
tiers of state power
Resurgence of regional strategies:
Regional scale is mobilised by all kinds 
of regional plans and regional policies
Regional scale is privileged by the state 
to enhance concentrated industrial 
development and urbanisation and to 
address enlarging inter-regional disparity 
by promoting growth in certain major 
urban regions
Territorial
dimension
Customisation:
Expansion of urban administrative 
boundaries, experiments on inter-city 
association, especially in the coastal 
area;
Administrative experimental zones 
under diverse titles across the whole 
national territory
This entrenches the customised, 
place-specific institutional 
arrangements since the economic 
reform
Concentration:
Promoting agglomeration, e.g. regional 
plans and policies are transforming 
urbanisation from the development of 
small, medium and large cities in favour 
of the development of city-regions
This contributes to the concentration of 
infrastructural investment towards key 
urban and regional development 
pathways, for example, the recent 
development of the high-speed railway 
network
Source: compiled by the author.
According to Brenner (2003b), the increasing inter-locality competition and enlarging 
uneven development is conceived as the driving force for the articulation of the new 
selectivity from urban entrepreneurialism towards new regionally-focused projects 
and strategies (Brenner, 2003b: 212). The similarly changing trajectory seen from the 
planning policies also demonstrates that institutional fragmentation is another factor 
leading to regional renaissance. Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones (2000: 714) 
documented that regional planning in the UK was made difficult by the downscaling
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of governance; for example, the privatisation of public utilities, and the emergence of 
semi-commercials and quangos. The resultant fragmented state spaces, based on 
individual institutions, were replaced by regional planning governance to make up for 
regional coordination. In contrast, the transformation of state spatiality in China has 
developed under a different local context (Table 3.11). During the socialist period, a 
redistributive regional policy was a necessary state governance strategy under the 
state-led industrialisation adopted by the planned economy (Wu and Zhang, 2010: 62). 
Under the catching-up industrial policy, the predominant role for the state in the 
socialist economy was to guarantee the low cost and high profit of industries by 
means of controlling production resources, product procurement, labour forces, labour 
mobility and urbanisation. As a consequence, resource-rich regions were made to sell 
their resources at a compulsory low price to production regions to facilitate rapid 
industrialisation. In turn, revenue remitted by the production regions was transferred 
to the resource-rich regions to sustain the regional division of labour. This differs from 
the Keynesian Welfare State, which strives to standardise industrial and infrastructure 
investment throughout the nation in order to support mass production and 
consumption to solve the crisis of oversupply and stabilise industrial growth (Brenner, 
2004b); the socialist state was characterised by constrained consumption and 
extensive expansion of means of production to accelerate the industrialisation process 
(Wu et al., 2007). Therefore, the organised division of labour between regions, urban 
and rural areas in actuality, created inequality inherent in different regions and 
industrial sectors. Although the strategic relocation of heavy industries to the interior 
region under the Cold War did transfer the production capacity from the coast to the 
inland area to some extent, production efficiency was not correspondingly transferred. 
Eventually, the economic inefficiency of state-led industrialisation and industrial
relocation starved national revenue and enlarged the deficit.
Table 3.11: Transformation of regional governance in China
Period Form of state spatial
selectivity
Form of urban and
regional governance
Major conflicts and
contradictions
1949-1978
Single scale of nation state State managerialism;
City and regional 
institutions as 
implementation belts
Urban-rural dualism;
Regional inequalities based 
on socialist internal 
division of labour
1979-
2001
Decentralise economic 
governance and planning 
powers etc. to lower layers of 
government; and also 
subcontract and divide 
responsibilities to lower 
levels;
multi-scales of state (mainly: 
local and central)
Urban
entrepreneurial ism;
Economic 
development is 
predominantly led 
and funded by city 
government;
Fierce inter-city 
competition;
Uncoordinated and 
redundant infrastructure 
development;
Environmental degradation, 
especially encroachment of 
rural land
2001-
present
The recentralisation of some 
state functions, such as land 
management;
The downscaling of the 
central state to the regional 
level to strengthen its 
intervening role;
The upscaling of the local 
state to the regional level to 
build regional 
competitiveness
multi-scales of state (local 
and central, with the making 
of regions)
Re-asserting a 
city-regional scale;
Regional scale as a 
layer o f‘soft 
institution’ without 
building up a 
substantial level of 
regional government 
or mechanism
The city-region as an 
‘imagined community’ 
which continues to see 
conflicting and diverse 
interests;
Region-building is 
achieved through both 
top-down and bottom-up 
processes, but the central 
government lacks full 
commitment towards a 
region; and local 
governance lacks a 
participatory political 
legitimisation process
Source: compiled from Wu and Zhang (2010: 61).
It is under this context that it was believed China’s economy was in urgent need of 
market mechanism and power decentralisation to unleash individual and local
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initiatives to increase productivity by means of competition. Therefore, the state 
orchestrated administrative and fiscal decentralisation laid down the institutional 
foundation and economic motivation for entrepreneurial urban governance. In short, 
decentralisation is a state strategy. As commented by Wu and Zhang (2008: 150), ‘the 
central government purposely uses it as an incentive for local government to promote 
local growth’. However, urban entrepreneurialism is problematic in that the centrally _ 
induced strategy is a fragmentally organised project (Brenner, 2003b: 210). As a 
consequence, locally-initiated industrial development has resulted in environmental 
degradation, redundant development and enlarging regional inequality. Fast-speed 
industrial expansion has created great demand for land and water resources. 
Accelerated consumption has already reached a threshold which threatens the 
environment. It is documented that China has lost arable land at an astonishing rate, 
leaving per capita arable land in some areas under 0.8 mu (1 mu equals to 0.06666667 
hectare), which is the warning line recognised by the United Nations (State Council 
Development and Research Institute, 2008: 97). It is also indicated that over 400 cities 
in China are confronted with water shortages due to the excessive industrialisation 
(ibid). Blind industrial development in environmentally-sensitive regions has 
generated even greater damage. In addition, whereas economic inefficiency was 
induced by low productivity and in-coordination in the centrally-planned system, the 
market-oriented economy in China remains inefficient due to continuous development 
and over-competition. Finally, the inter-provincial Gini-coefficient of GDP in China 
has increased from 0.347 in 1978 to 0.386 in 2004, an increase of 11.3% (State 
Council Development and Research Institute, 2008: 98); in terms of public services, 
the discrepancy is even more considerable. For example, only a third of the student 
dormitories in the central and western regions reach the national standard according to
the statistics (ibid). These figures just demonstrate the social and environmental 
problems that are confronting contemporary China. In other words, the land, 
environmental, economic and social problems caused by excessive industrial 
development under urban entrepreneurialism are the major factors that contribute to 
the recent regional renaissance in China.
3.11.3 The production of regional scale and inter-scalar politics
The form of spatial selectivity is only representative of actions and does not 
necessarily entail a straightforward replacement of the latter with the former (Deas 
and Ward, 2000). The changing process is highly contested by diverse powers and is 
embedded upon an ‘institutional product of earlier rounds of regulatory 
experimentation and socio-political struggle’ (Brenner, 2004b: 94). Therefore, it is 
important to recognise the ‘politics of scale’ in understanding the process of changing 
state spatiality and scale making. The concept of ‘politics of scale’ relates to the 
proposition that geographical scales, whether urban, regional, national or global, are 
not pre-given, but are socially constructed and politically contested (Brenner, 2002: 4, 
note 1). The concept, on the other hand, also indicates that the state has no power by 
itself, but is mediated through a set of institutional ensembles by social forces 
(MacKinnon and Shaw, 2010: 1228). The process-based approach and agency 
perspective is helpful to avoid the mistake of the regulational and structuralist 
‘top-down’ approach which is framed around the general and abstract tendency of 
economic Fordism to post-Fordism. In conceiving the state agency, the territorial 
approach considers the space is articulated by multi-levels of state, while the 
relational approach emphasises the local political actors which participate from a
range of overlapping political networks (e.g. Allen and Cochrane, 2007). Yet, it is 
argued by Sonn (2010: 1204) that it is also important to view the state as an 
organisation composed of ‘multiple sub-organizations, such as various departments, 
agencies and offices that have different, sometimes conflicting interests, than a 
monolithic entity’. In addition to the argument on new state spaces and agency, it is, 
on the other hand, suggested that the transformation of new state spaces could be 
driven not only by economic projects, but also political, cultural, social and 
environmental projects (Jonas and Ward, 2007). Brenner (2002: 4, note 1) has 
deployed the term ‘new politics of scale’ to ‘underscore the ways in which the scalar 
organization of capitalism is itself becoming an important stake of ongoing 
sociopolitical struggles’. It is hence argued that the development of new state spaces, 
which are the fusion of existing and evolving projects, are filled with uncertainties 
(Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones, 2000).
The above theoretical perspective is very helpful in terms of perceiving the dynamics 
in the building of regional scale in China. In conceiving the emergence of 
regionalisation, Xu (2008), Xu and Yeh (2011b) and Yeh and Xu (2008) attempted to 
understand the changes in regional cooperation from the transformation of the regime 
of accumulation. It is suggested that ‘regional cooperation is needed to overcome the 
hurdle of capital accumulation’ (Yeh and Xu, 2008: 413). In the pre-reform socialist 
regime, regional policies and cooperation strategies were developed to ‘enforce 
central planning so that the state could enhance its capacity to divert the accumulated 
surplus from organised socialist industrialisation to the new expansion of production’ 
(Xu, 2008: 161). In the post-reform regime, however, regional governance and 
strategic planning was initiated to achieve administrative efficiency or economic
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rationality, which is undermined by downscaled state function and entrepreneurial 
strategies (Xu, 2008: 162). In a word, regionalisation is explained as part of the wider 
process of changing state spatial strategy in response to economic restructuring after 
economic reform. Although the analyses of the changing rationales of regional 
cooperation in these studies (e.g. Yeh and Xu, 2008: 413) are acceptable, the 
explanation is problematic from two aspects. Firstly, the theorisation privileges 
economic factors over other elements, such as land politics and the environmental 
crisis in China after extensive decentralisation and entrepreneurialism. This also 
matches the criticism of the empirical conceptualisation made by Brenner (2004b). 
Even though Brenner (2002; 2004b) initiated a comprehensive conceptual framework 
to theorise changing urban governance and the rescaling of statehood, Brenner’s 
empirical analysis of changing statehood in Western European countries (2004b) is 
criticised from the point of view that ‘accumulation strategies are consistently 
privileged over hegemonic projects’ (Oosterlynck, 2010: 1156). That is, the potential 
connection with issues concerning social reproduction is missing from the analysis 
(Walks, 2006: 228). Secondly, the explanation seems to suggest that the regional level 
is a pre-given scale of statehood. It is suggested that the politics of regional 
cooperation are due to the loose approaches to forge regional cooperation, which 
hence makes regionalisation subject to political influence (Yeh and Xu, 2008: 414). 
However, as the above theoretical perspective implies, this chapter argues that the 
regional scale is not yet consolidated and well established, and the politics just show 
the tensions throughout the regional-scale making process. Overall, the ‘new politics 
of scale’ concept, the process-based approach and the agency perspective are 
particularly useful for addressing cases in China because these conceptual tools 
embed the analysis in the context of contested territorial politics, rather than treat it as
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a necessary outcome of economic restructuring.
Furthermore, the scalar tension in China is different from that of the UK and other 
Western countries. The latter are more democratised societies. The building of new 
state scalar architecture involves powers both within and outside the government. For 
example, the scalar tension in the case of waste management in the UK is manifested 
in the struggle over the terms of engagement (Davoudi, 2009: 147-148); whereas, the 
regional initiatives in China are articulated by the government, at both the central and 
local level, with the involvement of various divisions and departments. Furthermore, 
the tensions revolve around independent driving forces and the incompatible 
rationales between the centrally-launched and locally-initiated projects. The 
programmes launched by the central state are intended to be re-regulated through the 
level of regional governance to tackle the problems caused by earlier and ongoing 
entrepreneurial development across localities. In other words, the central government 
is motivated by government capacity problems, which is characterised by land loss 
and environmental degradation, excessive competition in manufacturing development 
and national economy safety, uneven development and social polarisation. By contrast, 
the intention for the local states to initiate bottom-up cooperation is largely for the 
sake of urban competitiveness and competition with other regions. That is, economic 
growth and economic benefits are still the main concern for the local governments. As 
the civil society and business sector are barely involved within the current regional 
programmes, the scalar tension is thus mainly articulated between the central and 
local governments, and between the divisions of ministries.
147
3.12 Conclusion
The chapter develops a thorough overview of China’s changing regional governance 
at different stages since 1949. Particular attention is paid to recent changes at the 
regional scale. It is discovered that China is now experiencing regional renaissance 
after decades of downscaling of governance since 1978. Through the investigation of 
the various policies and practices in the emerging regional governance, the leading 
actors, the underpinning rationales, the implication of regional governance, and the 
extent of implementation are examined. Based on the extensive analysis, the 
characteristics of the re-emerged regional governance are summarised.
The current second wave of regional practices in China is qualitatively different from 
the regional governance in the socialist period. Firstly, the regional programmes are 
mainly in the form of inter-city associations, regional planning or regional policies 
rather than a formal tier of regional administration. Secondly, the contemporary 
regional initiatives are focused on particular regions instead of being a nationally 
uniform administrative system. Thirdly, the launch of regional strategies is not 
motivated by redistribution and equalisation, but is promoted by the requirement of 
resolving locally-specific crises or problems. Furthermore, the current regional 
activities are not only orchestrated by the central state, but are also articulated by the 
local government. Therefore, the re-emergence of regional governance in China is 
more complex, since the emerging regional scale is intertwined with different leading 
actors and different rationales. The locally-initiated regional projects are intended to 
strengthen local endogenous growth opportunities and urban economic 
competitiveness. However, the initiatives led by the central government aim to
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manage the long-standing inter-locality adverse competition, in-coordinated and 
redundant development, and the enlarging inter-regional inequalities and tensions.
The notion of ‘state spatiality’ and ‘state selectivity’ is useful when perceiving the 
emerging regional governance from the perspective of the political economy and 
changing statehood. From the recent changes of governance, it is shown that state 
selectivity is oriented towards recentralisation and the resurgence of the regional scale, 
which is characterised with customisation and concentration. However, it is argued 
that the changing state spatiality in China is not triggered by the changes to the wider 
political economy, for example, the global economic restructuring and economic 
recession experienced in Western countries, but is provoked by China’s territorial 
politics, i.e. in order to manage the long-standing problems of urban entrepreneurial 
development such as excessive economic competition, waste of land resources, rising 
environmental concerns and requests for sustainable development. Furthermore, in 
order to illuminate the actual mechanism and process of regional-scale making, 
special attention is given to exploring the agency and politics underlying each specific 
regional project. It is established that the implementation of contemporary regional 
programmes is confronted by many challenges and tensions in practice. To sum up, 
the Chinese case of changing regional governance demonstrates that governance is not 
the automatic product of an economic accumulation regime, but is closely associated 
with local politics. In order to further illustrate the mechanism and inter-scalar 
tensions, in-depth case studies are to be conducted in the following chapters.
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C h A p t e r  f o u r
r e s e A r C h  f r A m e w o r k A n d  m e t h o d o l o g y
4.1 Research tasks and objectives
As declared in section 1.2, the overall aim of the study is to highlight the new 
phenomenon of re-emerging regional governance in China after decades of 
decentralisation, and to analyse the changing regional configurations in China, and 
account for the mechanisms which brought about these transformations and the nature 
of the changes. The research intends to add China’s experience to the current Western 
theory of changing local governance, which is mostly generalised from Western 
European and North American studies.
In order to realise the aim of the research, the following tasks are outlined:
1. To establish the theoretical perspectives to be taken by the research by reviewing 
Chinese and overseas literature to ascertain the gap in the theoretical and empirical 
knowledge in China on regional governance;
2. To identify and examine the different stages of changing regional configurations,
central-local state relationships, and the political context in China from 1949 to 
the present day; to summarise the different features of regional governance in 
different periods;
3. To examine different actors behind and different rationales for region-building, and
account for the dynamics of the emerging regional governance with the empirical
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study of the area of the YRD region;
4. To examine in what sense is there a ‘new state space’ created by the current 
practices articulated at the regional level in the YRD;
5. To compare the Chinese experience with literature documenting events in Western
countries, especially that from the UK; to understand the differences between the 
features and development trajectories from a different context; and also to 
examine the applicability of the existing Western-based theoretical concepts and 
empirical findings.
4.2 Research focus and definition
The focus of the study is the ongoing process of the emerging regional governance 
associated with different actors and practices. Due to the remarkably different context 
between China and the dominant western countries, it is deemed necessary to define 
the use of the term ‘region’ and ‘governance’ in Chinese context, which constitute as 
the essential research subject of the study.
According to the context chapter (chapter three), the landscape of the state power of 
China has been greatly transformed, compared to that in the socialist period. The 
authority is no longer centralised at the national state, i.e. the central government, but 
has been decentralised to the provincial government, city and county government, and 
even town and village governments at the lowest layer of the China’s government 
structure. In the meantime, the absolute control of the state administrative system is 
gradually disintegrating through marketisation, the introduction of foreign investment 
and the integration with the global economy, even though China’s business elites and
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civil society are still very weak. The two major aspects of change set the context for 
the use of ‘governance’ in China, which indicates the remarkable transition away from 
absolute central government control.
There has been a proliferation of studies on Chinese localisation and the changing 
urban governance (e.g. Oi, 1995; Walder, 1995; Wu, 2002, 2003; Wu et al., 2007; 
Zhang, 2002b), and the consequent local fragmentation and competition between each 
administrative level from provincial to the basic units (e.g. Chien and Gordon, 2008; 
Zhao and Zhang, 1999). However, the findings of chapter three have demonstrated the 
rising regional practices in the contemporary China. As documented in the previous 
chapter, the current practices are present at all kinds of different regions with a variety 
of geographical scales and boundaries. This is in part because of the fact that China 
does not have a formal level of regional government structure after the economic 
reform, neither an official definition on what constitutes a ‘region’. Due to the reality, 
‘region’ is loosely used in the research and implies all kinds of trans-border practices 
designed to tackle issues across administrative boundaries. The new phenomenon of 
regional governance in China hence refers to the tendency of a new level of 
sub-national governance beyond localisation and bounded administrative borders.
4.3 Research questions
The dominant role played by the Chinese state makes the conceptual framework of 
‘new state spaces’ proposed by Brenner (2004b) applicable to conceptualises the 
resurgence of regional exercises in China. In section 3.11, the research argues that the 
contemporary regional process is indicative of a changing geography of state power in
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China, i.e. the rescaling of statehood to build a new regional state space. With this as a 
foundation, the core of the research studies the ‘intention’ to create the new state 
space and how the space is developed.
As informed by the theoretical perspective derived from the western literature review, 
the study on the agency, the rationale and the context behind the formation process is 
essential to understand the intention of the production of regional spaces, and to 
unravel the nature of the changing landscape of governance. Henceforth, the 
following questions are addressed in the remainder part of the research.
1. Who is articulating the current regional practices?
2. For what purposes are the agents promoting these regional practices?
3. What are the conditions that have led the agents to shift from previous practices of 
decentralisation and localisation to recent attempts at regional governance?
4. What is the defining features of the contemporary practices of regional 
governance?
5. What politics are exposed in the process of governance building?
6. To what extent have contemporary regional state spaces developed in China?
The above research questions directly respond to the call for in-depth study on the 
transformation processes under way within places in the development of new regional 
state spaces in different parts of the world. This is deemed preferable to an approach 
based upon assumptions about the dominance and mechanisms of a top-down 
approach and general global context (e.g. Jonas and Ward, 2002, 2007). The research 
also fills the empirical gap in the understanding of the dynamics of changing regional 
governance in China in the existing literature.
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4.4 Case study approach and case selections
The case study approach is adopted to examine the ongoing process of the emerging 
regional governance in the real-life context. This is because a case study strategy is 
adept in examining contemporary events and delving into the ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
questions (Yin, 1994: 9).
One critical case, the evolution of regional governance in the Yangtze River Delta 
region (YRD) region, is examined to offer an understanding of the dynamics of region 
building. Located in the eastern coast area and centred on Shanghai, YRD is one of 
the first regions to be exposed to opening door policies and market-oriented economic 
reform. Many practices of decentralisation were foremost launched here and then 
spread to the other parts of the country. The YRD is also a region with a long history 
of regional institutional development. With the abolition of formal mega-region tiers 
of authorities in the planned economy, attempts to form a flexible network were made, 
either with state encouragement or spontaneously. However, the regional regime 
remained mostly nominal throughout the 1980s and 1990s. However, since 2000, the 
regional cooperation and development of YRD has again been highlighted in both 
local and national policy. The ups and downs of regional policy in the area and the 
complexity of actors associated throughout the process make the region an appropriate 
area for case study.
In this case, the regional governance development is examined from the two aspects 
of the changing economics and politics. As the findings of chapter three has indicated
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that the practices of recent regional governance are operated by two contrasting actors: 
the sub-national level governments at and below provincial governments, and the 
central government. Two embedded case studies are undertaken to demonstrate two 
different leading agents and their contrasting rationales and dynamics underlying the 
tentative regional governance. Firstly, a trans-border area between Jiangsu and 
Shanghai, i.e. the area between the county-level city in the region, Kunshan, and the 
Jiading district of Shanghai, is selected as the in-depth case study to focus on 
changing regional governance at the local level. Secondly, the recently formulated 
regional plans of the YRD are selected to study regional governance initiated by the 
central state, in which regional plans are utilised as the crucial device to deliver 
regional intervention and thus act as a contributor to changing territorial governance. 
The case selections are also closely related to the feasibility of data collection and 
fieldwork, which will be further discussed in data acquisition section.
4.5 Data acquisition and analysis
Data has been collected from both primary and secondary sources during the last four 
years. A pilot fieldtrip was conducted from January to March 2009, and intensive 
fieldwork was undertaken from February to May in 2010. Bookstores, local libraries 
of cities and universities, and personal contacts and visits are the main source of 
secondary data. Primary data has been collected through interviews to provide 
in-depth information on case studies.
4.5.1 Secondary data: documents and numeric data
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In the study, documents refer to any printed or written information. They are collected 
for three main purposes; the first is to gather the general documentation on the 
changing regional policies and administration in China. Longitudinal materials dated 
from 1949 to the present day include regional policies, regional administrations, 
administrative changes, and regional plans, etc. Data sources are mainly from existing 
studies and documentation in the form of articles and monographs; official 
publications of regional policies, National Five-Year Plans, and administrative 
handbooks; as well as fresh news and reports from newspapers or websites. In this 
section, data collection on the recent regional transformation is most critical, since 
they represent the latest developments and have not yet been systematically compiled 
in either domestic or overseas studies. With regard to data processing, qualitative 
analysis is deployed to carry out policy review and document compilation in 
accordance with the different stages.
The second purpose is to present the transformation of the case study area of the YRD. 
This mainly contains two datasets: territorial administrations and economic 
development. Consequently, maps of administrative divisions and changing regional 
administrations, and chronological data on the changes in administrative units, 
structures, and jurisdiction areas at the county level have been collected from 
administrative handbooks and statistical yearbooks. Moreover, data of industrial 
output, percentage of industries and from the tertiary sector, which indicate the facets 
of regional economic development, have been produced or collected from Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Shanghai Statistic Yearbooks and Chinese City Statistic Yearbooks. Some 
data may have been compiled by the author from various sources such as websites, 
reports and books, for instance, the distribution of economic zones. Furthermore,
quantitative analysis via Excel and Maplnfo is applied to visualise the changes in the 
governance structure and the spatial implications.
In addition, secondary data has been collected for the in-depth case studies of the 
changing relationship between Shanghai and Jiangsu, and the YRD regional plans, 
which are employed to illustrate the trajectory of YRD regional governance 
development in a vivid and detailed way. For the trans-border case on the side of 
Kunshan, a good foundation was established by existing studies on Kunshan and my 
experience in Kunshan during January, 2008 due to a local planning project. Materials 
such as the digital Kunshan administrative map, statistical yearbooks, the Kunshan 
master plan and Kunshan concept plan have already been collected through the 
planning project. However, further collection was made during the fieldwork of the 
most recent materials such as the newly approved master plan and statistical 
yearbooks to keep data up to date. On the other side of the border area of Anting town, 
Jiading district, Shanghai, materials of maps, planning documents and government 
policies were collected during the visit to the local planning bureau and economic 
zone development corporation.
With regard to the recent YRD regional plan, planning documents have been collected 
from open sources such as government websites, and from personal contacts with 
reference to unpublished texts. Materials on the historical development of YRD 
regional governance have been compiled from various publications including articles, 
reports and monographs.
4.5.2 First-hand data: semi-structured interviews
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Secondary data are best to trace and document historical transformation and economic 
development because statistical books, monographs and articles published over the 
years contain abundant information and numeric data to illustrate progress, while 
documents and policies are able to provide specific information on individual projects. 
However, the secondary data are not capable of providing information on the most 
recent developments and unpublished stories. Therefore qualitative interviews are 
used to enrich information generated by the secondary data, and also to give evidence 
of information that cannot be retrieved through secondary data.
Semi-structured interviews were arranged for the two embedded case studies. The 
semi-structured interview technique is employed because of its strength in eliciting 
views and opinions from people who are rich in relevant experiences. Moreover, it 
also allows ‘the interview to have more latitude to probe beyond the answers and thus 
enter into a dialogue with the interviewee’ (May, 1997: 111). The proper design of 
interview questions is critical to the acquisition of information; threads of interview 
questions should be formulated according to the theory questions that the research 
aims to answer (Wengraf, 2001: 73). In the research, analysis of the interview 
transcription is based on themes, and insights are quoted to capture the points.
In total, 43 in-depth face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted, 10 were 
made during the pilot fieldtrip and 33 were held during the second fieldtrip. All 
interviews were conducted in the interviewees’ offices, lasting from 30 minutes to two 
hours. Unfortunately, interviews made on the first fieldtrip were not recorded, but 
notes were taken. All 33 interviews later on were recorded and transcribed during the
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fieldtrip. The questions asked during interviews are attached in Appendix 1. Many 
experts were drawn from existing connections established during years of study in 
China, but some new contacts were also made during the research by means of 
references from supervisor and other experts.
The ten interviews made on the pilot fieldtrip helps the study to gather a general 
knowledge about all the emerging practices at the regional level, and also helps to 
make decisions on the research design, particularly on choices of case studies and 
future methods. Due to the researcher’s background in planning school and the 
involvement in live planning projects during the education, the two planning and 
development strategy-related cases of Kunshan (Jiangsu) and Jiading (Shanghai) and 
the Yangtze River Delta are selected. This is because the researcher is familiar with 
the plan-making process and can precisely target the relevant people to be recruited, 
who can be generally categorised into three types of people, that is, academics, 
planners and government and planning officials. In China, the planning and strategy 
making process is not only heavily involved by government officials of both senior 
civil servants and routine practitioners who are working in the relevant departments, 
and planning professionals who undertake the project, but also academics in the 
planning school. Academics often directly participate in planning projects and play a 
leading role in drafting plans rather than merely work as consultants. Therefore, 
planning academics in China have long established links with the government and are 
very familiar with the process of plan-making. The list of interviewees is attached in 
Appendix 2. In the case of Kunshan (Jiangsu) and Jiading (Shanghai), an overall 19 
interviews were made to both sides of trans-border region, with 2 academics, 7 
planners and 10 government officials; while in the case of the Yangtze River Delta, 14
interviews were made, with 9 academics, 6 planners, and 1 government officials. 
Although the research was intending to cover all types of people who participated in 
or are well informed regarding the recent events and planning issues, the achievement 
in the second case study is slightly poor in terms of approaching government officials.
One of the main disadvantages of interviews is difficulty in gaining access to the 
interviewees. The potential interviewee may not be available or may not want to 
cooperate. This is especially the case in the second case study of the YRD regional 
plan because the plan is overseen by the central ministries, where the civil servants are 
highly-ranked. Originally, four officials in the central ministries were targeted. Even 
though strenuous efforts were made, the results were disappointing even with contacts 
and references. They were either too busy to make an arrangement, or did not respond 
to enquiries regarding the possibility of an interview, or simply refused to participate. 
For example, neither the senior official nor the civil servant from the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) nor the person from the Ministry of 
Housing and Urban and Rural Development (MHURD) who is in charge of YRD 
regional plan making was available for interview, despite several attempts to meet. 
Finally, only one other official, the chief of the section of urban development in 
MHURD, were approached with the help of contacts. And this is the only official 
interviewed in the central ministries. Therefore, great efforts were made to obtain the 
missing information from alternative sources. For example, talks, interviews or 
speeches made by officials on public occasions were collected from various resources 
such as the government’s official website, news portal websites, newspapers, news or 
academic journals or personal contacts. Meanwhile, as many interviews as possible 
were conducted with academics, senior planners and others involved in the YRD
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regional plan preparation. For ethical considerations, the location of some of the 
interviewees is removed in the text due to the sensitivity of the comments or at the 
request of the interviewee.
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C h A p t e r  f i v e
t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e  y A n g t z e  r i v e r  d e l t A i n
C h i n A
5.1 Introduction
Under the centrally planned system prior to 1978, China was ruled under a command 
economy. There was no natural economic flow or monetary regionalisation during that 
time. Arbitrary spatial labour divisions were distinguished between cities and rural 
areas, with cities intended to develop industries and villages to develop agriculture. 
For example, Shanghai and the neighbouring county, Kunshan, were rarely related to 
each other and were even managed by separate urban and rural systems. During the 
socialist period, Shanghai was the most important manufacturing city in China. 
Shanghai’s products were appropriated all over the country under the central 
command. In contrast, Kunshan, the rural county, was mainly engaged in agricultural 
activities and farming. It is not until the start of the economic reform that horizontal 
economic connections began emerging between enterprises and cities, under the 
encouragement of the central government. The increasingly integrated regional 
economy with intense flows of trade, people, traffic, logistics and capital is a new 
phenomenon in China.
However, there is little research on the development of economic regionalisation and 
the consequently changing inter-city economic relationship in China in either
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Chinese- or English-language literature. Although some literature exists on the 
changing cross-border economic relationship between Hong Kong and Guangdong 
(e.g. Ash and Kueh, 1993; Shen, 2002, 2003; Yang 2004, 2005a; Yeh, 2001), the 
inter-relationship between Hong Kong and the PRD region is peculiar to mainland 
China in that the area includes one special administrative region, i.e. Hong Kong. The 
special framework of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ between the two areas increases 
the regional economy in the sense of ‘transnational’ regionalisation under economic 
globalisation. In contrast, the majority of the existing regional literature in China 
mainly focuses on the issue of regional economic development and the consequent 
economic and spatial transformation (e.g. Chen, 2007; Eng, 1997; Lin, 1997, 2001; 
Lo, 1989; Ma and Fan, 1994; Shen et al., 2002; Sit and Yang, 1997; Wei, 2002, 2010; 
Wei et al., 2009). Zhao and Zhang (2007) described the regional polarisation with 
strong outward linkages as global city-regions. It is widely acknowledged that FDI 
and local government are the indispensable driving forces which stimulate the 
regional economic development (e.g. Chien, 2007; Wang and Lee, 2007; Wei, 2002; 
Yang, 2009; Zhao and Zhang, 2007).
However, the recent Western literature on city-regions has transcended the focus on 
the physical agglomeration and spatial clustering of economies, and extended the 
analysis to the functional connectivity within the region (e.g. Hall, 2009: 804). That is, 
the concept of the city-region is not merely defined as a continuously urbanised area, 
but also ‘on the basis of what Manuel Castells has called the “space of flows’” (ibid).
Hall and Pain (2006) studied the cluster of cities in Europe and defined the functional 
polycentric region as a new form of urbanisation, which is organised by networks that 
are clustered around one or more large central city. It is documented that ‘these places
exist both as separate entities, ... and as parts of a wider functional urban region 
connected by dense flows of people and information along motorways, high-speed rail 
lines, and telecommunications cables’ (Hall, 2009: 806). It is suggested that the 
vibrant regional economy is drawn from the new functional division of labour within 
and between the networks (ibid).
The insufficient attention paid to the changing cross-boundary relationships between 
cities and provinces in China (except for Tang and Zhao, 2010; Zhang, 2006) provides 
a gap for research to examine the regionalisation process developing in China. The 
chapter attempts to illustrate the development of the regionalisation of the YRD 
region and the changing economic inter-relationship between the cities. It not only 
draws upon the great quantity of literature on the economic development of the YRD 
region to illustrate the implication of the economic development to the changing 
inter-city economic relationship, but also extends the analysis forward to the new 
development of functional connectivity between the cities in recent years. It is argued 
that the YRD has become virtually regionalised since the 1990s through two stages. In 
the 1990s, the region was developing into an export-oriented manufacturing belt with 
close relationships with foreign markets and investment. Cities within the dynamic 
region were increasingly inter-related to each other, not only in the sense that they 
were in sympathy with foreign markets, but also in that they were confronted with 
common regional issues such as housing problems, traffic congestion and 
environmental degradation after years of urban expansion. Since the beginning of the 
2000s, the regionalisation of the YRD has stepped into a new stage. Cities in the 
region at different development stages are beginning to develop functional division of 
labour between one another. The new development pattern is driven by both
government push and market pull, and facilitated by improved regional transport.
The chapter is organised according to the different development stages of economic 
regionalisation. In addition to the existing YRD literature and monographs, Shanghai, 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang statistical yearbooks have been collected. By making use of 
Maplnfo, maps based on county-level jurisdictional units (except Shanghai, where 
data of districts and counties cannot be accessed) have been compiled in order to 
illustrate the transformation of the YRD development.
5.2 The development of the regional economy in the YRD in the 1980s
Distinguished from town development in the PRD, the growth of the YRD in the 
1980s was largely not fuelled by foreign (overseas Chinese) investment and 
manufacturing exports. In contrast, the local development of town and village 
enterprises (TVEs) played a key role in the regional growth of the YRD throughout 
the take-off period of economic reform. As shown by the spatial distribution of 
industrial output value in the YRD in 1990 in Figure 5.1, manufacturing was no 
longer merely dominated by the provincial capital cities or main cities such as 
Hangzhou, Ningbo of Zhejiang province, Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou and Nanjing of 
Jiangsu province. The counties or county-level cities such as Wujiang, Changshu and 
Zhangjiagang under the Suzhou prefecture-level city; Xishan, Jiangyin under the 
Wuxi prefecture-level city and Wujin under the Changzhou prefecture-level city also 
performed a strong role in industrial production. This was due to the fact that TVEs 
had strongly driven rural industrialisation, especially in southern Jiangsu of Suzhou, 
Wuxi and Changzhou in the 1980s (Ma and Fan, 1994), which is also known as the
‘Sunan Model’ (Marton, 2000). It is documented that, during the period from 1978 to 
1994, industrial output in Suzhou and the Wuxi city region increased 44.1 times and 
34.6 times respectively, much higher than the 7.3 times in Shanghai and 15.6 times 
which was the national average (Shen and Ma, 2005: 765). The ‘Sunan Model’ is 
actually a kind of collectivism built on the institution of production brigade in the 
socialist economy. The thriving growth of towns occurred without the financial or 
policy assistance of the central government; rather, it was driven by local initiatives of 
the county, township and town government, or rural entrepreneurs (Ma and Fan, 1994: 
1642). In a word, the disappearance of the arbitrary division of labour between urban 
and rural areas, as well as the lessening control of the central government on the 
economy with the inception of economic reforms, had contributed to the influx of 
TVEs and the emancipation of the rural industrialisation.
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Figure 5.1: The spatial distribution of gross industrial output value in the YRD 
(1990)
Source: Jiangsu Statistical Bureau, 1991; Shanghai Statistical Bureau, 1991; Zhejiang Statistical 
Bureau, 1991.
Note: due to the data availability, the total amount o f industrial output rather than the per capita 
GDP is used here for illustration.
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In the meantime, the gradual elimination of the central administrative controls upon 
the economy also fused the segmented relationships between jurisdictions, 
particularly between urban and rural areas. For example, in the YRD, it is documented 
that a significant number of town and village enterprises (TVEs) in southern Jiangsu 
managed to develop business links with enterprises in other regions, over a half of 
which were state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Shanghai (The Yangtze River Delta 
Urban Economic Coordination Office, 2007: 27). These TVEs mainly undertook the 
initial processing or labour-intensive production for the big SOEs. Apart from the 
transfer or expansion of industries from Shanghai to this developing area, the outflow 
of capital, technology and trade from Shanghai was also very strong. At that time, the 
manufacturing capacity in the peripheral towns lagged behind to the extent that the 
majority of the equipment was transferred from Shanghai’s enterprises, and engineers 
were also borrowed from Shanghai’s factories on Sundays {ibid). The development of 
TVEs in Kunshan was exactly the case in point. The industrialisation of Kunshan 
started by attracting Shanghai’s investment, equipment, engineers and brand names 
(Kunshan Planning Bureau, 2010: 4). Overall, shortly after the economic reform, 
flows of investment, trade, and people were just about to emerge after a long term of 
stiff economy under the central command. Nevertheless, interactions during this time 
remained very limited and were even influenced by residual planning orders due to 
gradual and partial reform in the 1980s.
5.3 The regionalisation of manufacturing production in the YRD since the 1990s
After 1990, the regional economy in the YRD developed at a spectacular speed owing 
to the opening up of Pudong. The economy was gradually deviating from the
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state-sponsored development and the collectively-led ‘Sunan model’. In contrast, the 
development since the period has shown combined influences from local states and 
global forces. The development transition is contextualised in several transformations 
taking place in the YRD or even the whole country. First of all, the pillar of the 
region’s economy, the development of TVEs, was confronted with dwindling profits, 
especially after the mid-1990s. It is documented that 22% of the total number of TVEs 
in Jiangsu province lost money in 1995; and overall industrial output in Suzhou, Wuxi 
and Changzhou prefecture-level city dropped precipitously in 1995 and 1996 (Shen 
and Ma, 2005: 765-66). As a result, drastic privatisation of collectively-owned 
enterprises occurred from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s in order to reverse the 
downturn of the rural economy. It was reported that about 70% of TVEs in southern 
Jiangsu were privatised in the mid-1990s, and by 2000 more than 95% had practiced 
the property rights reform (Chen, 2005: 73), which virtually terminated the Sunan 
model. Parallel to the declining performance of TVEs was the opening up of Pudong, 
Shanghai in 1990. With the launch of the national strategy equivalent to that of the 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of the PRD, the YRD followed the PRD to adopt 
preferential policies to FDI and globalisation. With the infusion of foreign capital, 
TVEs lost their competitiveness even after the property rights reform. Henceforth, 
local governments gave higher priority to foreign invested enterprises than private 
ones. Consequently, a significant increase in the amount of overseas investment in 
YRD was seen from 1992 (Figure 5.2). Although influenced by the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis, the volume of foreign investment did not shrink sharply.
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Figure 5.2: The foreign capital actually utilised in the YRD (1990-2000)
Source: National Statistical Bureau, 2001.
The transformation of the local economy has been intensively researched in the 
existing literature, especially that based on the Suzhou municipality, the globalising 
region in the southern Jiangsu province, which used to be the prototype of the ‘Sunan 
model5. It is claimed that Suzhou had undergone a dramatic transformation, from an 
economy based on SOEs and TVEs towards one heavily dependent upon inward 
investment and export trade (Wei, 2002; Wei et al., 2009). The re-orientation of the 
local economy made a great impact upon the inter-jurisdictional and 
govemment-business relationships. As a considerable number of cities and counties 
had turned to foreign investment and the production of global commodities, the 
previous SOE-TVE cooperation had been replaced by parallel and competitive 
relationships. On the other hand, the TVE property rights reform made a legal 
separation of village administrations and business corporations, and led to a 
divergence between political leadership and corporate leadership, which used to be
1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
□  Jiangsu ■  Zhejiang □  Shanghai
1997 1998 1999 2000
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intertwined in the TVEs (Chen, 2005: 79). As a consequence, the local governments 
made a profit from the collection of management fees and taxes and the lease of land 
use rights, instead of directly from the turnover of corporations (Shen and Ma, 2005: 
770).
The development path of the YRD shares some similarities with the PRD in light of 
externally-driven regional development (Chen, 2007; Wei et al., 2009: 424). However, 
according to Yang (2009), the PRD region is driven by foreign (Chinese) investment 
without active local initiatives, while the YRD is fostered by local governments with 
explicit proactive strategies of globalisation. The active role of local governments is 
mainly demonstrated by their initiatives in development zone establishment and 
pro-business institution building (Wang and Lee, 2007). A considerable amount of 
land has been set aside by the local governments as development zones, and 
well-developed infrastructures and preferential policies are provided in order to attract 
industries, particularly foreign-invested enterprises. Such a development model, 
centred on development zones and institutional innovation, is coined as the ‘Kunshan 
Model’, a prototype based on a county-level city under the Suzhou municipality, 
which took the initiative to set up its own development zone in 1985 and adopted the 
globalisation strategy in the early 1990s, far ahead of Suzhou city (Chien, 2007; Wang 
and Lee, 2007: 1878-1879). At the beginning of economic reform, Kunshan was 
merely a small county not only in terms of administrative ranks, but also with regard 
to economic base. However, with the opening up of Shanghai and the Yangtze River 
Delta, Kunshan has led the way in driving local economic development by local-state 
initiated globalisation (Wei, 2002). In addition to ‘free’ land and tax exemptions in its 
development zones, Kunshan also tailored its local institutions to cater for business
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requirements for speed and flexibility (e.g. Wang and Lee, 2007; Chien and Zhao, 
2008). The fostering of an IT global production network plus a pro-business 
environment have transformed Kunshan into a close competitor to the giant city of 
Shanghai to attract big name enterprises or even the top 500 transnational 
corporations, particularly since the new millennium (Wu and Phelps, 2008: 474).
Consequently, the spatial economic structure in the YRD region is becoming more 
polycentric, with counties and towns at the margin of the metropolis of Shanghai 
achieving the fastest growth. This is because the peripheral region owns a vast amount 
of land available at a low price, offers more lax and flexible regulations, and enjoys 
geographical adjacency to Shanghai. However, the polycentric economic structure is 
generally characterised by a similar industrial structure predominated by 
manufacturing industries. Figure 5.3 shows that over a half of the GDP of Shanghai 
and neighbouring southern Jiangsu and northern Zhejiang was constituted by 
secondary industries in 1995. Although the inter-city interactions are booming in 
terms of logistics, capital, migration, business and so on, the functional division of 
labour among the cities is still relatively weak. Striking evidence is the widespread 
construction of development zones and the reduced cost of industrial land, priced to 
attract investment. In the 1980s, the industrial development zone was only a specific 
parcel of land approved by the central government to attract foreign investment. There 
were only fourteen economic and technological development zones in China in 1984. 
However, a great quantity of development zones has been set up by the local 
governments since the 1990s. There is a boom in development zones at different 
levels, depending on their supervising jurisdictions, ranging from ‘national’ economic 
zones to ‘municipal’ development zones, to ‘county’ and ‘town and village’ ones.
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According to Tao et al. (2010: 2218), the total number of development zones in China 
arrived at 3,837 by 2003, only 6% of which were founded by the central government, 
and 27% of which by the provincial governments. The total number almost doubled in 
the following years, rising to as many as 6,015 in 2006. The situation is similar in the 
case of the YRD. According to Yang (2001), the number of development zones in 
Shanghai, the south and middle of Jiangsu and the north of Zhejiang was only 17 in 
1991, while the number soared to 74 in 1993, which did not even include those 
approved by the counties and cities themselves (Yang, 2001: 125). Figure 5.4 
demonstrates the widespread nature of development zones in the YRD region.
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Figure 5.3: The regionalisation of manufacturing production in the YRD region
(the percentage of secondary industry in 1995)
Source: Jiangsu Statistical Bureau, 1996; Shanghai Statistical Bureau, 1996; Zhejiang Statistical 
Bureau, 1996.
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Figure 5.4: The widespread nature of development zones in the YRD
Source: compiled from YRD investment attraction website, http://www.c3i.com.cn/c3imap.asp: 
China development zone website, http://www.cadz.org.cn/index.isp.
To summarise, the opening up policy and attraction of investment has had a 
homogenising impact on local economies. With the infusion of FDI, the development 
of manufacturing production soon spread from major central cities to the wider region
around Shanghai and the nearby area of southern Jiangsu and northern Zhejiang. The 
spill over of manufacturing to the neighbouring towns and counties formed a partially 
regionalised production network in the region (Chen, 2007: 189-190). That is, the 
former SOE-TVE link has been replaced by a global-local production network or 
some local-local supplier-manufacturer links. Despite the network relationship, fierce 
competition exists between cities at the same hierarchy or late-comers struggling into 
the network or cities trying to move upwards in the division of labour. The 
regionalisation of manufacturing development served as a catalyst for growth and 
turned the YRD into a dynamic region in the national economy. For example, it is 
documented that, in 1993, the density of industrial output in the core area of the YRD 
region was 12,370,000 Yuan/km , which was 7.3 times the national average; and the 
GDP of the area accounted for 18% of the GDP of all the cities in the country 
(National Statistical Bureau, 1994: 529, 531). In a word, the foci of foreign 
investment and the regionalised production chains have stimulated and sustained an 
unprecedented booming economy in the region of the YRD (Chen, 2007). However, 
the physically extended metropolitan area has also posed huge pressure on land 
consumption and environmental sustainability; for example, air quality deteriorated 
and water pollution occurred. That is, the region was beginning to suffer the negative 
externality of economic agglomeration.
5.4 Industrial restructuring and the emerging integral labour and housing
market in the YRD since 2000
With the accession to WTO, manufacturing in the YRD has risen once more since 
2000 (Figure 5.5). Manufacturing in counties and county-level cities around Shanghai,
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Hangzhou and Nanjing achieved spectacular development and the proportion of 
secondary industry accounted for over 60% in 2005. However, manufacturing 
distribution has demonstrated two features that are distinct from those of the 1990s. 
First of all, the proportion of secondary industries of the central cities of Shanghai, 
Hangzhou and Nanjing began to drop to less than a half of total GDP. Secondly, 
manufacturing development gained a notable growth in the area south of Zhejiang and 
north of Jiangsu, which has previously lagged behind in this aspect. The rise of 
manufacturing in this area was even more marked in 2009. The percentage of 
manufacturing of the majority of cities in the area reached over 45% of GDP in 2009, 
with none falling below 33%. Overall, it seems that while some of the cities in the 
wider region have just started the process of industrialisation, the major cities of the 
region such as Shanghai, Hangzhou and Nanjing are beginning industrial restructuring 
in the meantime.
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Figure 5.5: The spread of manufacturing development to the wider region of the YRD (the percentage of secondary industry of 2000, 
2005 and 2009)
Source: Jiangsu Statistical Bureau, 2001, 2006, 2010; Shanghai Statistical Bureau, 2001, 2006, 2010; Zhejiang Statistical Bureau, 2001, 2006, 2010.
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The de-concentration of industrial development and the industrial restructuring within 
the YRD are driven by both government push and market pull. On the one hand, the 
manufacturing environment in YRD began to change after a period of extraordinary 
development, especially over the most recent two years. Regionally speaking, a 
low-cost labour shortage has emerged in the area (Chen, 2007: 193). The demand for 
manpower has led to ‘high turnovers, rising salaries, and shrinking margins’ for the 
local manufacturing businesses (ibid). Additionally, some of the cities and counties 
that developed first in the region are on the verge of using up their land quota under 
the stringent central land policies. For example, the ‘small’ county-level-city Kunshan, 
beside the Shanghai metropolis, is said to be likely to run out of land for industrial use 
in the near future in its latest master plan (2007-2020). It is analysed that only 128.9 
km of land area is physically left, besides lake and compulsory agricultural land. If 
the industrial land grows in accordance with the average speed of about 22 km every 
year that occurred from 2000 to 2008, then the left land area of 128.9 km could only 
last for five to six years. Therefore, it is suggested that it is urgent for Kunshan to 
attract more profitable manufacturing enterprises to replace some of the existing 
low-end industries in order to sustain economic growth. In a word, the constraint of 
land resources has become the common challenge for many cities, especially for those 
which have been developing their manufacturing sector since the 1990s. As a result, 
industrial upgrading has been turned from a discursive slogan into real pressure. For 
example, the interviewee from Anting, Shanghai mentioned that:
We would not consider small or lower-end manufacturing projects any more 
because these projects would not bring big revenue, but only huge land 
consumption. We were even considering relocating some less-valued 
industrial projects from our development zones to other cities. These
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potential or existing projects would be recommended to move to lagging 
areas such as the northern part of Jiangsu. Cities from northern Jiangsu would 
also come to Anting to attract projects that we don’t want anymore. 
(Interview, government official, Anting, 20 April, 2010).
Nationally speaking, it is reported that the manufacturing sector is leaving hubs along 
the coast, such as the YRD, to go to inland areas for cheaper labour forces, lower 
investment costs, and improved logistics and infrastructure. It is estimated that 
production costs are 10% higher in the coastal regions. For example, it is said the 
minimum monthly wage in Shanghai is 1,120 Yuan while in Anhui is just 720 Yuan 
(Financial Times, August 4 2010, p. 9). As a result, some rural backwaters in the 
centre and west of China, which hardly received any direct investment from overseas 
or other provinces, are now booming with inward investment. For instance, the Anhui 
province, which used to be the labour supply to the south and east coast, is now 
receiving industries that moved from the urbanised coast. The inland shift 
significantly gathered pace over the past two years owing to government investment 
in interior infrastructure, such as the high-speed railway system, since the global 
financial crisis (Financial Times, October 27 2010, p. 3). Overall, the notably 
improved infrastructure and the lower production costs have changed the outlook for 
manufacturing in inland China and, moreover, challenged the advantage enjoyed by 
the coast, for example, the YRD region in manufacturing development. 
Manufacturing development is beginning to disperse from the core area around 
Shanghai to the periphery of the YRD region or even to inland China (c.f. Chen, 2007: 
183).
On the other hand, the service sectors are also developing fairly fast in the region,
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accompanying the growth of manufacturing. Industrialisation is due to bring an 
increase in average wages, and higher consumer spending would be expected as a 
result. Henceforth, demand for services such as housing, catering, retailing, 
housekeeping, hairdressing and so forth will grow, which is manifested by the 
increase in the rate of tertiary industry in GDP. Figure 5.6 shows the development of 
tertiary industry in YRD from 1995 to 2009. In 1995, tertiary development in most of 
the region was below a third of the GDP, without a single city above the rate of 50%. 
In 2000, the central cities of Shanghai, Nanjing and Hangzhou became the only three 
cities in which the tertiary proportion rose above 50%. In the meantime, the increase 
in tertiary development was also conspicuous in southern Jiangsu. In 2005, the tertiary 
rate of Nanjing and Hangzhou dropped below 50% due to administrative annexation 
with neighbouring counties. In 2009, the tertiary percentage of Shanghai, Nanjing, 
Hangzhou and Ningbo again reached over 50% and the tertiary development of the 
majority of cities in the region reached over a third of GDP. The increase of the 
proportion of the tertiary industry not only represents an increase in the untradeable 
services, but also the emerging market for producer services. For instance, the role of 
Shanghai as the regional business centre has been largely strengthened since 2000. 
For example, the headquarters of many industrial enterprises were based in Shanghai, 
but the companies set up manufacturing factories in neighbouring secondary cities 
such as Suzhou. It is documented that Suzhou has attracted a total capitalisation of 
over US$5billion from Shanghai-based industrial companies since 1999, which turns 
Shanghai into the largest investor in Suzhou (Chen, 2007: 187). Tang and Zhao (2010) 
compared the urban network within the metropolitan region around Shanghai in 1995 
and 2005, and found that these cities are gradually shifting from parallel industrial 
production to division of labour in accordance with chain of value. Throughout the
decade, Shanghai, Nanjing and Hangzhou were largely occupied by 
technology-intensive manufacturing and producer services. Shanghai, in particular, 
performed as the headquarters for home and overseas businesses and acted as the 
gateway city for the region, with ample linkages to the outside world. Overall, 
industrial development has been much more diversified since 2000 compared to that 
of the 1990s. The emergence of a further division of labour within manufacturing, as 
well as the development of service sectors, has created more scope for complementary 
cooperation.
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Figure 5.6: The development of tertiary industry in the YRD region (the 
percentage of tertiary industry of 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2009)
Source: Jiangsu Statistical Bureau, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2010; Shanghai Statistical Bureau, 1996, 
2001, 2006, 2010; Zhejiang Statistical Bureau, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2010.
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Furthermore, the functional division is facilitated by the dramatically improved 
inter-city and regional transport within the YRD region. Particularly in recent years, 
the building of a railway network instead of highway construction has been prioritised 
by the central government. The National Transport Ministry started to build an 
inter-city high-speed railway between Nanjing-Shanghai, Hangzhou-Shanghai and 
Nanjing-Hangzhou in 2007. The high-speed railway line between Nanjing-Shanghai 
was put into use on 1st July, 2010, while the Hangzhou-Shanghai line began operating 
on 26 Oct in 2010. As a consequence, the travel time from Nanjing to Shanghai only 
takes 73 minutes, whereas from Hangzhou to Shanghai only takes 45 minutes. The 
direct Nanjing-Hangzhou line is under intense construction and is expected to be put 
into operation on 31 Dec, 2011, which will take only 50 minutes compared to the 
current travel time of three hours on the expressway. Table 5.1 shows the current 
frequency of the high-speed railway within the YRD. At peak times, inter-city trains 
between Nanjing and Shanghai leave every five minutes. The operation of the reliable 
and fast inter-city transport makes one-day return not only possible, but much more 
convenient than before in the YRD region. This will enormously facilitate daily 
commuting within the region, besides the existing large number of business trips and 
logistics.
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Table 5.1: The frequency of the high-speed rail line within the YRD region
Shanghai Nanjing Wuxi Suzhou Changzhou Zhenjiang Kunshan Danyang Hangzhou Jiaxing Haining Jiashan Tongxiang Yuhang
Shanghai — 65 49 44 37 33 46 24 50 20 1 6 6 7
Nanjing 64 — 36 40 36 30 32 21 5 1 0 2 0 1
Wuxi 44 41 — 36 31 27 28 16 5 1 0 2 0 1
Suzhou 58 29 27 — 22 20 41 11 5 1 0 2 0 1
Changzhou 38 35 30 33 T ~ 25 26 19 5 1 0 2 0 1
Zhenjiang 30 33 21 24 25 — 22 9 4 0 0 2 0 0
Kunshan 50 31 28 25 23 — 16 3 0 0 2 0 0
Danyang 21 24 18 17 14 15 12 — 1 0 0 0 0 1
Hangzhou 50 5 5 5 5 3 4 2 — 16 1 9 14 8
Jiaxing 16 4 4 4 4 2 o 2 20 — 1 0 2 4
Haining 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 — 0 0 0
Jiashan 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 2 0 — 1 0
Tongxiang 14 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 0 0 6 — 1
Yuhang 8 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 7 7 0 0 1 —
Source: compiled from www.shike.org.cn (accessed on 23 Dec, 2010).
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As demonstrated by Table 5.1, many small cities around big cities such as Shanghai, 
Hangzhou and Nanjing have become the main stops on the high-speed rail line. For 
instance, the shuttle service runs 50 times between Kunshan and Shanghai every day. 
With the development of the fast link, the housing prices of these small cities have 
also rocketed. It is said that many young residents who are working in Shanghai are 
very interested in property in the smaller cities along the high-speed rail line, which 
offer a better environment and lower housing prices compared to Shanghai. In the past, 
the decentralisation of Shanghai’s population was only directed to the suburban 
districts of Shanghai, but now Shanghai could develop an integral housing market 
within outer-suburbs such as Songjiang and Jiangding, as well as the nearby 
secondary cities such as Jiashan, Jiaxing, and Kunshan, due to the improvement of 
regional transport. As a result, the region will not only benefit from economically 
networked clusters surrounding Shanghai, but is also going to possess an inherently 
integral housing and labour market. In other words, there is wider scale for spatial and 
functional division of labour between cities within the region. The surrounding region 
could not only develop manufacturing, but also residential and service industries 
owing to the enhancement of transport connectivity.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter analyses the development of the regional economy and the 
regionalisation process of the YRD region before and after the economic reform.
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During the planned system, the regional economy in the YRD was segmented 
between jurisdictions and economic sectors. Ruled under the central command, there 
was no natural economic flow in the local economies. After economic reform, 
horizontal economic linkages were advocated by the central government, and the 
arbitrary division of labour between urban and rural areas was also abolished. In the 
context, many TVEs in the rural area began to develop business links with SOEs in 
the central cities, and the division of labour began to evolve between urban and rural 
areas in terms of manufacturing. The previous pattern of cities developing industries 
and villages developing agriculture was broken by cities providing technology and 
engineering and villages undertaking initial processing. Overall, horizontal economic 
flows were just emerging in the 1980s after the economic reform.
In the 1990s, spectacular regional growth was witnessed in the YRD region due to the 
opening up of Pudong, Shanghai and the infusion of foreign investment. The 
development model based on supply-side policies such as effective administration, lax 
development policies and land management to attract foreign investment became 
widespread in the region, from urban to rural areas. The development of TVEs 
suffered disadvantages due to its own problems and outside challenges from foreign 
investors. The extensive development of export-oriented manufacturing soon turned 
the YRD into another economic hub similar to the PRD. The regionalisation of 
manufacturing development made the region more and more polycentric in spatial 
structure in terms of industrial structure, GDP growth, inward investment, industrial
output and so forth. To some extent, the development of economic flows and logistics 
brought the cities within the region into regionalised production chains. Furthermore, 
cities within the region were also experiencing some common problems such as 
environmental degradation and land encroachment after the excessive manufacturing 
development. To sum up, the extended metropolitan region of the YRD was formed 
by the 1990s with the phenomenal process of industrialisation from primary industries. 
The physical or morphological phenomenon of urban expansion is not only due to 
urbanisation and suburbanisation, but also to the entrepreneurial development of 
individual cities. Industries began to be clustered in some core areas such as the 
development zones of the cities due to the active role of the local government. Some 
manufacturing towns around the major cities have become dynamic and competitive 
manufacturing clusters for certain specialised products for both global and regional 
markets (Chen, 2007: 190). However, fierce competition also exists between these 
clusters, such as the competition in IT manufacturing between Suzhou and Kunshan 
(Wang and Lee, 2007). This is because the clusters were mainly oriented to global 
manufacturing and did not possess close inter-relationships.
Since 2000, the regionalisation of the YRD region has reached a new stage. The cities 
in the wider region started rapid industrialisation, while the central cities in the region 
began industrial restructuring. The different development stages of the cities provide 
the scope for vertical cooperation between the service sector and manufacturing 
within the region. Meanwhile, functional connectivity is also facilitated by improved
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regional transport such as the operation of a high-speed rail line within the region. In 
addition, the fast inter-city link also makes daily commuting between central cities 
and the surrounding small cities more convenient, which would facilitate the new 
‘ suburbanisation ’ that is common in Western countries, where people working in large 
and central cities live in the surrounding small cities. Overall, a more complicated 
pattern of functional connectivity is just developing in the YRD region.
The analysis in the chapter extends the previous YRD overview on economic 
development and regional transformation forward to the recent stage beyond 
excessive competition and spatial polarisation. It is argued that the regionalisation of 
the YRD region is entering a new stage and economic and functional integration is 
just emerging in the YRD region after decades of market development after economic 
reform. The development tendency may match with the new urbanisation form of 
polycentric mega city-region thesis proposed by Hall and Pain (2006). In the Western 
literature, the transition to the new form of metropolis is suggested to be fed by 
‘economic restructuring, digital telecommunications, demographic shifts, and 
neoliberal policies’ (Lang and Knox, 2009: 790), while in China, some of the 
intriguing factors may be the same as those in Western countries such as the 
development of digital technology and regional transport. However, at the same time, 
what is different in China is that the dispersal of urbanisation to the wider region is 
not triggered by rising costs in the central cities in terms of services and businesses, 
but is due to the rising costs of labour and land in manufacturing. The service
economy and integrated housing and labour market are just developing in China. It is 
argued that the ever-increasing commuting and business flows will be the main driver 
for integrated economic development. Nevertheless, the development of an 
economically integrated region does not mean that the region is functioning as a 
coordinated actor. In fact, the region comprises a complexity of local actors. The 
following two chapters will examine the process of regional governance and planning 
development in the YRD region.
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t h e  C h A n g i n g  r e l A t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  s h A n g h A i A n d
J i A n g s u : t h e  e m e r g e n C e o f  i n t e r - l o C A l i t y
C o l l A b o r A t i o n
6.1 Introduction
In the centrally-planned economy during the Socialist period, inter-city relationships 
were not spontaneous, but were decided by the economic plan and central command. 
After market reform in 1978, economic mobility developed with increasingly intense 
flows of trade, people, traffic, logistics and capital. Nevertheless, the natural market 
flow was hampered by artificial blockades and adverse competition between cities or 
provincial governments (e.g. Chien and Gordon, 2008; Zhao and Zhang, 1999). 
However, recently, a regional discourse of inter-city cooperation has appeared in both 
governmental reports and Chinese academic literature (e.g. Hong, 2009; Ji et al., 2006; 
Tao, 2007; Wang, 2008; Wang, 2009; B. J. Yang, 2004; Zhang et al., 2007; Zou and 
Shi, 2004). The emergence of a regional agenda to some extent represents the policy 
response to the pervading conflicts and competition between different jurisdictions. 
Meanwhile, there is an emerging body of literature from overseas researchers 
documenting the initiatives of regional governance in China (e.g. Luo and Shen, 2009; 
Wu and Zhang, 2009, 2010; Xu, 2008; Xu and Yeh, 2010, 2011a, b; Yeh and Xu, 2008;
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Zhang, 2006; Zhang and Wu, 2006). For example, Zhang (2006) suggests that 
Chinese cities are experiencing a change from inter-city competition to regional 
collaboration. However, Zhang’s paper does not answer to what extent collaborative 
regional governance departs from previous individually based urban 
entrepreneurialism.
Rather than assuming that regional governance is established in China, this chapter 
seeks to investigate the actual transformation process of regional governance. For the 
purpose, it is considered important to distinguish the process of economic 
regionalisation and the development of regional political institutions. The distinction 
is helpful to understand the nature of Chinese emerging regional space. Jones and 
MacLeod (2004) distinguished the process by ‘regional (economic) space’ and ‘space 
of regionalism’. The latter is dealt with from the governance perspective, following 
the ‘old’ political regionalism between the 1960s and 1970s, when the establishment 
of regional government was witnessed across many Western countries. However, the 
former is associated with the ‘new regionalism’ literature, in which it is conceived that 
the region is the unit of economic agglomeration in the post-Fordist and knowledge 
economy (e.g. Krugman, 1991; Scott, 2001; Storper, 1995). The chapter then 
highlights that ‘the formation of any given regional map is reflective -  and indeed 
constitutive -  of an unevenly developing, often overlapping and superimposing 
mosaic of economic practices, political mobilizations, cultural performances and 
institutional accomplishments’ (Jones and MacLeod, 2004: 433). That is, in the
meantime, the formation of a region is socially and politically constructed to manage 
local conflicts and struggles (Jones, 2001; Jones and MacLeod, 1999; Jonas and Ward, 
2007; Ward and Jonas, 2004).
The distinction helps to investigate emerging cooperation and integration practices in 
China by disentangling regional economic development and regional institutional 
development. Following the work of Jones and MacLeod (2004), this chapter aims to 
answer the following questions through a case study of the YRD region: is there 
inter-city cooperation in China? What is the scope of these practices? How intensive 
are these collaborations? What are the conditions that led to the change from 
development based on individual cities to cooperation between different cities? This 
study focuses on the border region between Shanghai and Jiangsu province to 
examine the trajectory of a changing inter-city relationship. It is then argued that 
although the development of regional economics is where the discursive regional 
governance is embedded, it does not necessarily mean that the development of 
regional governance is well established in reality.
The location of the cross-border region is illustrated in Figure 6.1. The city of 
Kunshan in Jiangsu borders the Jiading district of Shanghai. Kunshan is one of the six 
county-level cities beneath the municipality of Suzhou. Before the 1990s, Kunshan 
developed slowly and was mainly engaged in agricultural production. However, the 
rural county was transformed into a manufacturing district in subsequent years
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through attracting foreign investment and export-oriented industries. The Jiading 
district, located west of the city proper of Shanghai, is a suburban district of Shanghai 
municipality. Jiading used to be a county led by the Shanghai municipality, and was 
converted from a rural county to a suburban district in 1992. The key industry of 
Jiading has been involved in auto-manufacture since the development of a joint 
venture with Volkswagen in Jiading in 1985. Because these places focused on 
different economic and industrial specialisations and their built-up areas were 
relatively compact and separated by a vast rural hinterland, the relationship between 
the counties of Kunshan and Jiading was very loose in the 1980s. However, the 
relationship between the two became very tense at the turn of the new millennium, as 
Shanghai decided to take advantage of its vast suburban area to sharpen its edge in 
attracting foreign investment. Consequently, the cross-border region of Kunshan and 
Jiading was turned into a battlefield for developing export-oriented industries. 
Nevertheless, initiatives to promote regionalisation are more recently being witnessed 
within this very region, especially between the town of Huaqiao under the city of 
Kunshan and the town of Anting under Jiading district. Therefore, the border region 
offers a very good case to understand the emergence of a regional agenda and its 
underlying dynamics.
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Figure 6.1: The border area between Shanghai and Jiangsu
Source: compiled by the author.
The chapter is organised as follows. First o f all, the rivalry and competition at the 
border of Shanghai and Jiangsu is documented. Secondly, the new phenomenon of 
cooperative development is scrutinised. The scope of collaboration and collaborative 
practices is described, and the intensity of collaboration is assessed. The next section 
explains why local governments changed from engaging in hostile competition to 
seek collaboration. Then, the characteristics and dynamics o f emerging regional
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governance in China are summarised. Finally, the chapter concludes that the politics 
around region building in China do not depart substantially from local 
entrepreneurialism.
6.2 Rivalry in manufacturing projects in the border area between Shanghai and
Jiangsu
Integrated regional development has become a very popular discourse in the YRD 
region since 2000. Many organisations were established between the governments or 
within the academics to discuss and promote inter-city cooperation (Zhang et al., 2008: 
155). However, the agreements that have been reached tend to be rhetorical (ibid). In 
other words, cooperation is pursued by every government on public occasions, but 
inter-city relationships remain competitive in reality. For example, after Shanghai’s 
successful bid to hold the 2010 World Expo in 2002, Jiangsu and Zhejiang provincial 
government declared the strategy of jointly holding the Expo as a pledge to integrated 
economic development (e.g. Lu and Shi, 2008: 160). However, no real agreement or 
action plan was put in place after the pronouncement. In fact, the inter-relationship 
between Shanghai and its neighbouring provinces were under great pressure at the 
time, because Shanghai made the decision to build its own deep-water seaport in 
Yangshan, and move the international airlines from Hongqiao Airport to the new 
Pudong International Airport. The moving of Shanghai’s international airlines to 
Shanghai Pudong International Airport placed export-oriented southern Jiangsu at a
great disadvantage. The time distance from Suzhou, Kunshan and Wujiang in 
southern Jiangsu to the airport increased by more than two hours, as the route to reach 
the new airport travelled through the city centre (Lu and Shi, 2008: 275). However, 
the new location greatly benefited Shanghai’s IT industry, for instance, the Songjiang 
Hi-tech Park in the Songjiang district of Shanghai (Lu and Shi, 2008: 175). On the 
other hand, the construction of Shanghai Yangshan seaport also raised the competition 
with Beilun port in Ningbo, Zhejiang (Lu and Shi, 2008: 274; Zhang and Wu, 2006: 
10). Under pressure, Zhejiang province built Kuahai Bridge from Ningbo to Jiaxing, 
which cost more than 1.85 billion Yuan, in order to improve the accessibility of 
Beilun port (Zhang et al., 2007: 314-317). Henceforth, Jiangsu and Zhejiang claimed 
the giant Shanghai was not cooperative at all in economic integration. The above 
cases demonstrate that inter-city relationships are still very tense, especially in terms 
of economic development, for example, in manufacturing development, investment 
attraction, and strategic infrastructure construction. The following section examines 
the case of ‘project 173’ and the consequences that it caused to illustrate the strained 
relationship during the period.
6.2.1 The launch of ‘Project 173’ by Shanghai
The so-called ‘project 173’ was launched by Shanghai in 2003. ‘Project 173’ refers to 
three development zones with a total area of 173 square kilometres in suburban 
Songjiang, Qingpu and Jianding districts (Figure 6.2). The development of project
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173 originated from the rival relationship between Shanghai and Kunshan with regard 
to attracting overseas investment. In contrast to spectacular industrial development in 
neighbouring cities, Shanghai felt itself to be marginalised in the competition for 
foreign-invested manufacturing industries. The municipal government had striven to 
promote the development of the tertiary sector in the central city in order to build 
itself into a global city before 2000, and did not place much emphasis on 
manufacturing development in the suburbs. As a result, manufacturing industry in 
Shanghai did not see fast growth, compared with other neighbouring cities. The 
suburban districts enjoyed few preferential policies from the municipal government of 
Shanghai. With the slow growth of manufacturing industries, Shanghai’s GDP growth 
rate and FDI lagged behind those of the municipality of Suzhou (Table 6.1). Under 
these circumstances, Shanghai launched ‘project 173’ in 2003 in order to enhance its 
attractiveness for overseas investment and maintain double-digit GDP growth.
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Figure 6.2: The location of Project 173 in Shanghai
Source: compiled by the author.
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Table 6.1: GDP growth rate and FDI in Shanghai, Jiangsu and Suzhou
Year GDP growth rate (%) FDI (100 million USD)
Shanghai f..-  . . Jiangsu Suzhou Shanghai Jiangsu Suzhou
1990 3.5 8.2 14.7 1.77 1.4 0.34
1995 14.3 15.4 25.3 32.5 47.8 23.3
2000 11.0 10.6 13.4 31.6 64.2 28.8
2001 10.5 10.1 14.3 43.9 71.2 30.2
2002 11.3 11.7 18.2 50.3 103.7 48.1
Source: Shanghai Statistical Yearbook (2002, 2004); Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook (2009); Suzhou 
Statistical Yearbook (2007).
These three development zones were not built from scratch, but were based on 
existing town-level industrial districts. ‘Project 173’ upgraded these former town-level 
development zones to the status of municipal level and further allocated a significant 
amount of additional land for industrial development. According to the Shanghai 
Municipal Government No. 37 Document in 2003, the area of officially approved 
industrial land in the three development zones was increased by about three times 
(Table 6.2). In order to create extra land, some towns were converted to development 
zones. For example, the original town of Loutang in Jiading district was converted 
into part of the Jiading development zone, which created 32 square kilometres of 
industrial land. Over 40,000 former residents were relocated for this reason.
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Table 6.2: The increase of planned industrial land area by Project 173
Unit: km2 Overall planning area
Existing planned 
industrial area
Newly planned 
industrial area
Qingpu experimental 
development zone 56.2 16.2 40
Jiading experimental 
development zone 57.2 24.8 32.4
Songjiang experimental 
development zone 59.8 20.6 39.2
Total 173.2 61.6 111.6
Source: compiled from Shanghai Municipal Government No. 37 Document of 2003
Furthermore, some preferential policies were piloted in these development zones in 
order to serve investors better. Henceforth, the three development zones were named 
‘pilot zones’ of Shanghai. Two official documents, the Implementation Guideline of 
Shanghai Municipality for Improvement of Investment Environment in Shanghai’s 
Pilot Development Zones (Shanghai Municipal Government No. 72 Document in 
2002) and Suggestions of Shanghai Municipality for Improvement of Foreign 
Investment Environment in Shanghai (Shanghai Municipal Government No. 73 
Document in 2002), were released by the municipal government to carry out these 
pro-business regulatory changes. According to these documents, enterprises in the 
three pilot zones enjoyed VAT exemption, a lower standard of social insurance 
obligations, half land reclamation fees, and flexible administrative institutions (for 
more details, please see Table 6.3). A memorandum was signed between Shanghai 
Municipal Revenue Bureau, Real Estate Management Bureau, Foreign Investment
Committee, Industrial and Trade Bureau, Price Bureau, Finance Bureau and other 
related departments to ensure the implementation of the proposed policy as a joint 
programme.
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Table 6.3: The special policies for the Jiading, Qingpu and Songjiang
experimental development zones
Type Content
Land
Guarantee of land supply for significant investment projects;
Special land quota designation for experimental development zones;
Three years’ delay for balance between occupation and compensation for 
arable land is allowed;
In the tenth five-year period (2000-2005), expenses of taxation on land 
were halved to decrease land cost.
Social insurance Experiment of particular social insurance institutions for small towns, at lower standards than normal social insurance.
Tax
During the tenth five year period (2000-2005), local tax revenue was 
allowed to be totally kept by the development zone as a special fund for 
infrastructure construction and investment attraction;
Two years of tax exemption and three years of half tax rate for enterprises 
with additional investment;
A decrease in the tax rate for foreign enterprises.
Utility charges
Public hearing system on utility fees;
Clearance of unreasonable charges;
Reduction or exemption of administrative charges for significant foreign 
investments.
Infrastructure
Improved telecom and Internet services;
Help to solve problems of workers’ accommodation;
Improved living environment, for example, schools and hospitals.
Administrative 
speed and 
flexibility
Promotion of immediate customs entry services;
Single unified process for varied administration procedures and charges.
Incentive
Responsibility and evaluation system is carried out for administrative 
leaders and staff of development zones in accordance with investment 
attraction and administration service improvement.
Source: Compiled from Shanghai Municipal Government No. 72 and No. 73 Documents, 2002.
As demonstrated by the above policy initiatives, Shanghai took deliberate action to 
improve its weak position in terms of investment cost, land supply and government
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services. For example, the reason why the municipal government expanded the area of 
allocated industrial land was not because industrial land resources were largely 
consumed or leased out in the suburbs; in fact, the originally planned area of 
industrial land in the outskirts still included plenty of room for development at the 
time in 2003 (interview, an official of Jiading Planning Bureau, 21 April 2010). The 
underlying motive was the intention to compete with neighbouring cities by means of 
‘unlimited’ land provision, since these cities had more lax land control than Shanghai. 
In essence, the launch of project 173 was intended to suffocate the development 
opportunities enjoyed by the lower-ranking cities around Shanghai.
6.2.2 The industrial belt along Shanghai: counter actions by Kunshan
The Shanghai locally initiated project was soon widely reported by external media, 
since the designated 173 square kilometres were considered to be Shanghai’s ‘special 
economic zones’ against Jiangsu and Zhejiang. The relationship between Shanghai 
and Kunshan was, hence, rather strained, which may be sensed from the following 
remark:
‘The launch of Project 173 by Shanghai put Kunshan under great pressure (as 
two of the three pilot zones are located along the border of Kunshan). 
Kunshan’s leaders were keen to make inquiries about the project’ (interview, 
a senior planner of Shanghai Planning Institute, 10 March 2010).
To cope with the challenge posed by Shanghai, Kunshan took prompt counter-action.
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In July 2003, the Kunshan Planning Bureau prepared an ad hoc plan to convert all the 
towns along Shanghai’s border into an industrial belt encircling Shanghai’s Project 
173 (Figure 6.3). The overall industrial layout was forced to adjust due to the change, 
although at that time the Kunshan Master Plan (2002-2020) was already in the final 
stage of preparation (interview, a senior planner of Shanghai Planning Institute, 10 
March 2010). Moreover, some of the towns such as Dianshanhu and Qiandeng, which 
were put under preservation and were restricted areas in the initial draft of Kunshan 
Master Plan in 2002, were incorporated into the industrial development belt in order 
to allocate land to industrial development. As a result, a whole 155 km of land area 
was ‘raised’ for the rival project, with 50 km planned for industrial development, and 
another 25 km reserved for future industrial use. In addition, a government led group 
and an investment service centre were established to attract investors and provide 
government and business services.
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Source: compiled by the author.
Overall, growth-first competition between jurisdictions is very intense, as each level 
of government is responsible for its own revenue sources. What is unique to China is 
the fact that the competition is predominantly led by government leaders, as the 
evaluation o f Chinese cadre performance is based on economic growth indicators 
(Chien and Gordon, 2008). As development is concentrated in the manufacturing
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sector, aggressive competition rests upon production elements such as airports, 
seaports, and land. In order to boost local competitiveness, entrepreneurial policies 
revolve around reducing the cost of investment and the speedy delivery of 
government services. Negative effects of competition result from highly competitive 
price competition and redundant infrastructure construction.
6.3 Rising regionalisation agenda in the border area between Shanghai and
Jiangsu
In recent years, the relationship between Shanghai and Kunshan has been transformed. 
First of all, project 173 at the border area is no longer a priority of the Shanghai 
municipal government. As the project was initiated by former Shanghai mayor Chen 
Liangyu, related policies were abandoned after Chen was jailed. What is more, 
although project 173 was initially intended to compete with Jiangsu by means of 
government subsidies, tax relief, a preferential land and labour policy, investment 
costs in Shanghai can never be as competitive as in Jiangsu (interview, a planner of 
Shanghai Planning Institute, 25 February 2010). Instead, in the Eighth Plenary 
Session of the Ninth Municipal Party Committee held in July 2009, Shanghai made an 
undertaking to stick to its international financial hub goal. That is, the Shanghai 
municipal government pledged to transform itself into a global economic, financial, 
trade and shipping centre, rather than to compete with neighbouring provinces for 
manufacturing investment. Moreover, concrete projects were formulated for the
purpose. For example, Shanghai decided to put a high-speed train station at Hongqiao, 
where Hongqiao Airport is located. Moreover, it intends to build the Hongqiao area 
into a comprehensive hub with diversified means of transport such as regional 
transport options of a high-speed train, a mag-lev train, an inter-city train, an 
expressway, airlines, and inner city transport comprising a subway and bus links. A 
so-called ‘new Hongqiao’ programme is planned to use the advantage of accessibility 
to build the area into the centre of producer services and a headquarters economy 
(interview, a planner of Shanghai Planning Institute, 20 April 2010). More importantly, 
the ‘new Hongqiao’ strategy is not only oriented to transnational companies, but also 
to manufacturing enterprises in the YRD region. This strategic positioning is of great 
significance, since it highlights that the Shanghai municipal government took the 
initiative to relate its economy to the development of the YRD region. As for the city 
of Kunshan, the industrial belt development along Shanghai was also replaced by a 
new project. The new practices of collaboration, the causes of transformation, and the 
resulting dynamics are going to be examined in detail in the following sections, again 
focusing on the border area between Shanghai and Jiangsu.
6.3.1 The launch of international Huaqiao business park by Kunshan
Huaqiao is a town under Kunshan county-level city, which borders the Jiading district 
of Shanghai. It was incorporated in the industrial belt encircling Shanghai in 2003. 
Unlike the initial project at Qiandeng, which was planned as one of the manufacturing
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bases in the industrial belt, Huaqiao at the time was positioned to develop business 
services. In fact, an area of 800 mu (15 mu equals one hectare) of Huaqiao was 
designated as the Jiangsu International Business Centre by the provincial government 
as early as 2000. At that time, Jiangsu intended to build three provincial business 
parks across the province to pioneer its industrial restructuring from manufacturing to 
producer services; however, the Huaqiao project was not implemented until 2005. In 
that year, the Jiangsu International Business Centre was upgraded to the Huaqiao 
International Business Park, and the original area of 800 mu was expanded to as much 
as 50 km by the provincial government.
In opposition to competition based on financial incentives with Shanghai for 
manufacturing investment, the Huaqiao international business park demonstrates 
some efforts to collaborate with Shanghai, both institutionally and functionally. For 
example, the site selection of the business park is very unusual. The site chosen by the 
provincial government for the business centre was not regarded as an ideal location by
'V
the Kunshan government:
Initially, Kunshan expected the provincial project to be located at Kunshan 
Economic and Technological Development Zone (KETDZ). This is because 
KETDZ is at the centre of the city of Kunshan, while Huaqiao is 20 
kilometres away (interview, a senior planning official of Kunshan Planning 
Bureau, 14 April 2010).
However, the advantage of the location selected by the provincial government was
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soon discovered: the site where the business city is seated ‘intrudes’ into the territory 
of Shanghai. More specifically, 2.5 km of the 50 km is enclosed by the Shanghai 
outer-ring highway (Figure 6.4). This means that cars travelling to Shanghai do not 
need to pay a toll fee (interview, a planning official of Huaqiao Planning Bureau, 3 
March 2010). This is of great significance, as the toll fees charged by Jiangshu and 
Shanghai provincial-level governments on travelling cars whose licences are not 
locally registered act as a factor in investment costs. In other words, the location of 
Huaqiao Business Park could circumvent this regulation. The provincial government 
therefore deliberately selected this location with this in mind.
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Figure 6.4: The location of Huaqiao International Business Park
Source: compiled by the author.
In fact, the element that makes the Huaqiao International Business Park different from 
past government-led projects is that all sets of development policies for Huaqiao 
revolve around regionalisation. The slogan for the business park is ‘the Business 
Satellite Town for the International Metropolis (Shanghai)’. This apparently takes into 
account the plans of Shanghai. In the tenth five-year period (2000-2005), Shanghai 
planned nine new towns around its suburban area, none of them envisaged to be
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business-oriented. Therefore, Huaqiao aimed to be the ‘tenth suburban town of 
Shanghai’ to supplement suburban Shanghai in producer services. Additionally, 
Huaqiao took a series of measures to integrate physically with Shanghai. This is very 
well demonstrated by the branding concept of Huaqiao business park: ‘it is not 
Shanghai, but it is just as in Shanghai’ (bushi Shanghai, jiuzai Shanghai). For 
example, Huaqiao International Business Park is covered by both Jiangsu and 
Shanghai communications networks, so that both landline and mobile calls made from 
Huaqiao to Shanghai are charged at the local rate instead of at the much more 
expensive rate for long-distance calls. Regarding transport, Huaqiao Business Park 
vowed to reduce the trans-provincial travel time between Huaqiao and Shanghai to 
less than 30 minutes. One primary example is the negotiation made by the Huaqiao 
leadership with the Shanghai municipal government in order to extend Shanghai’s No. 
11 subway line to Huaqiao International Business Park. The No. 11 metro line 
connects central Shanghai and Anting International Automobile City that borders 
Huaqiao. The last stop at the auto-city is only 400 metres away from Huaqiao 
International Business Park (Figure 6.4). However, transport integration is very 
difficult to achieve because of local economic competition. Therefore, although the 
agenda had been introduced by the Kunshan side as early as around 2004, the 
negotiation did not make any progress until 2009, when senior political figures were 
involved in the dialogue in person:
The deal cannot be reached without the involvement of top leaders. The 
former governor of Jiangsu province (Li Yuanchao), and the General
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Secretary of the Communist Party of Shanghai municipality (Yu 
Zhengsheng), both of whom are members of the Standing Committee of the 
Political Bureau of China, played a magnificent backstage role and helped to 
bring about the success (interview, a senior planning professional of Jiangsu 
Planning Institute, 17 March 2010).
The regionalisation efforts made by the governments of Huaqiao and Kunshan are 
unprecedented and were exerted with great effort; nevertheless, the motive behind the 
regionalisation was, in fact, very entrepreneurial. Take the negotiation for the No. 11 
metro line, for example. As remarked by a senior planning professional:
Money issues are not at all the core of the negotiation. It is estimated that the 
Kunshan government will have to spend around 110 million yuan (for the 
400-metre-extended metro line). And it is actually not cost-effective at all as 
it is just a sub-line and still costs an hour to get to the central city of 
Shanghai....But as soon as the deal is made, real estate developers in 
Huaqiao begin marketizing their properties as ‘virtually located in the city of 
Shanghai (tongcheng xiaoying)\ The subsequent increase of land value in 
Huaqiao will be unimaginable, which is invisible to our ‘naked’ eyes 
(interview, a senior planner of Shanghai Planning Institute, 10 March 2010).
In other words, regionalisation is just one of the themes of place promotion for 
Huaqiao. As summarised by local officials, the development of Huaqiao is reliant on 
its competitive edge with a ‘virtual location in Shanghai, preferential policies from
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Jiangsu, and low cost of Kunshan’. In this respect, the current regionalisation strategy 
demonstrated in the Huaqiao project is not much different from Kunshan’s previous 
marketing of its close location to Shanghai and easy access to Shanghai’s ports in 
order to obtain manufacturing investment in the 1990s. However, now the intention is 
to use geographical proximity to attract the lower-end and labour intensive producer 
services that cannot afford the high costs of metropolitan Shanghai. Overall, the new 
practice of collaboration exemplified by the development of Huaqiao International 
Business Park is actually strategic regionalisation with an entrepreneurial thrust.
6.3.2 The transformation of the Anting development: strategic collaboration for
industrial upgrading and urban development
A regionalisation initiative is also emerging on the other side of the border in Anting, 
Shanghai. Anting is a designated town under the Jiading district. Geographically, 
Anting is at the edge of the Jiading district, and borders Huaqiao of Kunshan. For this 
reason, there is frequent contact between the local people of Anting and Huaqiao. 
However, since the towns are separated by a provincial division, official 
communication and collaboration are not common in the area. Regionalisation is even 
seriously blocked by transport separation; indeed, Kunshan and Shanghai are only 
connected by a single highway. Proposals to integrate the road network cannot be 
carried out, even though this highway is very congested. As interpreted by an official 
in Anting town:
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It is believed by most leaders that transport integration would give more 
benefits to the neighbour in attracting investment and enjoying Shanghai’s 
service, while putting the consequently increased transportation pressure on 
Anting (interview, an official of Anting Town Government, 20 April 2010).
Nevertheless, a new phenomenon of collaborative development has recently been 
witnessed in the border area. The proposition of collaboration is demonstrated by the 
new development plan made by Anting. Anting’s economy is led by auto 
manufacturing thanks to a joint venture with Volkswagen (Shanghai) for the domestic 
market. As of 2000, Anting was positioned by the Shanghai municipal government to 
be developed into an auto city for China, like Detroit in the USA or Wolfsburg in 
Germany. However, the new town programme did not progress successfully. Several 
key municipal projects such as Formula 1 settled in Anting in the tenth five-year 
period (2000-2005), but momentum slowed after 2005 due to the shift of Shanghai’s 
focus to the construction of the Yangshan deep-water port and Lingang New Town. 
The development downturn is sketched in the recent Anting International Auto-City 
Strategic Development Plan, prepared in late 2009:
Anting’s commercial and conference functions constitute only 10 percent of 
original planned area (till 2009)....The ratio of industrial land use to 
residential land use in Anting is as high as 3.81....Only 5 percent of the 
working population lives in Anting, leaving about 100,000 people 
commuting from Shanghai central city to Anting every weekday....The
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service sector in the town is just too low-end to satisfy the white collars and 
attract them to live in Anting....What’s worse, due to the lack of demand, 
auto-related business provisions constructed according to the original plan 
were mostly closed and deserted (compiled from the text document and the 
PowerPoint document of the strategic plan).
Consequently, Anting is stuck in its transformation from a satellite manufacturing 
district to an independent auto-city. At the same time, it is challenged by the latecomer 
at the border, Huaqiao. The service-oriented business park just supplements 
manufacturing-dominated Anting in service and residential provision. Some 
white-collar workers in Anting even choose to live in Huaqiao, since it provides a 
better living environment (Anting International Auto-City Strategic Development 
Plan). Furthermore, even some company meetings and training are now held in 
Huaqiao, since it has five-star hotels while Anting has none (interview, an official of 
Huaqiao Planning Bureau, 3 March 2010).
Confronted with the challenge posed by the neighbouring Huaqiao, the government of 
the Jiading district and the development organisation, Anting International Auto-city 
and New Anting United Development Corporation, have tried to create a new 
development strategy. After outlining the advantages of Anting in contrast to central 
Shanghai and other urban projects in the Jiading district, the recent strategic plan does 
not treat Huaqiao as a threat to Anting, but conceives the prosperous development of 
Huaqiao as a great opportunity for Anting’s future development. It suggests that
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Anting auto-city should seek collaborative development with Huaqiao in order to 
‘fuel’ its urbanisation. It is hoped that the ‘twin-city’ can function as a single edge city 
on the outskirts of Shanghai and develop as a service node within the Shanghai 
metropolis. Guided by this concept, Anting’s transportation network and functional 
layout is prepared by the incorporation of Huaqiao’s functional plan. The strategic 
plan even puts the scale of school, hospital, kindergarten and other cultural facilities 
to be built in Anting at the level of a 500,000-populated medium city, i.e. taking 
Huaqiao’s 300,000 planned population into account. When asked about the earlier 
worries regarding collaboration, the general manager of Anting International 
Auto-city and New Anting United Development Corporation replied that:
In the sense of development, we may be more in need of Huaqiao’s support 
in certain way, especially in terms of population. Anting needs high-profile 
population at the moment in order to promote modem service 
development...therefore we finally accepted to organize our urban functions 
and transportations catering to Huaqiao...(even we) put our recent 
development focus at the place that borders Huaqiao, i.e. where the No. 11 
metro line of Shanghai is to be extended....As to competition, there are 
competitions everywhere. Anting is even competing with Nanxiang, Malu, 
which are both the towns under the Jiading district. On the other hand, if the 
house prices in Huaqiao are on the increase, then how can it be possible that 
Anting’s property prices are lower? The cooperation is mutually beneficial 
(interview, a general manager of Anting International Auto-city and New
Anting United Development Corporation, 21 April 2010).
In short, collaboration happened in circumstances where Anting was confronted with 
the problems of upgrading its industrial structure towards a service-oriented 
arrangement. That is, local officials compromised the regionalisation strategy in order 
to break the local development deadlock.
6.4 Characteristics of regional collaboration between Jiangsu and Shanghai
The case of the Jiangsu-Shanghai trans-border area has demonstrated that individual 
cities have begun to seek collaboration with adjacent neighbours. However, at present, 
these collaborative intentions are mainly articulated in planning documents or 
conveyed by chief governors, which are far from being practical actions. Most 
regional collaboration strategies are formulated by the policy makers of one city 
rather than by networking or substantial participation. Although local strategies are 
oriented towards cooperation, ‘officials of the other side will not be invited for the 
discussion or be informed of the proposal’ (interview, a chief planner of Jiading 
Planning Institute, 22 April 2010). That is, local institutional functions are still largely 
hedged by administrative boundaries and no collaborative mechanism has been 
substantially institutionalised. Since regional cooperation schemes are still managed 
by individual cities, they may be prolonged or even eventually fail, as in the case of 
the extension of the metro line from Anting to Huaqiao, ‘even though the extension is 
totally financed by Kunshan government, it has to rely on Shanghai’s arrangement.
Therefore, Kunshan’s project won’t be put into schedule very soon since Shanghai 
will have to attend to its own projects first’ (interview, a chief planning official of 
Kunshan Planning Bureau, 14 April 2010). Moreover, at the current stage, the agenda 
of cooperation is largely limited to the realm of transport infrastructure. 
Communication is not broadly structured, but ‘concentrates on ad hoc projects such as 
on one particular road... Except for roads, there is little communication on such topics 
as regional development strategy, industrial development or environmental strategies’ 
(interview, a chief planner of Jiading Planning Institute, 22 April 2010). In other 
words, inter-locality cooperation practices in China are nascent and preliminary, with 
no formal institution or informal policy network having yet been established. The 
findings here in the Yangtze River Delta are in line with studies on the Pearl River 
Delta, in which it is argued that the Pan-PRD regional cooperation ‘is un-formulaic in 
nature’ (Yeh and Xu, 2008: 423), or ‘a collection of loosely assembled local 
governments’ (Wu and Zhang, 2009: 12).
Although economic regionalisation does not immediately indicate that the political 
agenda of regionalisation is well established, it does have some effect on agenda 
formation. For instance, due to the rapid development of high-speed railways and 
inter-city railways within the YRD region, conventional measures such as the 
obstruction of road integration undertaken by local governments to protect the local 
economy will be disrupted. Moreover, as the need for trans-border convenience and 
mobility is on a sharp increase, not only for business, but also for residents, better
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inter-city connectivity would eventually bring benefits to the local economy. On the 
other hand, there is mounting pressure for the industrial structure within the YRD to 
upgrade from the manufacturing to the service sector due to the tightening up of land 
supply and the rising cost of manufacturing. As commented by a senior planner of 
Shanghai, the potential manufacturing shift in Shanghai due to land cost, higher 
environment standards and other factors cannot be affected by the government. As 
soon as Shanghai realised that the development tendency could not be reversed by any 
means such as rivalry and competition, it tried to make profits by other means such as 
cooperation (interview, a senior planner of Shanghai Planning Institute, 10 March 
2010). That is, the government strategy is very pragmatic and follows concrete issues. 
As the tertiary industry is untraded and firmly embedded in localities, the coming 
industrial restructuring may create more scope for cooperation within the region.
Even though economic regionalisation, regional transport and economic restructuring 
would create more scope for inter-city collaboration, the nascent governance exercises 
towards cooperation are not a turning away from entrepreneurial endeavours or 
inter-city competition. Similar to past competition to set up manufacturing 
development zones, cities are now rushing to establish business parks. It is 
commented that there is a boom of building business parks by the town government in 
Kunshan after the development of the Huaqiao International Business Park by the 
provincial government (interview, a senior planner of Shanghai Planning Institute, 10 
March 2010). That is, every government sees the business sector and the service
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economy as a new source of economic growth after manufacturing development. The 
widespread business parks are again going to lead to fierce competition to attract 
business investment. For instance, Huaqiao business park summarised its competitive 
advantage as ‘proximity to Shanghai, preferential treatments of Jiangsu, and low 
production cost of Kunshan’. Apparently, the Huaqiao business park is still trying to 
use the competition of production elements such as cheaper land and preferential 
policies such as lower taxes to compete with other business parks, especially those in 
Shanghai with much higher costs. Therefore, it can be predicted that there may be a 
new round of economic competition between localities to develop producer services. 
Overall, the current regional cooperation practice is only a tactical strategy of urban 
governments to sustain local economic development.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter has examined nascent regional collaboration practices in the YRD region. 
The study reveals that the relationships between different jurisdictions are no longer 
hostile as in the past, and some cooperative initiatives have emerged in the region. 
However, based on an in-depth case study of the Jiangsu and Shanghai border area, 
the chapter finds that current collaboration is far from being established (e.g. Zhang, 
2006; Zhang and Wu, 2006). The mechanism of cooperation in contemporary China is 
not based on substantive inter-jurisdictional networking. The formulation of 
development proposals and economic strategies are still based on individual cities,
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although a regional perspective is generally adopted by local governments in the 
process of preparing their development strategies. Other cities are included in the 
consideration, which is largely based on inter-city transportation and economic 
competitiveness. Local interests are still dominant on the development agenda. 
Moreover, contemporary regional economic development in China is predominantly 
launched by the state without engaging a wide range of actors and organisations 
outside the government body. Therefore, even though the relational perspective of 
scale is stressed in the literature (e.g. Allen et al., 1998; Allen and Cochrane, 2007; 
Lagendijk, 2007), the topic is undeveloped in China. Although collaboration and 
cooperation is pursued by the local actors including local residents and the local state, 
the outcome is predominantly decided by the reality of jurisdictional boundaries and 
the relationships between local governments. China’s regional collaborative projects 
are still fragmented by the administrative hierarchy and territory. Communication and 
collaboration cannot easily be undertaken between different governments, especially 
at different levels (such as the county level of Kunshan and the district level of 
Jiading of Shanghai municipality), and this significantly undermines the effectiveness 
of interaction between cities.
In order to examine emerging regional initiatives, the chapter distinguishes the 
economics and politics of regionalisation. It is argued that, albeit in economic terms, 
the economy of the YRD has been regionalised and, at the same time, the scope of 
collaboration has also widened, although a regional agenda has not been widely
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achieved among cities. In fact, a regional agenda has only been selectively adopted by 
the local governments in response to the current volatile economic environment. 
Increasing inter-city competition and the difficulty of export-oriented manufacturing 
industries has driven local officials to adopt new strategies such as adopting the 
development of the tertiary industry. Therefore, regional collaboration in China is a 
product of changing economic strategy rather than a substantial shift in regional 
governance. Although the environmental agenda in the Western context is a major 
driver for emerging regional governance, it has not been the dominant force in region 
building in China. It is argued by Xu and Yeh (2008: 423) that the contemporary 
cooperative strategy is merely used as an ‘institutional fix’ for the city to open up new 
avenues for capital accumulation. As illustrated by the case study of the 
Shanghai-Jiangsu border area, cooperative development is the tactic only employed 
by the local government to facilitate local economic growth in terms of business and 
property development, when development margins for manufacturing are narrowed 
under the rising land and labour costs and the stringent state land policies.
Finally, this research suggests that the current policy solution on inter-city cooperation 
inside China is too simplistic. The problem tends to be attributed to the lack of 
communication in the Chinese administrative system; hence, more networking is 
advocated. As examined through the changing relationship between Shanghai and 
Jiangsu, this chapter argues that the development of regional governance is strongly 
embedded in local and territorial politics. In other words, regional governance
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research must be contextualised in the circumstance of economic devolution and 
urban entrepreneurialism in post-reform China. Besides the lack of communication 
channels, competitive relationships between different localities also exacerbate the 
ineffectiveness of inter-governmental collaboration. Although emerging 
regionalisation and industrial restructuring in China is creating more scope for 
inter-city economic cooperation, it does not change the competitive relationship 
between different jurisdictions. This is because China is still fiscally decentralised, a 
context in which local governments have to build their economic capacity and earn 
their own revenue (e.g. Wong, 1991a; L-Y. Zhang, 1999). Although the central state 
has put forward more stringent land policies, it does not substantially challenge the 
established pattern of the local governments as local land manager. Therefore, 
competition by means of land and preferential treatments will still exist, since they are 
the effective administrative means that the local governments can deploy to spur 
economic growth. However, on the other hand, entrepreneurship also makes the local 
governments very pragmatic regarding the issues of competition and cooperation. As 
demonstrated by the case of the trans-border area between Jiangsu and Shanghai, 
bottom-up cooperation will become more active as long as it is assumed by the local 
governments that benefits can be obtained from the cooperative development. 
Administrative bureaucracy and fragmentation can be reshaped in favour of 
cooperation for the sake of economic interests. That is, the local interests provide the 
main impetus for local governments to choose between competition and cooperation. 
In this regard, the prospect for inter-city cooperative development in China might be
more than that of the UK. In the UK, regional competitiveness and economic 
development seem to be seen as more the concern of the national state, for which 
regional development and regionalism are at the centre stage of the national policy 
rather than being addressed by the local policy (e.g. Bristow, 2010: 4). The politics of 
political regionalism in the UK are complicated and full of tension with regard to 
cultural identity, local party politics and civic engagement (e.g. Deas and Ward, 2000; 
Phelps, 2010).
Overall, the case of the changing Shanghai-Jiangsu inter-relationship has illustrated 
the politics in the regional scale building process in the YRD area. However, this is 
only one aspect of regional-making practices in the YRD region. In contrast to the 
focus on the local forces of regionalisation, the next chapter will scrutinise the 
intention of top-down forces to develop regional governance in the YRD. The 
rationale and politics underlying the top-down programmes are significantly different 
from those of the bottom-up articulation presented in this chapter.
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7.1 Introduction
China was well known for its top-down planned economy in the socialist period. At 
that time, regional plans were formulated by the National Planning Commission, the 
backbone of the central state, to arrange economic development. However, it is less 
known that pre-reform China used to be equipped with regional-level government in 
the state system. Regional government was set up above the provinces for top-down 
control and intra-regional coordination. For instance, the YRD region has seen the rise 
and demise of three regional organisations (e.g. Yangtze River Delta Urban Economic 
Coordination Office, 2007: 9-11). Firstly, an East China Administrative Region was 
set up from 1950 to 1954, including Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang along with Anhui, 
Shandong, Fujian and Taiwan province. The administrative region during the short 
period accommodated complete governmental departments, as well as military and 
Party organisations (Chen, 2007: 3). The regions were set up to help China’s 
Communist Party to consolidate political power and resume industrial production 
after the civil war (Yangtze River Delta Urban Economic Coordination Office, 2007:
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9). Secondly, an East China Collaborative Region was established from 1954 to 1960, 
which covered Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shanghai, and Anhui, Jiangxi, Shandong and Fujian 
province. The remit of the region was limited to economic development (Chen, 2007: 
5), i.e. the production and constitution of a self-contained regional economy. 
Therefore, only one committee was set up for the running of the regional organisation 
(ibid). Finally, an East China Central Bureau was set up in 1961 to re-confer the 
previous economic collaborative region with Party and political power (Chen, 2007: 
7). However, the Cultural Revolution, which started in 1966, affected the function 
of the administrative region (Yangtze River Delta Urban Economic Coordination 
Office, 2007: 11).
Since the beginning of the economic reform, China’s state system has not retained a 
regional level of administration between the central government and the provinces. 
Regional planning such as the national five-year plan was still practiced, but its 
influence was also very much weakened afterwards. However, the discourse of 
regional coordinated development has reappeared in both governmental reports and 
academic literature since the beginning of the new millennium. Region-wide 
cooperation is advocated, and even building up a new level of regional government 
has been suggested (e.g. Hong, 2009; Ji et al., 2006; Tao, 2007; Wang, 2008; Wang, 
2009; B. J. Yang, 2004; Zhang et al., 2007; Zou and Shi, 2004). In this context, a third 
boom in regional planning, which was unprecedented in terms of the overall number 
of planning projects and amount of planning funding, has been witnessed (Wang,
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2007: 3). In the region of YRD, two regional plans were prepared in 2005. The YRD 
Regional Plan was prepared by the central ministry of National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), whereas the YRD Urban Cluster Plan was introduced 
by the Ministry of Housing and Urban and Rural Development (MHURD). These 
regional plans are remarkably different from the features of the locally initiated 
regional plan. They cannot be fully explained by entrepreneurial thrust, as seen in the 
earlier stage of city planning (Xu and Yeh, 2005; Wu, 2007; Wu and Zhang, 2007). 
According to Wong et al. (2008), planning is now developed as a functional and 
spatial coordination device to pursue environmental sustainability and social 
coherence (Wu and Zhang, 2008: 154). In other words, this new regional agenda, to 
some extent, represents the top-down policy response to the problem of conflicts 
between cities in the region.
The chapter hence intends to investigate the resurgence of the centrally initiated 
regional plan in the YRD. Western European countries have also witnessed the revival 
of strategic spatial planning at the national and regional scale since the 1990s (e.g. 
Albrechts et al., 2003; Albrechts, 2004; 2006). The approach of state theory is used to 
understand the changing nature of the current regional plan (e.g. Allmendinger and 
Haughton, 2007, 2009; Haughton et al., 2009). It is argued that the new spatial 
planning ‘is a contributor to and a reflection of a more fundamental reform of 
territorial management’ (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2009: 620). It is representative 
of the restless search of the state for territorial management (Allmendinger and
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Haughton, 2007: 631). Following the lens of planning, governance and ‘new state 
space’ (Brenner, 2004b), this chapter attempts to use the case of the NDRC-led YRD 
Regional Plan to illustrate the development of the ‘new state space’ in China. The 
YRD Regional Plan, together with Beijing-Tianj in-Hebei region, was prepared by the 
NDRC during the eleventh five-year plan period (2006-2010). It occupies a pioneer 
role in the current wave of making regional plans. This regional plan was recently 
approved by the State Council in May 2010, which represents the first official policy 
of cross-boundary governance in the region. The central research question is how the 
regional plan is formulated and articulated by upper-level government as a vehicle to 
deliver its regulations in contemporary regional governance. Built on the argument 
that the regional plan represents the state’s recentralising effort (e.g. Xu, 2008; Xu and 
Yeh, 2010), this chapter attempts to further argue that current up-scaling planning 
practices are part of the process of the restructuring of state spatiality, i.e. the new 
development of the regional level by the central government represents a new scale of 
policy intervention and state power.
The organisation of the chapter is as follows. Firstly, there will be a review on the 
marginalisation of regional administration and regional plans in the YRD after the 
economic reform. It is suggested that localities virtually developed individually 
without a regional vision after the downscaling of governance. Secondly, the recent 
formulation of the Yangtze River Delta Regional Plan is studied to examine how the 
plan resumes the role to regulate local development, i.e. how the plan contributes to
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the production of ‘new state space’. Next, the ongoing tension between different 
levels of government and different divisions in the development of ‘new state spaces’ 
is discussed. Finally, in the conclusion section, the deficiencies of regional planning 
are highlighted, and some policy implications are provided.
7.2 The marginalisation of regional governance in YRD in post-reform China
Since economic reform, China has changed its focus from political control to 
economic development. The regional level of government was abandoned since it was 
found to be too rigid and detrimental to spontaneous business cooperation (The 
Yangtze River Delta Urban Economic Coordination Office, 2007: 10). Instead, 
informal regional organisation was promoted by the central government. In contrast to 
the previous regional administration, the informal regional organisation had three 
main purposes. First of all, it attempted to promote inter-regional and inter-city 
economic cooperation, or in the language of the time, ‘horizontal economic relations’ 
(hengxiang jingji lianhe). Secondly, it also aimed to break down urban-rural dualism 
and to promote commercialisation and economic trade (Li, 2008: 29). Finally, it 
intended to promote inter-govemmental networking and inter-ministry coordination, 
which was deficient in the previous ministry-led centrally planned system (Yu et al., 
2008: 152). For example, within the YRD region, a Shanghai Economic Zone (SEZ) 
was designated by the State Council in December 1982. Geographically, the region 
consisted of ten cities: Shanghai, Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou, Nantong, Hangzhou,
Jiaxing, Huzhou, Ningbo, and Shaoxing. When setting up the region, the central 
government intended to build up a regional economy around the city of Shanghai 
(Yangtze River Delta Urban Economic Coordination Office, 2007: 11). In order to 
break down the previous ministry-led economy by bringing the ministry and localities 
to work together (Yu et al., 2008: 63), the leading office of the regional organisation, 
the Shanghai Economic Zone Planning Office, was constituted by central ministries 
and the three provincial-level governments. The central ministries included the 
National Planning Commission, National Economic and Trade Commission, and other 
specialised ministries such as industry ministries, the Hydroelectric Power Bureau, the 
Transport Ministry, the Chemical Industry Ministry, the Electronics Ministry, the 
Spinning Ministry, and the Light Industry Ministry (Yu et al., 2008: 151). From 1984 
to 1988, conferences attended by the provincial governors and city mayors were held 
once a year in order to facilitate ‘horizontal’ relationships and communication 
between different cities and economic sectors (Yangtze River Delta Urban Economic 
Coordination Office, 2007: 11). Throughout the process, many state enterprises within 
the region started to cooperate with each other in sales, production, technology and 
capital with the help of the government (Yu et al., 2008: 152).
In addition, as a complement to reduced top-down state control, a territory plan (guotu
guihua) was imported and it was advocated by the State Council to cover the whole 
country in the early 1980s. For example, the SEZ region was regarded as one of the 
key regions under the national territory planning led by the National Planning
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Commission (NPC) (Wu, 2006: 110). With the function of the Planning Office, 
integrated attempts were made to coordinate infrastructure construction, water 
management, industrial development and other issues within the region (Sun and 
Zhao, 2005: 144). It is documented that one Shanghai Economic Zone Strategic 
Development Plan and as many as twenty-two special plans were prepared during the 
period (Yu et al., 2008: 152). Some profound examples included: the planning of 
Shanghai-Jiangsu and Shanghai-Zhejiang highway, which was later adopted by the 
Transport Ministry and put into construction in the 1990s (Wang, 2009: 116); the 
flooding control plan for the Tai-Lake Basin, which was then approved by the State 
Council (Li, 2008: 29); the territorial plan of Shanghai-Jiangsu and lower Yangtze 
River Delta area (Wang, 2009: 116) and the urban distribution plan for the Shanghai 
Economic Zone (Wu, 2006: 115) (Figure 7.1). Overall, in the early years after the 
economic reform, informal regional organisation was set up, not to consolidate central 
control, but to promote local initiatives and natural economic trade. In the meantime, 
there was an upsurge in regional planning to coordinate market-oriented development 
rather than to arrange economic distribution.
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However, the regional body was abolished in 1988 for many reasons. Firstly, at the 
time of decentralisation, the regional organisation, which was immediately 
subordinate to the State Council and directly led by the National Planning 
Commission, was regarded with suspicion. It was believed the top-down approach to 
promote business links was characterised by residual central command (The Yangtze 
River Delta Urban Economic Coordination Office, 2007: 11). That is, business 
cooperation was pre-arranged by government orders rather than spontaneously. 
Secondly, local governments were actually passive regarding inter-regional 
cooperation and were really more interested in the economic benefits of their own 
jurisdictions (Sun and Zhao, 2005: 144; Wang, 2009: 116). Due to the partial and 
incremental reform of economic planning, fiscal arrangements, goods management 
and the price administrative system at that time, local governments were able to take 
advantage of their residual planning power to influence business operation and 
prevent cooperation (Lu and Shi, 2008: 154). Examples of material wars and market 
blockade, instead of achievements of inter-regional economic cooperation, were 
extensively documented during the period (e.g. Zhao and Zhang, 1999: 272). Thirdly, 
the regional functioning demonstrated a path dependency on the former economic 
planning approach, which was ingrained with socialist legacies such as top-down 
administrative measures. For example, the regional plan prepared during the time was 
still a blueprint document without any concern for the implementation mechanism and 
public policies. Although a Regional Regulation for the Shanghai Economic Zone 
(shanghai jingji qu zhangcheng) was formulated (Yangtze River Delta Urban
Economic Coordination Office, 2007: 11) and a strategic development outline was 
agreed upon (Li, 2008: 29), these remained as paperwork without any binding effect. 
No legislation was passed for the plan formulation or regulation, either. That is, the 
realisation of the regional vision was still reliant upon top-down administration and 
local obedience. As a result, the effectiveness of the region was increasingly 
challenged by decentralisation and market reform, where the context of governance 
became much more complicated than purely top-down instructions and unconditional 
obedience. Finally, the intention to build a regional economy around Shanghai also 
met with resistance from some localities (Lu and Shi, 2008: 155). Owing to the 
uneven open policy and the disintegration of the command economy, Shanghai lost its 
absolute advantage in economic development. For example, Lianyungang and 
Nantong in Jiangsu province, as well as Wenzhou in Zhejiang province, were allowed 
to receive foreign investment in April 1984, six years earlier than the opening of 
Pudong of Shanghai in 1990. Shanghai’s regional status was severely challenged by 
the faster economic growth in the provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang, which benefited 
largely from the prosperous development of town and village enterprises (Zhang, 
2006: 41). Under the circumstances, Nanjing and Hangzhou, the capital cities of 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, both intended to compete with Shanghai to be the 
leader city of the region (Lu and Shi, 2008: 154). In short, the conflicts between the 
traditional top-down administrative approach and the emerging decentralisation 
environment led to the failure of the regional experiment. In other words, the 
disassembly of the NPC-led Shanghai Economic Zone marked the failure of the
intervention by the central government into local development after economic reform.
The top-down regulation was further weakened following the reorganisation of the 
central government in 1998. After that, the NPC was reformed to become the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and responsibility for territorial 
management was moved to the newly established Ministry of Land Resources (MLR). 
As a result, the formerly unified function of economic management and territorial 
management was separated under two ministries (Wu, 2006: 121). However, MLR 
made the preservation of agricultural land its priority and set aside territorial 
management, i.e. the making of territorial plans. In other words, top-down spatial 
regulation was temporarily placed in a vacuum during the period. In contrast, city 
planning under the Ministry of Construction (MoC) (the later MHURD) was 
developing rapidly. According to the 1989 City Planning Act, an urban system plan is 
required for the preparation of an urban master plan. Consequently, the influence of 
the urban system plan underneath the MoC system was greatly enhanced and it 
virtually became the regional-level plan in the post-reform era. For example, the 
Jiangsu Department of Construction prepared the Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou 
city-region plan during the preparation of the Jiangsu Provincial Urban System Plan 
to tackle the problem of incoordination and competition in the developed southern 
Jiangsu area. However, the city-region plan was very difficult to implement in reality 
(Luo and Shen, 2008). Furthermore, the preparation of the urban system plan under 
the MoC was generally based on provincial administrative divisions, which actually
left the coordination between provinces unattended. Overall, the urban system plan 
has been under increasing criticism in recent years. It is argued that its existence is 
merely due to the fact that it is a statutory plan required by the 1989 City Planning Act 
rather than because of its real value in practice (Zhu, 2005). In reality, the 
effectiveness of the urban system plan was greatly challenged in the late 1990s for its 
outdated technocratic planning methodology, which addressed a static urban 
hierarchical system and a rigid standard of urban size distribution (e.g. Q. Zhang, 
1999).
Overall, regional planning became marginalised for a short period in the 1990s. In 
fact, it was downgraded owing to the ineffectiveness of regional governance. First of 
all, regional plan-making was still ingrained with socialist planning theory, which is 
an approach simply comprising a blueprint outline without any implementation 
mechanism. Its usefulness was hence questioned and it was even seen as the legacy of 
the planned economy and no longer suitable in the market economy (Zhu, 2005). 
Secondly, and more importantly, this is because the upper-level government was left 
with few administrative and fiscal resources for territory management after economic 
devolution (e.g. Wu et al., 2007; Luo and Shen, 2008). Due to the fact that the region 
has been widely documented for its spectacular growth speed, as well as the 
increasingly intense competition between various localities for investment, land and 
policies (e.g. Zhang, 2006; Chen, 2007; Zhao and Zhang, 2007), there are increasing 
concerns over administrative fragmentation, adverse competition and redundant
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development within the area.
7.3 Formulating the Yangtze River Delta Regional Plan: the contribution to a
new state space in the YRD
In 2002, NDRC changed the name of the conventional five-year economic plan to the 
five-year spatial plan, which was intended to reassert its role of spatial regulation. In 
the following year of 2005, NDRC launched the YRD regional plan project as an 
experiment to include spatial components within the eleventh five-year plan 
(2006-2010). The YRD region in the plan incorporated the area of Jiangsu, Zhejiang 
and Shanghai. This is very unusual because it spans three provincial-level 
jurisdictions, including 24 prefecture-level cities, 49 county-level cities and 61 
counties (Figure 7.2).
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The preparation of the plan was totally funded by the central government, and headed 
by the then vice-director o f NDRC. Planning preparation was executed by the Local
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Economic Development Department (diqu jingji fazhan si) under the NDRC. Instead 
of an internal task undertaken by the central government itself, local governments, 
universities, academics and experts were involved in plan-making with regard to 
planning consultation. The overarching plan-making framework was divided into 
three research teams, namely: the comprehensive team, the expert team, and the local 
team (interviews, involved academics, East China Normal University and Nanjing 
Institute of Geography and Limnology of Chinese Academy of Sciences, 21 April 
2010 and 11 March 2010). The comprehensive team represented the core of the 
plan-making group, which took on the responsibility for integrating sector and local 
plans and the compilation of the final planning document. The expert team was in 
charge of research on particular subjects of crucial significance, such as population 
and urbanisation, land use and arable land protection, industrial development, and 
implementation mechanism and policy design. These plans were then used as the 
formal sector plans of the related ministries and bureaus. As the comprehensive team 
was led by the Nanjing Institute of Geography and Limnology of the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences, the expert team comprised researchers from Shanghai and 
Zhejiang in order to balance domiciles of origin. Finally, the local teams were formed 
by local development and reform commissions and other colleges. They were the 
representatives of the localities and also acted as the interface between central and 
local governments (all the above details are taken from an interview with an involved 
academic, East China Normal University, 21 April 2010).
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Although the plan was scheduled to be published in mid-2006, the release date kept 
being postponed. The plan was not actually approved or published until 25 May 2010, 
which was at the end of the eleventh five-year period (2006-2010). The main reason 
why plan-making consumed such a long time was that there were different views on 
the boundaries of the regional economy and the extent of regional integration within 
the area (interview, involved academics, Nanjing Institute of Geography and 
Limnology of Chinese Academy of Sciences, 11 March 2010). In the very beginning, 
the regional plan only covered 15 prefectural cities as well as Shanghai. This is 
because the smaller-sized region is economically more developed, is closer to 
Shanghai, and corresponds to the historical YRD institutional landscape, in terms of 
the Shanghai Economic Zone in the pre-reform era and the Yangtze River Delta 
Economic Association in the post-reform era (for a brief introduction to the Yangtze 
River Delta Economic Association, please see Luo and Shen, 2009). However, the 
State Council released the document ‘Instructions on Furthering the Reform and 
Opening-Up, and Promoting the Social Economic Development in Yangtze River 
Delta Region’ (in short, changsanjiao zhidao yijiari) on September 2008, which 
officially announced that the YRD region should incorporate the whole jurisdictional 
area of Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces. The document even created a term 
of jargon called ‘Pan-YRD region’ in order to combine Anhui, the underdeveloped 
province on the periphery, with the region of YRD. Obviously, the intention of the 
central government was to encourage industrial relocation from the relatively 
developed YRD area to Anhui province, which would promote economic restructuring
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in the YRD region, as well as enhancing economic development in Anhui province. 
On the other hand, the massive expansion of the YRD region was also because of the 
strong requirements of the provincial and local governments to join the ‘YRD region’ 
to promote local economic growth. Overall, scientific research on the structure and 
boundary of the regional economy did not have much effect on the space of regional 
planning since it was greatly influenced by the politics of central and local 
governments.
7.3.1 T he new  leg itim ate  level o f  planning: the crea tion  o f  a new  scale o f  state
spatiality
The YRD regional plan is the first integrated plan for all three provincial-level 
jurisdictions. It specifies strategic positioning, development objectives, spatial 
distribution and coordinated development for the entire area. The plan contains twelve 
chapters. Chapter one analyses the challenges and opportunities confronting the 
region. In Chapter two, a unified regional strategy is proposed for the vast area. It 
aims to realise ‘social well-being in 2015 and modernization in 2020’. The aim of the 
specific goal of GDP per capita is to reach 82,000 Yuan in 2015 and 110,000 Yuan in 
2020. More importantly, the plan forecasts that the service sector should account for 
48 percent in 2015 and 53 percent in 2020. The goal for the service industry 
represents the intention of the central government to promote economic restructuring 
in the YRD region in order to enhance its regional competitiveness in the world and
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upgrade the current structure of export-oriented manufacturing industries. For this 
purpose, the regional plan provides overall guidance for the region in Chapter three. It 
envisions the future spatial development structure as ‘one core with six belts’ (Figure 
7.3). Furthermore, it specifies the urban system within the region and the particular 
roles of cities in the region. Overall, the YRD regional plan represents one of the few 
centrally prepared documents on cross-boundary regional development and the first 
ever in this area since economic reform. Through the making of the regional plan, the 
regional scale is created to promote integrated development in the fragmented and 
complex region.
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Although the YRD Regional Plan is not a statutory plan according to the City 
Planning Act, it is conferred with legitimate power by the State Council to ensure the 
implementation of the integrated plan. The approval of the YRD Regional Plan by the 
State Council provides legitimacy for NDRC to conduct administrative management 
in accordance with the plan. As an economic coordinator in the socialist economy, 
NDRC retains some administrative power to approve certain investment projects that 
would have an impact on the environment and economic safety (Zhang and Zhang, 
2005). However, the regional plan is now used as the basis for project approval. For 
example, if a project is not included in the plan, then it cannot be approved within the 
five-year period; if proposed projects are not located in the spatial zoning area, they 
cannot be approved either (interview, involved academic, Nanjing Institute of 
Geography and Limnology of Chinese Academy of Sciences, 26 March 2010). In this 
way, the central government can impose its location preference for locally initiated 
projects, especially the big schemes that have a huge impact on local development and 
the environment. For example, although metallurgical plants are not totally banned in 
the YRD region, they are spatially restricted in the plan in order to protect the 
environment and eliminate over-capacity of output. Therefore, metallurgical projects 
may not be approved if applied for by cities located outside the proposed area within 
the plan. Apart from the above administrative measures, the statutory status of the 
plan requires all cities and counties within a region, and all the ministries and bureaus 
involved, to refer to the YRD regional plan document in their policy and plan making. 
Consequently, the long absent regional vision is restored by the enforcement of the
regional plan.
The reason why NDRC resumed a strong role in spatial planning is historically 
contingent and is because NPC, from which NDRC originates, was the most 
comprehensive and powerful ministry-level commission in the central government. 
NDRC is even now half a level higher than other government departments at the 
ministry level. Likewise, the conventional five-year economic plan used to be and still 
is the plan for the whole government body rather than the plan for individual 
departments. Every government institution at various levels of government should 
formulate their department plans to be incorporated into the five-year economic plan. 
In this sense, the five-year plan supervised by NDRC is the most powerful strategy 
that embodies the overall governmental plan. By deploying the authority of the central 
government and the administrative resources of NDRC, the weakened regulatory 
power of the provincial government and other ministries in the YRD region should be 
restored through the implementation of the regional plan.
7.3.2 The enlarged scope of planning: the changing nature of planning for
strategic governance
Although the initiator of the plan is NDRC, which used to compile the five-year 
economic and territorial plans, the YRD Regional Plan is not a purely economic plan 
or land use plan. The scope of the plan is widened to include all aspects ranging from
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the economy, land resources, environment, infrastructure development coordination, 
regional inequality to regional innovation. In addition to an overall strategy, the 
remaining part of the plan prescribes strategies and locations for various development 
subjects such as major industries, infrastructure projects, highways or fast roads, and 
inter-city train lines. The remaining ten chapters of the plan deal with urbanisation 
and urban-rural coordinated development, industrial development and distribution, 
innovation and creative city-regions, infrastructure planning, land resources and the 
environment, social development and public services, institutional reform and 
innovation, the deepening of opening-up and cooperation, and planning 
implementation. According to an official of the NDRC, integrated considerations are 
made for these strategies and locations in a top-down manner based on the following 
considerations: the national interest, regional competitiveness, and regional common 
issues such as environmental protection and coordination (Zhou, 2005). For example, 
an industrial strategy was formulated for the whole region to develop tertiary industry 
and new-technology industry to promote the restructuring of export-oriented 
manufacturing sectors. Correspondingly, restrictions were imposed on steel and 
petrochemical industries, because output capacity in the region was believed to 
exceed demand. It was suggested that existing small enterprises should merge with 
large ventures to build up new capacity. In addition, specific industrial strategies for 
each city in the region were proposed in order to eliminate redundant industrial 
development. Another case in point is the proposal for intra-regional transport 
infrastructure. It was judged that the region was greatly lagging behind in terms of
inter-city transport links. Although the highway network was well developed, and 
played an important role in linking different places, it was argued that the highways 
encroached on too much land and were not environmentally friendly. As a result, it 
was decided that highway construction would no longer be encouraged in the region. 
Instead, inter-city high-speed railways were given priority and the spatial structure of 
high-speed railways was proposed. Consequently, the centrally initiated proposal 
helped to break the deadlock because local governments had no capacity to invest in 
inter-city infrastructure, even though demand for inter-city commuting was sharply 
increasing. Thus, the regional plan fills a gap in institutional arrangements through an 
integrated regional perspective, and helps to resolve critical problems and concerns 
that could not be solved by individual provinces or municipalities (Yang and Chen, 
2007).
The broader scope of planning shows that regional planning, rather than individual 
government departments, now tries to solve the major problems that confront the 
overall regulation of the region. For example, land use and land protection lies under 
the Ministry of Land and Resources, while the management of urbanisation and urban 
development is the responsibility of MHURD. The broadened scope of the plan 
demonstrates that it attempts to pay attention to all relevant issues in order to develop 
an integrated strategy for land, resources and development. Overall, the scale of new 
regional planning is designated by NDRC with the intention of guiding and governing 
the activities of local governments in their local strategy making and project proposals.
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The scope of the plan is hence greatly widened and it is no longer simply an internal 
department document. In addition, the plan is conferred with statutory status rather 
than being reliant upon administrative measures for implementation. It is thus 
anticipated that coordination between different places and departments should be 
promoted. In other words, the governing of the YRD region will not lead to the 
establishment of a particular government or governance body at the regional scale; it 
is the central government itself that directly plans and governs the region. That is, the 
regional plan is the ‘new state space’ introduced by the central government to govern 
local development without inserting another level of regional government body into 
the existing five-tier government hierarchy. As a socialist legacy, however, territorial 
management is still more reliant upon employing hierarchical authority and 
administrative measures than building consensus by means of open negotiation, 
public participation and awareness. Because of relatively limited local involvement, 
the effectiveness of the regional plan was doubted at the beginning of its preparation.
7.4 The ongoing tension in the development of new state space
7.4.1 The contest between ministries for spatial regulation power
The YRD Regional Plan prepared by NDRC did not proceed smoothly, and faced 
many challenges. Its sole authority has been contested by plans made by the other 
ministries. For example, MHURD started preparing the YRD Urban Cluster Plan
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(2007-2020) in 2005, which is to the same timescale as that by NDRC. Following 
NDRC and MHURD, the MLR also jumped the bandwagon and attempted to make its 
own regional plan. Among the competition, the rivalry between NDRC and MHURD 
is the most acute. The YRD Urban Cluster Plan project by MHURD started on 15th 
November 2005, and ended in early 2008 (interview, involved planner, Chinese 
Academy of Urban Planning and Design, 8 April 2010). The project was co-financed 
by MHURD and Provincial-level Commissions of Housing and Urban and Rural 
Development, while MHURD took the lead in organisation (interview, involved 
planner, Chinese Academy of Urban Planning and Design, 25 February 2010). The 
mega-project was mainly shouldered by the Chinese Academy of Urban Planning and 
Research, which is subordinate to MHURD. Historically, the two planning agencies 
had different foci: NDRC concentrated on economic regulation, while MHURD 
covered urban land use and construction. However, both plans now put spatial 
regulation and coordination at the top of their agendas and adopt a regional 
perspective and spatial approach. Therefore, the contents and structure of the 
MHURD plan are quite similar to that of the NDRC plan. For example, the MHURD 
plan has five sections. The first section deals with the opportunity and challenge 
confronted by the YRD region. The second sets overall goals and strategy for the 
whole region. The third allocates spatial policies for urbanisation, population, 
employment, industrial distribution, rural development, transport systems, energy use 
and ecological protection. The fourth focuses on the key trans-border areas for 
integrated development or collaboration and the last section illustrates the
implementation mechanism and related policies for the plan. In other words, similar to 
the regional plan made by the NDRC, the urban cluster plan by MHURD also 
undertakes comprehensive analyses including different aspects of land, resources, 
industries and regional inequality to take forward a unified spatial development 
framework for the region. Coordinated policies were designed for the three provinces 
and one municipality in terms of urbanisation, industries, transport, environment and 
spatial development. Under the general framework, special concern was paid to some 
important trans-border areas, such as the trans-border cities which need coordinated 
spatial and transport development, and areas that need coordination in terms of 
environmental management.
Through interviews with both ministries and their affiliated organisations, it seems 
that MHURD is recognised as more adept at plan preparation. However, NDRC is 
unwilling to use the plan made by MHURD to guide its administrative management. 
Although MHURD acknowledges that NDRC possesses more administrative and 
political resources to implement regional plans, MHURD regards its plan as more 
scientific and realistic. In short, the making of these regional plans represents the fact 
that consensuses have been achieved by different central ministries and that a 
higher-level intervention is required to coordinate city-based development from a 
regional or even national consideration. However, the various planning agencies have 
not yet taken coordinated action or integrated policy-making processes as advocated 
by European spatial planning. Consequently, each plan is pursuing
comprehensiveness by itself, without any effort to join-up different strategies of 
different sectors, or to work together across various sectors on one overall strategy.
The conflicts have even spread from the process of formulating regional plans to that 
of building planning institutions. In order to re-establish their legitimacy to formulate 
and implement regional plans, both MHURD and NDRC are eager to strengthen the 
legal status of their regional plans. For example, the role of the urban system plan has 
recently been totally redefined by MHURD. Under the 1989 Planning Act, it was 
stipulated that the different tiers of urban system plan at the national, provincial, 
municipal and county level were prepared mainly as groundwork for the urban master 
plan. In other words, the main purpose of the urban system plan was just to ensure the 
feasibility of the function and scale of individual cities in the urban master plan. 
Therefore, even though the urban system plan is the only statutory regional plan in 
China and is the compulsory plan under the Planning Act, it does not hold an 
independent role, but is auxiliary to the urban master plan, particularly for those at 
and below the municipal level. However, recently, MHURD has sought to take 
advantage of the statutory status of the urban system plan to consolidate its role of 
regulation. It has attempted to use the different levels of urban system plan as 
regulation devices for the corresponding level of government, not only the Housing 
and Urban and Rural Development Department. As explained by the chief of the 
regional planning department under MHURD, ‘Each level of the urban system plan 
corresponds with the regulation imperative of the level of the government. The
different levels of urban system plan are responsible for the corresponding level of 
government to coordinate urban development of the lower-level governments’ (from 
the PPT presentation made by Qin Zhang at the 2009 Annual Conference of Regional 
Plan and Urban Economics Academic Committee, 2009-12-20, Beijing). As 
illuminated in Figure 7.4, it is hoped the cascade of urban system plans would become 
well-functioning top-down guidance on various levels of local development. 
Obviously, MHURD is expecting its urban plan to go beyond the ministry and 
become the tool of the government in spatial regulation. For the purpose, MHURD 
commanded the Chinese Academy of Urban Planning and Design Institute to prepare 
the National Urban System Plan in 2005, which has not been prepared before. This is 
expected to be the device of the central government to strengthen national guidance 
on local development (interview, the chief planner of a major planning academy, 30 
March 2010). Unfortunately, this plan was not approved by the State Council. It is 
believed that the plan became the sacrifice of the conflicts between ministries for 
spatial regulation power (Interview, the chief planner of a major planning academy2, 
30 March 2010). Since the central government shows more favour to the plan 
prepared by NDRC, it would rather not approve that made by MHURD due to the 
consideration of redundancy. As a result, the national urban system plan could only be 
used as an internal document by MHURD, even though it is the statutory plan 
according to the City Planning Act (interview, the chief planner of a major planning 
academy, 3 0 March 2010).
2 Because of the sensitivity o f this comment, the location o f the academy remains unlisted.
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At the same time, NDRC is also very ambitious for its regional plans to be adopted as 
the overall government plan:
The NDRC attempts to get through an overarching regional plan ordinance to 
coordinate all regional-level plans of various government departments under 
the NDRC regional plan umbrella. The intention of the proposal is to 
streamline the regional plans made by various departments and make the 
regional policies more compatible with each other. However, the proposal
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was fiercely resisted by other ministries, especially MHURD and MLR 
(interview, leading academic in planning, Nanjing University, 12 March 
2010).
Although NPC, the predecessor of NDRC, used to hold sole authority over the 
planned economy and guided overall economic and spatial development, the 
mandatory power of NDRC is now much weaker after economic reform. Although the 
State Council has treated NDRC more favourably and approved all its regional plans, 
‘harmonious relations between ministries’ have to be taken into account. 
Consequently, the ‘proposal for legislation made by NDRC was finally compromised 
under great pressure and the released document is limited by the system of five-year 
plans’ (interview, the director of a major planning academy3, 17 March 2010). In this 
sense, the regional plan is merely an additional planning ordinance within the system 
of NDRC, just like that of MHURD, rather than an overarching planning legislation.
Overall, the contest between different ministries on the formulation and 
institutionalisation of the regional plans actually manifests the battle articulated by the 
ministries to safeguard their power and interests (c.f. Hu, 2006b). The unprecedented 
emphasis placed by the central government on spatial regulation represents the new 
area of power for these ministries. Henceforth, MHURD, which is now in charge of 
making urban and regional plans, is eager to upgrade its plan as the device of the 
government for spatial governance; while NDRC and MLR, which were historically
3 Because o f the sensitivity o f this comment, the location o f the academy remains unlisted; similar views are 
shared in other interviews about the difficulty o f coordinating plan making between different ministries.
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engaged with regional plan making, are keen to resume the making of regional plans. 
This is in stark contrast to the attitude to regional planning in the early decades of 
economic reform, when territory plans were not valued by either NPC or the later 
MLR.
The repetitive plan-making has not only caused tension at the regional scale, but also 
resulted in a lot of controversy and ambiguity over the regional spatial plans. For 
example, the YRD spatial plans made by MHURD and NDRC have not only 
formulated different policy agendas and spatial policies on their own, but even have 
different understandings from one another in terms of the geographical boundaries of 
the YRD region. The NDRC ministry originally specified that the YRD region only 
covered a small area of 15 prefecture-level cities around Shanghai, which was then 
expanded to a larger region including Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang. However, the 
area understood by MHURD to comprise the YRD region was composed of Shanghai, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang plus Anhui province. The big divergence between the two main 
ministries thus leaves the localities with excuses not to follow any plan formulation.
7.4.2 The conflicts between levels of government
On the other hand, the YRD Regional Plan is challenged by implementation and 
effectiveness in practice. The motivations between the central and local government 
are often contradictory. The regional plan by NDRC received much attention from
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local authorities for its participative role in plan-making and its perceived strategic 
status in the national and regional economy and consequential preferential treatment 
of policy support and project allocation. ‘Many provincial governors are very anxious 
about whether the city regions under their jurisdiction will be incorporated into any 
national strategies’ (interview, a leading academic in planning, Nanjing University, 12 
March 2010). This is because NDRC is the major economic planning agency in China; 
for example, NDRC is in charge of the four trillion Yuan stimulus plan approved by 
the State Council to cope with the global financial crisis in 2008. For this reason, 
localities strive to be included in the regional plan, not for the sake of strengthened 
governance, but because they are hoping for some potential opportunities to be given, 
even implicitly, by ‘national strategies’:
Local authorities can make use of the plan to their own benefits and market 
the strategic significance of the city in the national and regional economy to 
attract investment. Although the centrally made regional plan does not 
provide direct capital support, local authorities tend to use the regional plan 
to lobby other ministries for special policies, especially for the quota of 
construction land, loans from national banks, and more autonomy in ex-ante 
‘institutional experiments’ without permission from higher-level 
governments (interview, involved scholar, Nanjing Institute of Geography 
and Limnology of Chinese Academy of Sciences, 11 March 2010).
Even though the NDRC regional plan obtained its statutory status, it is still very
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difficult for central government to deal with game-playing local governments and 
guarantee the enforcement of the regional plan. First of all, as commented by an 
experienced academic in a planning school:
The contents of the current regional plans are still too general and too brief; 
few offer guidance linked with enforcement regulations. And hence, it is very 
difficult for the relevant government departments to intervene in local 
development by reference to the regional plan (interview, scholar, Nanjing 
University, 12 March 2010).
Secondly, the regional plan is not equipped with any regulatory power, funding or 
other incentives for implementation, even though it is strongly advocated by central 
government. ‘Since there is no Regional Planning Act in China, there is no relevant 
regulation on what to do if there is no compliance with the regional plan. Neither are 
regulations enforced on the local governments to ensure they follow the regional plan 
to prepare their local plans’ (interview, scholar, Nanjing University, 12 March 2010). 
Furthermore, a common problem for planning in China is the fact that ‘even though 
the plan is approved by the upper level government, the implementation actually lies 
in the hands of the local government...’ (interview, official, MHURD, 6 April 2010). 
Since China’s economic reform, the operation of local government is no longer 
granted by the central government, but predominantly by itself; local development is 
not funded by the central government either, but is largely initiated by the local 
government as well. On the other hand, ‘the primary land market is virtually
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administered by the local government, which further facilitates the locally initiated 
development’ (interview, official, MHURD, 6 April 2010). In a word, the central 
government is confronted with great difficulties when seeking to safeguard the 
implementation of the plans it has approved. As a result, the central government is 
forced to ‘strengthen the law in terms of plan enforcement and plan revision, and in 
the meantime put aside a quantity of money to use satellite data for real-time 
supervision of the implementation of the plan and land protection’ (interview, official, 
MHURD, 6 April 2010). However, as pointed out by a senior professional, ‘...the 
spatial planning is not any panacea...as long as the locally-initiated development 
model is not changed, the intention to use spatial planning to control the local 
development is very difficult to achieve’ (interview, senior planner, Chinese Academy 
of Urban Planning and Design, 2 April 2010). In other words, even the strictest 
censorship is doomed to fail under the current situation, which could only exhaust the 
resources and energy of the central government.
Although the regional plan by NDRC suggests that the current promotion system 
based on economic performance should be reformed and that the tax-sharing system 
and revenue structures be modified, these suggestions are on the recent agenda of 
political reform:
The system of cadre promotion is under the charge of the Organization 
Department of the CPC Central Committee; the system of tax and revenue is 
under the charge of the Revenue Department; while the transfer payment is
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determined by the Ministry of Finance. Although NDRC is a half-level 
higher than other ministries under the State Council, that only means it is 
able to organise inter-ministry meetings; it cannot make policies for issues 
that are the responsibility of other ministries (interview, official, MHURD, 6 
April 2010).
In a word, it seems that the central government still lacks the commitment to initiate 
overall institutional and political reforms. Plan-making is not given any stronger 
status in the administrative system. As revealed by a participant academic:
Plan-making is headed by the vice-director of NDRC, whose political status 
is only equivalent to that of vice-provincial governors. In the fieldwork and 
data collection period, the planning group is mainly led by the vice-director 
of Local Economy Department under NDRC, whose political status is even 
lower, merely equivalent to the deputy mayor of a prefecture-level city. In the 
circumstances, the involved provinces and cities may pretend to collaborate 
with the planning work, but do not take the plan seriously. Even though the 
plan is totally funded by the national government, NDRC actually cannot 
impose strong interventions whether in communication with local leaders or 
in the substantial planning contents (interview, an involved academic in a 
leading planning school4, 19 March 2010).
Overall, it seems the central government is left with few devices to regulate local
4 Because o f the sensitivity o f this comment, the location o f the affiliation remains unlisted. As a tradition in China, 
academics are heavily involved in plan preparation, playing a leading role in directly drafting plans rather than 
mere consultation. As a result, the participating academics, who have long established links with the government, 
are familiar with the process o f plan-making.
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development after decades of decentralisation. With policies only on paper, the 
regional plan alone cannot impose much restraint on local discretionary behaviour.
In addition, the plan-making process lacks a substantial participation mechanism. For 
instance, the regional plan made by NDRC only involved a fieldtrip to major 
prefecture-level cities. In other words, only leaders of relevant departments at the 
prefecture-level cities were involved in the plan preparations. More importantly, this 
participation was not in terms of decision-making, but was just to provide local 
information to the central ministries and plan-makers. Some of the counties and towns 
may not even be aware of the regional plan at all. When conducting interviews at the 
county-level city Kunshan, the planning official of the city somehow felt the regional 
plan was irrelevant to them, even though their area was covered by the plan. The lack 
of involvement in the negotiation not only reduces the likelihood of consent to the 
regional plan by authorities, but also undermines the transparency of the 
policy-making process. For example, the sophisticated and non-transparent spatial 
zoning in the process of plan-making encouraged, to some extent, under-the-table 
deals. As spatial zoning is associated with spatial regulation and investment approval, 
local authorities try by all means not to be put in the restricted or forbidden area of 
development, and in the meantime propose to have as many local projects as possible 
written into the regional plan for future convenience in project approval. For example, 
the plan intends to strengthen environmental protection in one of the regions in 
Zhejiang province, which means that local development within the area would be
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constrained. To avoid this restriction, one of the cities located in the area made 
significant efforts to persuade the plan-makers to change the policy. Finally, 
compromises were made and some particular cities were allowed to be developed 
along the environment-sensitive belt (interview, involved scholar, Nanjing Institute of 
Geography and Limnology of Chinese Academy of Sciences, 11 March 2010). As 
revealed by the scholar, who participated in plan preparation, many cities took 
advantage and lobbied the ministry and plan-makers in order to gain a more 
privileged status in the planning document due to the less transparent zoning 
procedure.
Overall, it seems that the regional plan is in an awkward position since ‘the central 
government cannot effectively intervene in local developments by the use of the 
regional plan; on the other hand, local authorities can take full advantage of the plan 
to lobby for relaxation of control in development’ (interview, a participant academic, 
Nanjing University, 12 March 2010). Therefore, the influence of the regional plan in 
practice is still in great doubt. It is held by some critics that the regional plan still 
exists more in a symbolic sense than in reality. As commented by an involved 
plan-maker, ‘anyway, even for scientific development or coordinated development, 
what is overriding is still to develop the economy’ (interview, senior planner, Chinese 
Academy of Urban Planning and Design, 8 April 2010). The senior planner even held 
a pessimistic outlook for the regional plan because ‘the scientific development, the 
recentralisation, and the regional plan is just a short and temporary wave, the general
trend for China is still rapid development.’
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter analyses the ebbs and flows of regional administration and regional 
planning in the YRD in China from 1949 to recent times, and maps these changes 
with the transformation of regional governance. Historically, the central government 
has attempted to establish regional-level administration in the area around the current 
YRD region, that is, the East China Administrative Region from 1950 to 1954; the 
East China Cooperative Region from 1954 to 1960; and the East China Central 
Bureau from 1961 to 1976. These regional jurisdictions were launched by the central 
government in order to consolidate the top-down regulation on local territorial 
development. However, the political turbulence during the period undermined the 
stability and effectiveness of the regional administrations.
Since 1979, the Chinese state system has no longer retained a regional level of 
administration between the central government and provinces. This is because 
decentralisation was advocated by economic reform. However, China has not stopped 
practising regional planning for this reason. As a matter of fact, the central 
government attempted to set up an informal regional organisation within the current 
YRD region to facilitate top-down regulation and horizontal coordination. The 
informal organisation, namely the Shanghai Economic Zone, was also considered to
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be an important region within the national territory planning launched at the time by 
NPC. Henceforth, a great number of integrated strategies and sectoral plans were 
prepared for the SEZ region. Nevertheless, the central intervention on territorial 
development and horizontal cooperation was, to some extent, resisted by the local 
government because it was regarded as a residue of the central command economy. 
Post-reform regional planning was even marginalised in the structure of governance 
due to the downscaling of planning power to the municipal government. The 
influence of regional planning has been undermined because of its outdated planning 
approach. The sceptical attitude towards regional planning, as well as the 
re-organisation of the central government, contributed to the weakened role of 
regional governance. Consequently, China’s local development proceeded without 
much effective regional intervention for a period after economic reform.
The YRD Regional Plan initiated by NDRC in 2005 represents the recent 
re-emergence of national and regional plans across the country. The impetus of 
emerging spatial plans is predominantly to cope with rampant localised land 
development and to restore governance capacities. In the absence of regional 
government, the centrally initiated regional plan functions as the vehicle for the 
central government to reassert its influence on local development at the regional level. 
In this respect, recent practices of spatial planning demonstrate another wave of 
efforts to go beyond local entrepreneurialism and pursue regional coordination for the 
purpose of sustainable development. In other words, the top-down approach to
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planning at the regional scale is intended to create a ‘new state space’ to safeguard 
strategic interests, enhance regional competitiveness, and eliminate excessive 
competition. The widened scope of planning beyond the economic development and 
land use planning also demonstrates the changing nature of planning, from being an 
internal document of one department to a spatial regulation tool for the whole 
government. However, through the case study of the YRD Regional Plan, it is also 
suggested that the current regional plans are more akin to visions created by central 
government rather than concrete actions with immediate effects. Firstly, central 
government has not yet supplemented these regional plans with any concrete regional 
policies. The regional plan-makers could only suggest central government as a 
coordination mechanism on paper. Secondly, legislation for regional plans is very 
weak. Although the central government ministries intend to integrate a cascade of 
plans, compliance cannot be guaranteed because of the complexity of 
inter-govemmental politics. Moreover, in addition to contradictory motivations 
underlying the central and local governments, the regional plan is further undermined 
by the different agendas of ministries. For example, although the current YRD 
regional plan is approved and issued by the State Council, it is still viewed as a plan 
within the NDRC system rather than the overall plan for regional governance. Efforts 
are being wasted on rival planning processes rather than being spent on the 
development of a consensus and on integrating working arrangements. Finally, 
although the core of these plans is discursively focused on land management and 
sustainable development, the target still prioritises economic growth.
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Overall, compared with the bottom-up efforts to assert regionalisation, the top-down 
forces seem to be more effective in developing regional governance. An overall 
regional plan has been orchestrated by the central state in a relatively short time, 
whereas substantive forms of inter-city networking are not yet formed, even after 
years of development of inter-city associations. The effectiveness of the top-down 
forces is due to the remaining strong vertical bureaucratic control in China, even 
though China is greatly decentralised in terms of fiscal relations (Tsui and Wang, 
2004). Nevertheless, the current situation also shows that central government is still 
very precarious in the formulation of a new regional state space. Although emerging 
spatial plans help to introduce a new regional perspective, the new state space is being 
created incrementally without a consolidated mandate of regional development. The 
emerging spatial plan, however, does help to develop a spatial discourse and involve 
multiple actors (albeit quite limited at present), which in the long term may strengthen 
regional governance and region building.
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C h A p t e r  e ig h t
C o n C l u s io n
Aiming to examine the regional renaissance and the existing regional governance in 
China, the study traces China’s historical development of governance, and further 
makes an in-depth investigation into the study area of the Yangtze River Delta region. 
Drawn on the theory of the strategic relational approach and politics of scale, the 
study conceptualises the changing regional institutional landscape as an attempt to 
reorganise state configurations by both bottom-up and top-down processes. The study 
explores the agency, the rationale, the politics and the nature of new state spaces in 
the context of China, rather than mapping China’s experiences in an uncritical way. 
As the concluding section of the research, this chapter synthesises the transformation 
of China’s regional governance based on the research work conducted in the previous 
chapters. Conclusions are drawn regarding the evolution, the dynamics and the 
characteristics of the current regional governance initiatives. Based on the findings of 
the research, some theoretical implications are proposed for the current ‘new state 
spatiality’ and (city-) region debate. Finally, reflections are made on the limitations of 
this study and suggestions are put forward for continuing work on this topic.
8.1 The main findings
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China used to be conferred with strong regional policies and formal regional 
administration in the Socialist period. During the ‘roll-back’ era, with decentralisation 
and market-oriented economic reform, however, regional strategies were marginalised 
and gradually displaced by urban programmes. However, it appears regional policies 
and practices have re-emerged in China since 2000. These regional programmes are 
distributed at all subnational scales above the urban level. They are manifested by the 
new coordinated polices, and the main functional area plan, which represent the return 
of regional policies; the recentralisation of land management, and the 
province-leading-county administrative reform, which manifest an upward scaling of 
governance towards the regional scale; and the various regionalisation attempts 
undertaken by both central and local governments, which consist of urban 
administrative annexation and merger, building regional alliances and partnerships, 
and formulating regional plans. The disparate regional practices launched by different 
levels and divisions of government are conferred with various definitions of regions. 
The lack of unified divisions of regions in policy-making and the absence of a formal 
level of regional institution within the government structure make the governance 
landscape at the regional level widely divided between different policy areas and 
levels of governments.
The current development of regional governance in China is the outcome of economic 
development, political mobilisation and the state rescaling process. The development 
of the economy, i.e. the regionalisation of the economy accompanied by
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market-oriented economic reform, not only promotes economic links between the 
jurisdictions, but also creates the need for cooperation in areas such as waste, 
transport and environmental management owing to the agglomeration of economy and 
the population. Under the drive of practical demand, the development of regional 
governance is, in the meantime, strongly engineered by both the central and local 
government. Regional cooperation and collaborative development is promoted by the 
central government for the regional and national interest, for example, controlling 
rampant land development and environmental degradation, regional coordination and 
redundant development, industrial upgrading and economic safety. Due to the central 
austerity policy on land supply and the uncertain global manufacturing market after 
the 2008 global financial crisis, local government has also shown more interest in 
collaborative development. This is because local governments are pushed to seek an 
alternative service industry for economic growth, which inherently requires better 
connections in all respects. In other words, the rationales behind the top-down and 
bottom-up regional initiatives are different and incompatible. While the central 
government is pursuing integrated regional development from the perspective of 
overall national interest, the local government is merely joining in the regional 
cooperation based on local interests. The conflicts between national and local interests 
are very likely to lead to tensions in the implementation of regional programmes.
Compared with previous regional administrations, recent practices are based on 
flexible organisation rather than formal administration. For example, the recent
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top-down recentralisation initiative does not involve the establishment of a regional 
level of government body like that in the 1950s, but only the making of regional plans. 
That is, the central government is mainly deploying regional plans, policies or 
programmes to impose regional governance on territorial development. In contrast, 
local governments are drawing upon soft inter-municipal agreements to address 
concerns over cross-jurisdictional transport, human resource mobility, inter-city 
tourism, trade and logistics. Unfortunately, neither of the forms is fully 
institutionalised. Although the trend is to legitimise the regional plan per se,
institutions for the implementation of the plan are not yet established. On the other 
hand, lack of accountability and binding power is detrimental to the authority of 
spontaneous inter-locality association. As a result, the actual effectiveness of the 
top-down or bottom-up regional initiatives is in doubt. In the meantime, the 
persistence of the political environment, for example, the fiscal decentralisation, 
economy-dominated cadre evaluation system and rigid administrative hierarchy, 
altogether makes the top-down and the bottom-up regional practices more of a 
symbolic gesture. On the one hand, the decision-making system in China typically 
only involves the prefectural-level and the administration above, which is 
incompatible with the downscaling of governance towards counties, towns and 
districts. In other words, the regional consensus, if achieved, is only representative of 
a partial group of cities rather than all the jurisdictions in the region. The lack of open 
dialogue in the top-down and bottom-up regional practices impacts upon the 
legitimacy and consensus of the regional issue. On the other hand, the persistence of
economic growth targets and pressure also makes concepts such as environmental 
sustainability, which would entail regional cooperation, rhetoric than real. Especially 
among the local governments, interest is only shown towards collaboration in terms of 
transport, which is conceived to bring economic dividends, rather than other urgent 
issues such as trans-border lake and water management. Henceforth, the development 
of regional governance in China is in a rather preliminary stage.
The plethora of recent regional practices, although taken for their symbolic meanings, 
demonstrates the search of the various agents for an ‘institutional fix’ to competitive 
and entrepreneurial governance. In Western countries such as the UK, which are built 
upon the welfare state and political democracy, the scalar tension of the regional 
project typically revolves around the role of state, market and society. Moreover, the 
active engagement of society also expands the core issue of regional projects from 
economic development to sustainability, climate change, democracy, cultural identity 
and autonomy. In contrast, the scalar tension in the case of China is mainly manifested 
in the division of power and responsibility between levels of government. Struggles 
are witnessed over the potential power reshuffling between tiers of government i.e. 
either the recentralisation of central power on territorial development (the top-down 
regional initiative) or the remit of part of the local power to the regional level (the 
bottom-up regional initiative). As far as the present day is concerned, it seems 
inter-city association is more like an occasional tea party than a formalised 
organisation with multi-lateral agreements. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the
spontaneous regional organisation rests with the central government’s decision in 
China’s political system. Indeed, there is no sign to suggest that the central 
government is intending to confer any authority on the inter-city association. It seems 
that the central government aims to promote local coordination through the means of 
central-level coordination. That is, the politics of China is resurgent with tendencies 
of recentralisation. However, such recentralisation would be implicitly contested by 
the local governments, which would require the resolution of the national state.
To summarise, contemporary China is now experiencing a resurgence of regional 
policies and practices. However, the currently re-emerged regional initiatives are 
qualitatively different from the regional programmes in the socialist period. First of 
all, the current regional initiatives are led by both the central and local governments. 
Secondly, different from the socialist regional programmes which aimed to 
consolidate political regulation and a centrally-planned economy, the current regional 
practices are more complicated in the sense that projects with different leading actors 
are associated with different purposes. The centrally-led regional programmes address 
the land, environmental and economic problems caused by discretionary local 
development after economic decentralisation and entrepreneurial development. In 
contrast, the locally-initiated regional practices are intended to overcome the limits 
and transcend the growth ceiling of the economic model of individual development 
and manufacturing expansion. The two rationales are incompatible with each other in 
the sense that the central government, to some extent, privileges development quality
over extensive development, whereas the local governments are still committed to 
pro-growth motivation. Thirdly, distinguished from the regional programmes in the 
socialist period, which were imposed by the central government with a level of 
government between the centre and provinces, the contemporary regional practices 
are softly institutionalised and loosely organised. Finally, the coordinating role of 
either the centrally-orchestrated regional practices or the locally-initiated regional 
associations is extremely limited. Their capacity is hampered by the limited powers 
and resources of these institutions, the competing agendas between the central and 
local government, as well as between the central ministries, and the persisting 
institutional context of fiscal decentralisation and the cadre promotion system. Overall, 
the preceding account has shown that the emerging regional scale in China is still a 
fuzzy concept in reality. The regional scale building process is riddled with tensions 
and conflicts between central and local government over the division of power and 
responsibility.
8.2 Empirical and theoretical contribution
8.2.1 The significance of the YRD regional governance study
The recent practices in both of the PRD and YRD region have demonstrated the 
tendency towards a cooperative agenda. The construction of Guangzhou-Foshan 
high-speed railway (Liu et al., 2010), the initiative of building Pan-PRD inter-city
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association (Yeh and Xu, 2008) and the formulation of PRD regional plan (Xu, 2008) 
are all examples of ongoing regional cooperative development in the PRD region. 
Compared to the existing literature on the regional governance in the PRD region, the 
YRD region is relatively under-researched. This study suggests that the experiences 
between the YRD and PRD have some resemblance in terms of the bottom-up process 
of region-building. The tendency for the local government to promote regionalisation 
and regional cooperation is fostered by potential external competition and pursuit of 
regional competitiveness. The transformation from hostile competition to strategic 
cooperation seems to be the second wave of entrepreneurial policies, which is 
different from the previous urban entrepreneurialism and individual development. 
Meanwhile, the higher-level government such as the provincial government or the 
central government often plays an important backstage role in facilitating inter-city 
coalition or cross-administrative projects. That is, the hierarchical administrative 
power is able to mediate between multiple jurisdictions and helps to enforce certain 
consensus among the localities. Nevertheless, the politics in the PRD region-building 
also has some peculiarities. The original PRD region only constitutes a certain 
number of cities within the Guangdong province, which dose not involve 
cross-provincial barrier and as a result the provincial government could play a bigger 
role in mediating the disparate jurisdictions. In contrast, the recent pan-PRD region is 
far more complex and consists of six provinces and two special administrative units, 
Hong Kong and Macao, under the ‘One Country and Two System’ framework. In this 
case, the government structure in the pan-PRD region is much more complicated and
the spontaneously-initiated regional agenda often requires the consent of the 
authoritative central government. Therefore, although the rationale and motive 
underlying the regional cooperation in PRD and YRD seems similar, there are slight 
differences in their process of governance building. Since the YRD is a 
cross-provincial region within the mainland, its experiences are more typical of the 
other regions in mainland China.
On the other hand, the YRD region is believed to hold more value to the 
understanding of China’s emerging regional governance in that the YRD has 
witnessed independent initiatives taken by the central government to promote regional 
integrated development, in addition to the practices undertaken by the local 
government. The two separate processes going on in the YRD region help 
demonstrate the potential dissonance in current regional governance and institution 
building in China, i.e. the struggle between the central and the local government for 
control of regional space.
8.2.2 The outcomes and significance of emerging informal regional institutions in
China
The study of the YRD region demonstrates that there exists two ways of regional 
governance development in China, that is, the mechanism of top-down and bottom-up 
approach. The research findings have shown that the central government (the
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top-down approach) seems to be speedier than the local government (the bottom-up 
approach) in developing a form of regional governance. For example, it only took the 
central government five years to formulate and publish the YRD regional plan, 
whereas the regional association among local governments is still functioning as an 
informal coalition and does not possess any power. This is due to the fact that the 
central government still maintains strong vertical bureaucratic control in 
contemporary China. However, one of the surprises in the research findings is that the 
top-down administrative power is not as effective in implementation as it is in taking 
initiatives. This is because after the administrative and fiscal decentralisation, the 
central government has little leverage on local development and policies; neither did 
the central government create any incentive to stimulate local governments to follow 
the central arrangement. In contrast, even though it is difficult for the local 
governments to build a regional consensus, it could be more effective in carrying out 
certain regional agenda, if only the cross-administrative projects conform to practical 
needs and mutual benefits. Overall, even though China’s image is a much centralised 
country administered by the Central Communist Party, China’s regional governance 
development could not be simply enforced by the central government but requires the 
cooperation of the local governments.
Nevertheless, the great concern shown by the central government on regional issues is 
still of great significance even though it is symbolic. This is typical in China’s politics 
after economic reform, when the central government only sets the general direction
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and it is up to the localities to implement the central agenda under its own conditions. 
Overall, the emergence of informal regional institutions is of great significance for 
China’s future development. It marked a governance transformation away from the 
well-known and well-documented urban entrepreneurialism. The learning of 
coordination and cooperation is crucial for China to conquer the localism and 
competition brought about by decentralisation and entrepreneurialism after the 
economic reform.
8.2.3 The new state spaces in China
The new state space on the regional scale in China is still being formed. It is reflected 
by the regional policies and programmes launched by the local and central 
governments. The regional configuration and interpretation are differently 
manipulated by the central and local government in different policy areas. For 
example, the regional activities can be articulated at the mega-regional level covering 
several provinces, or at the district level which crosses administrative boundaries. In 
general, the regional definition is dependant upon the concerns of the initiators. The 
two main actors not only differ in terms of their conceptions of the ‘region’, but also 
collide in their rationales for region building. The central government is, to some 
extent, transforming its attitude to its previous decentralisation policies. The central 
government is reconsidering the benefits and shortcomings of administrative 
decentralisation and is trying to impose certain arrangements on the local
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development. However, on the other hand, the local government is still taking use of 
the regional cooperative strategies to pursue entrepreneurial development. The 
dissonance between the central and local government in regional building is further 
due to the incompatibility between the regional cooperation agenda and the prevailing 
political context in China. Even though the central government now starts promoting 
regional integrated development, the previous policies of fiscal decentralisation and 
economic-based cadre evaluation system have not been changed. What is even worse 
is that the central government is still mainly using the administrative mandate to build 
and deliver the overall regional development vision. The lack of dialogue and 
participation mechanism in the virtually decentralised governance landscape just 
undermines the prospect for coordinated development. Overall, the new state space in 
China is soft and fuzzy, and the rescaling of the statehood is far from established. This 
is not only due to the different interpretations by different actors for different purposes, 
but also owing to the ineffective institution building at the regional level and the 
porous governance management by the central and local government.
8.2.4 The economics and politics of the (city-) region
The ‘new regionalism’ argument is blamed for its straightforward causal link between 
economic regional space and political regionalism (e.g. Harrison, 2006; MacLeod, 
2001a). It is doubted, in that the region is not automatically an agent in political 
development (e.g. MacLeod, 2001b). However, it is also argued whether this means a
278
total debunk of economic factors in interpretations merely due to that reason (e.g. 
Harding, 2007). It is suggested that the political regional discourse in the UK in part 
derives from the economic perception of enlarging economic disparities, economic 
relational economy and economic competitiveness (e.g. MacLeod and Jones, 1999; 
Harding, 2007).
In the case of China, the economic factor has definitely played a role in the 
development of regional initiatives, which is related to China’s particular 
development background and development stage. China used to be ruled under a 
centralised economy, in which there were no natural economic flows. At the time, 
horizontal cooperation was imposed by the central government in a top-down fashion 
by the means of setting up an economic cooperation region. At the beginning of 
economic reform, economic cooperation was again promoted by the central 
government without real local economic regionalisation; the attempt ended in failure 
again. In contrast, the recent proliferation of cooperation initiatives is witnessed, 
along with the spread of regionalisation, where commuting, trade and logistics, 
tourism have become common occurrences. To a great extent, the need for mobility 
has triggered the local attempt to cooperate by setting up standardised customs and 
human resources systems and so forth to combat institutional fragmentation. On the 
other hand, the regionalisation and agglomeration of the economy have also 
engendered common regional problems, such as transport and environmental issues, 
which force neighbouring cities into thinking of each other as a region rather than
disparate entities. Furthermore, the improved regional transport triggered by 
regionalisation has further strengthened regional prospects. The closer relationship 
and emerging spatial division of labour in accordance with the market chain of value 
opens up a new dialogue of cooperation between local competition forces. Overall, 
the development of relational economic geography has played an indispensable role in 
the emergence of regional practices in China.
In contrast, the economic-political relationships in Chinese regional literature have 
moved too far towards the economic lens. Although the results show that economic 
development and regionalisation do increase the prospect for cooperation and 
coordination, they also demonstrate that political factors cannot be ignored. The trend 
towards regionalisation does not mean consensus has been reached on regionalism (c.f. 
Yeh and Xu, 2008: 409). The research findings demonstrate that the regional 
restructuring is decided by the influence of all the factors, for example, the economic, 
cultural and political processes, which need to be examined in a case-specific context.
8.2.5 The top-down and bottom-up mechanism in the building of new state
spatiality
The case of YRD demonstrates regional governance building as a phenomenon with 
both bottom-up and top-down dynamics. The top-down force is primarily represented 
through a set of changes at the central government level: regional policy and
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plan-making, land management rescaling and administrative restructuring. In a sense, 
this is just like ‘centrally orchestrated regionalism’ in the UK (Harrison, 2008). 
However, the tendency towards re-centralisation is undermined by decades of 
decentralisation since economic reform. As China’s political system is still dominated 
by fiscal decentralisation and top-down delegation of economic targets, the possibility 
of re-centralisation is severely challenged in reality. Additionally, top-down 
recentralisation is not the only source from which the regional scale arises. In contrast, 
there are ongoing spontaneous negotiations between the local states to reach regional 
agreement. Efforts have been taken to improve the segmented institutions between 
individual jurisdictions in terms of trade, human resources, transport and the like. This 
is intended to overcome fragmented jurisdictional administration and seize benefits 
from economic regionalisation. Distinct from the bottom-up approach in Western 
democratic society, the local efforts in China are led by local governments without 
much involvement from civil society. Agreements tend to be reached on the basis of 
specific projects rather than on overall regional prospects and strategy.
Even though constituted as the distinct aspects of the making of regions, the two 
mechanisms are independent processes and are not even compatible with each other. 
For the central government, the regional scale is constituted by the provincial units; it 
intends to use the provincial governments as the agents to implement central policies. 
This was initiated by the central ministries to cope with the problems caused by 
decentralisation. As to the local government, the regional scale is also constructed at
281
the provincial level, but more in rhetorical terms. The regional regime seems to be 
more feasible at and below prefectural-level. This is owing to a lack of substantial 
local engagement mechanisms in the complex regional institutional landscape. The 
local interest in building a regional scale is also different from that of central 
government. Regional cooperation is pursued by the local states to deal with the 
growth pressure on manufacturing in the current quicksilver global economic 
environment. All in all, the case of YRD demonstrates the diverse agents and politics 
through the scalar configuration, and the fuzzy and porous boundary of the region 
(Allmendinger and Haughton, 2009). In the case of the UK, this fuzzy space is used to 
insert new scales for intervention in accordance with the relational perception of 
regions, which is to break away from the rigid boundaries of formal regions and take 
the fluid and loose boundaries as openings for unexpected issues (ibid, 619, 631). 
That is, the loose space of a region is created on purpose to provide room to 
manoeuvre from the viewpoints of partnership, coordination and integration, i.e. 
‘governance’ from outside of the governments (ibid, 631). This is the result that actors 
of various scales and sectors from both within the government and outside the 
government seek in order to address market, state and governance failures (ibid). In 
contrast, the soft space of regions in China, on the one hand, results from the porous 
governance capacity of the central government, through which regional terrain is 
highly contested and battles are played out about the division of power and the power 
struggle between central and local governments. On the other hand, the fluid scale of 
the region is due to the opportunistic and entrepreneurial nature of local governments.
8.2.6 Beyond the grand political economy in conceptualising the production of
new state spatiality
Although Brenner (2002) acknowledges the plural nature of regional projects in 
reality, it seems the influential work by Brenner (2004a, b) is featured in 
neo-liberalisation under the general imperative of globalisation and competition. It is 
embedded in the interpretative framework of the generic structural shift of the state 
from a Keynesian welfare state to a Schumpeterian workfare state (Brenner, 2004a, b; 
Jessop, 1990). Although Brenner’s conceptualisation of regional development from 
the state-relational perspective is widely adopted, his framework of regional dynamics 
is argued to lead to a universal top-down mechanism and an abstract theory of 
globalisation, accumulation and crises of capitalism (c.f. MacLeod and Jones, 1999: 
578; Harding, 2007: 451; Oosterlynck, 2010: 1156-1157). It is argued that the political 
construction of the city-region can be driven by forces at the lower levels of scalar 
other than the global scale (McGuirk, 2007: 179). Globalisation may be turned into a 
symbolic discourse to cope with imagined or actual global pressures (e.g. Boudreau, 
2003). It is thereby suggested that the research agenda should be broadened from 
economic governance to categories such as the environment and sustainability, and 
that a bottom-up approach to social power should be incorporated (e.g. Ward and 
Jonas, 2004; Jonas and Ward, 2007).
The empirical study on China’s regional restructuring process resonates with the 
above criticism. The politics of the regional renaissance in China show that the central 
and local logics behind regional projects did not directly involve globalisation and the 
accumulation crisis, as framed under Western capitalism, but were responsive to 
China’s local politics; for example, land and decentralisation, and concerns over 
social management. To a great extent, ‘globalisation’ was used as a discourse by the 
government to justify their policy choices. The 2008 global financial crisis is not the 
source which led to the emergence of regional projects, which were beginning to 
emerge a long time before 2008. However, the 2008 crisis did act as a form of 
pressure and powerful discourse to strengthen and justify the process of 
regionalisation. Overall, the process of regional restructuring is not a pre-defined 
top-down process drifting from the global force. Vice versa, the global force was 
imagined and used as the discourse by the involved actors for their own ends.
However, this does not mean the genealogy of state regime shift (Brenner, 2004b) is 
totally useless. In the words of Jessop (1995), this shift was essentially ‘descriptive, 
synthetic and generalized’ and needs an explanation itself, for example, by delving 
into the ‘events that constitute these processes’ through the exploration of the 
articulation of actors and forces (cited in MacLeod and Jones, 1999: 581-82). The 
new state spaces framework issue can be otherwise resolved by an emphasis on the 
examination of the state agency, politics of scale and discourse employment (e.g. 
MacKinnon, 2010; Sonn, 2010; Varro, 2010). This is neither to absolutely abandon
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the paradigm shift, nor to take the state shift as prescribed. What is of most 
importance is to examine the on-the-ground process informed by the generic 
tendencies.
8.3 Limitations and future work
The study is trying to apply the new state space theory to understand the Chinese 
changing state spatiality, particularly the new tendency of regional governance 
development and the emerging regional state spaces in China. The research is mainly 
focused to employ a process-based approach to examine the building process of the 
emerging regional scale, which considers more ‘agency’, such as the role of local state 
and the other groups, in the politics of development. Although the research findings 
reveal that the regional state space building process is filled with different actors for 
different purposes, and hence it is conflict-ridden and full of uncertainties, the thesis 
is relatively weak in exploring the dissonance between the processes, the conflicts in 
the rescaling process and the politics of scale. For instance, in the case studies to 
examine the top-down and bottom-up processes, the research is primarily focused on 
acquiring the data of the main acting players behind the process, and didn’t manage to 
collect many direct resources to reflect the reactions of the other relevant actors. 
Based on the experiences and limitations of this study, the following topics and 
questions are considered to be worthy of further study in the sphere of China’s 
regional governance, which is still a relatively under-researched area.
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Firstly, the central government has been a key actor in launching the recent regional 
practices in China, which is remarkably different from the predominant attitude of 
decentralisation and ex-post state endorsement after the economic reform. However, 
the intention and implications of the central practices are still not very well researched. 
All the practices such as the new experiment of province-leading-county 
administrative reform, the launch of the main functional area policy are worthy of 
further exploration, apart from the case of formulation of regional spatial plans 
adopted in the thesis.
Secondly, the state rescaling process is worthy of further exploration from the 
perspective of discourse, spatial imaginaries and political mobilizations. The cultural 
political economy approach developed by Jessop (2005) and Sum and Jessop (2001) 
(Bristow, 2010: 29) could be adopted in future studies to further examine how state 
rescaling is carried out. Hegemonic projects, discourse and scales of 
representativeness and dependence (Cox, 1998; MacLeod, 1999) would be useful 
concepts with which to resume the study. For example, it seems both central and local 
governments make use of the discourse of ‘regional competitiveness’ to promote 
regional cooperation and coordination. However, the account of Chinese regional 
development demonstrates that the ‘regional competitiveness’ may function more in 
terms of discourse than as the real intention. It seems the central government employs 
the discourse of ‘regional competitiveness’ (or ‘national competitiveness’, which
actually is not much different) to justify its reassertion of power on the localities, 
whist local government is cooperating on a limited scope and scale under the 
imaginary ‘competitive region’ to attempt to benefit from inter-city collaboration. 
Beyond an echo to the overseas scholars’ critical reflections on the discourse of 
‘regional competitiveness’ (e.g. Bristow, 2010; Lagendijk, 2007), the examination on 
the use of discourse and the substance of making of regions can add a more 
sophisticated understanding on the nature of the current regional-building and state 
rescaling.
Thirdly, the study into the conflicts between different actors in each regional project, 
the incompatible rationales within different regional projects led by the same agent, 
and the struggles between practices led by different actors will contribute to the 
understanding on the tensions characterising the scale-building process, and the 
hybrid and inconsistent nature of the attempts of regional state space development in 
China.
Finally, based on the research findings of chapter five, it seems just the time to study 
the longitudinal transformation of the regional economy, uneven development, and 
labour division in China, particularly in China’s three big regions, i.e. the Yangtze 
River Delta, the Pearl River Delta and the Jing-Jin-Ji region. It is believed that these 
three hubs along the coast are currently transformed from being the sites of extended 
manufacturing development to functional nodes of regions. The research on China’s
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development of regions contributes to poly-centric city-region study based on Western 
experiences. On the other hand, the study would contribute to the understanding of 
uneven development and governance in China. Even though intensive studies have 
concentrated on regional inequalities in China, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
analysis at that time was strongly influenced by neo-classical economics and is 
therefore poorly related to the perspective of governance, state and the political 
economy. The studies mainly examine diverging or converging regional inequality 
before and after economic reform, based on regional, provincial or prefecture-level 
units. The ignorance of county and district units indicates the absence of the 
perspective of governance in the previous analysis. It is argued that only when 
informed with the approach of the political economy could the nature of uneven 
development and regional policies in China be unpacked, reflected and critically 
examined.
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A p p e n d ix  1
s e m i-s t r u C t u r e d  in t e r v ie w  Q u e s t io n s
Case study 1: Shanghai-Jiangsu cross-border area 
On the side of Huaqiao, Kunshan:
Theory Question 1: What are the conditions that led to local collaboration?
(la) How is the previously planned industrial belt proceeding?
(lb) Under what circumstances was the Huaqiao project proposed?
(lc) What is the relationship with the previously planned industrial belt along the 
area adjacent to Shanghai?
Theory Question 2: How is the project articulated?
(2a) Who decided the location of the Huaqiao project?
(2b) What is the strategic positioning of the Huaqiao project? Who decided this? 
(2c) How is the project funded?
Theory Question 3: How is the collaboration proceeding now? To what extent has 
regional governance developed?
(3a) How is the negotiation to extend the Moyu stop in Shanghai to Huaqiao 
progressing?
(3b) What is the major issue in the negotiation?
(3c) What difficulties have been encountered in terms of the implementation?
On the side of Anting, Shanghai:
Theory Question 1: What are the conditions that led to local collaboration?
(la) How has Anting developed over the years?
(lb) Why has Anting recently adopted a new strategy of cooperative development 
with Huaqiao, Kunshan?
(lc) Why hasn’t the strategy been considered before? Why now?
Theory Question 2: How is the project articulated?
(2a) What are the actions following the strategy?
(2b) Who is involved in these exercises?
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Theory Question 3: How is the collaboration progressing now? To what extent has 
regional governance developed?
(3a) On what areas is the collaborative development currently focused?
(3b) What difficulties have been encountered in the collaborative development 
with Kunshan?
Case study 2: YRD regional plan
Theory Question 1: What is the ministries’ rationale with regard to formulating YRD 
regional plans?
(la) Under what circumstances was the YRD regional plan initiated?
(lb) Who was involved in the regional plan proposal?
(lc) What are the differences between the current plan and the former urban 
system plan (Five-year Plan)?
(Id) What is the priority of the current regional plan?
Theory Question 2: How is the project articulated? What politics are exposed in the 
process?
(2a) How was the planning preparation arranged?
(2b) Who was involved in the preparation of the regional plan?
(2c) How was the project funded?
(2d) What was the attitude of levels of government during the preparation of the 
plan? In which area are they mostly interested? With which elements are they 
dissatisfied?
Theory Question 3: How is the regional plan functioning now? To what extent has 
regional governance developed?
(3a) Has the plan attained legal status?
(3b) What does legal status mean to the plan?
(3c) How is the plan designed to be implemented?
(3d) What are the anticipated difficulties in implementation? What has caused 
these problems?
(3e) Have the contradictions between different regional plans posed any threat to 
implementation?
(3f) Is there any intention to improve the coordination between different regional 
plans? What is the major difficulty with the current efforts?
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A p p e n d ix  2
l is t o f  in t e r v ie w e e s
Role
Academic in the Nanjing University
Academic in the Nanjing Institute of 
Geography and Limnology of Chinese 
Academy of Sciences
Chief of the Regional Division of 
Nanjing Economic Coordination Office
Chief of the Regional Economic 
Division of Nanjing Development and 
Reform Committee
Academic in the Nanjing Institute of 
Geography and Limnology of Chinese 
Academy of Sciences
Academic in the Nanjing University
Chief in the Jiangsu Construction 
Commission
Chief in the Nanjing Development and 
Reform Committee
Date
11 February 2009
12 February 2009
16 February 2009
16 February 2009
17 February 2009
18 February 2009 
23 February 2009
17 March 2009
Academic in the East China Normal 18 March 2009
University
Planner in Chinese Academy of Urban 
Planning and Design
Planner in Shanghai Planning Institute
Planning official of Huaqiao Planning 
Bureau in Kunshan
Planning official of Kunshan Planning 
Bureau
Planner in Chinese Academy of Urban 
Planning and Design
Senior planner in Shanghai Planning 
Institute
Academic in the Nanjing Institute of 
Geography and Limnology of Chinese 
Academy of Sciences
Academic in the Nanjing University
Director of a major planning academy
Academic in a leading planning school
Academic in the Nanjing University
Chief planner in the Suzhou Planning 
Bureau
25 February 2010
25 February 2010 
3 March 2010
5 March 2010
9 March 2010
10 March 2010
11 March 2010
12 March 2010 
17 March 2010 
19 March 2010 
19 March 2010 
22 March 2010
Director in the Jiading Planning Bureau 
in Shanghai
Academic in the Nanjing Institute of 
Geography and Limnology of Chinese 
Academy of Sciences
Chief planner of a major planning 
academy
Academic in Tsing-Hua University
Senior planner in Chinese Academy of 
Urban Planning and Design
Senior planner in Chinese Academy of 
Urban Planning and Design
Official in Ministry of Housing and 
Urban and Rural Development
Planner in Chinese Academy of Urban 
Planning and Design
Senior planning official in Kunshan 
Planning Bureau
Official in Jiading Industiral District
Research fellow in Shanghai Social 
Science Institute
25 March 2010
26 March 2010
30 March 2010
31 March 2010 
2 April 2010
6 April 2010
6 April 2010
8 April 2010
14 April 2010
15 April 2010 
19 April 2010
33 Official in Anting government in 20 April 2010
Jiading District in Shanghai
34 Planner in Shanghai Planning Institute 20 April 2010
35 Planner in Shanghai Planning Institute 20 April 2010
36 Planner in Shanghai Planning Institute 20 April 2010
37 General manager of Anting 21 April 2010
International Auto-city and New Anting 
United Development Corporation
38 Academic in the East China Normal 21 April 2010
University
39 Academic in Tongji University 22 April 2010
40 Official in Jiading Planning Bureau of 22 April 2010
Shanghai
41 Chief planner in Jiading Planning 22 April 2010
Institute
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